University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

12-1975

Sources of Political Instability and Stability in Iran, 1779-1973
Ahmad Pishva
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Pishva, Ahmad, "Sources of Political Instability and Stability in Iran, 1779-1973. " Master's Thesis,
University of Tennessee, 1975.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4205

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ahmad Pishva entitled "Sources of Political
Instability and Stability in Iran, 1779-1973." I have examined the final electronic copy of this
thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.
Gill C. Evans, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
T. Alexander Smith, Harry M. Lindquist
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ahmad
Pishva entitled "Sources of Political Instability and
Stability in Iran, 1779-1973." I recommend that it be
accepted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of
Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Gill C. Evans, Major Professor

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

SOURCES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND STABILITY
IN IRAN, 1779-1973

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts
Degree
rhe University of Tennessee

Ahmad Pishva
December 1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is grateful to Dr. Gill C. Evans for his
invaluable guidance and his very constructive suggestions
in the preparation of this thesis.
Th� author expresses his appreciation to Dre Te Alexander
Smith and Dre Harry Me Lindquist for the academic
encouragement which they have provided throughout the
author's undergraduate and graduate careers.

ii

ABSTRACT
The purpose o� this study was to define anq examine the
main sources of political instability and stability which
existed in Iran between 1779 and 1973.

The magnitude of the

political, social, and economic changes in Iran during this
period fostered an atmosphere in which the elements of both
instability and stability prevailed.

The study dealt with four distinct political periods9
The first period examined was that of the Qajar Dynasty
(1779-1925).

The second period dealt with was the

modernization of Iran under Reza Shah (1926-1941)

9

The third

period discussed was the early segment of the reign of
Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1953).

The fourth period covered

was the strengthened rule of Mohammad Reza Shah (1953-1973)

a

The concluding segment of this study summarized the principal
sources of political instability and stability in Iran which
prevailed during the aforementioned periods.

The conclusion

also examined the theory of leadership in relation to the
Shah of Iran�

It was found that all of the political periods examined

in this study exhibited a combination of the elements of

political instability and stability, with the exception of
the period between 1963 and 1973, which was a truly stable
period.
iii

iv
It was the conclusion of this thesis that the period
between 1963 and 1973 was the only period in which signs of
permanent political stability were exhibited.

The

stabilization of the political arena in this period was
achieved as a result of the viable leadership of
Mohammad Reza Shah, and his implementation of the reforms
of the "White Revolution. "

•
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis will define and analyze the principal.
sources of political instability and stability which
prevailed during the various periods of Iranian political
history from 1779 to 1973.

In defining political stability,

it is appropriate to examine the concept within each distinct
political setting,. for it would be impractical to give a
general definition which would apply to all countries.

In

the case of Iran, the lack of one or more of the following
characteristics resulted in a certain degree of political
instability: viable leadership to which the majority of the
population defers, economic solvency, internal security, and
internationally respected sovereignty.

On the other hand,

the presence of a combination of these traits created a
degree of stability.
The thesis will be divided into four main chapters and
a concluding chapter.

The first chapter will cover the

period from 1779 to 1925, which encompasses the rise and

fall of the Qajar Dynasty and the establishment of the
Pahlavi Dynasty.

The second chapter will deal with the

period from 1926 to 1941, focusing on the modernization of
the country under Reza Shah.

The effects of World War II upon

Iran and the events which·led to the abdication of Reza Shah
1

2

will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

The

third chapter will concentrate on the post-World War II
period from 1941 to 1953.

This chapter will discuss the

continued occupation of Iran by the Allied forces, the
separatist movements in the country, the rise and fall of
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and the reassertion of
the nation's support for Mohammad Reza Shah.

The fourth

chapter will focus on the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah from
1953. to 1973.

The first part of this chapter will discuss

the ways by which the Shah strengthened his rule between 1953
and 1962.

The second part of the chapter will present the

decade of the "White Revolution, " 1963-1973, concentrating
on the reforms referred to as· the "White Revolution" or "The
Revolution of the Shah and the People, " and their effects

upon the political, social, and economic structures of Iran.
The concluding chapter will first summarize the sources of
instability and those of stability which prevailed in Iran
during the periods discussed in the thesis.

The major part

of the conclusion will be devoted to the discussion of

leadership as applied to the present leader of Iran.

CHAPTER I
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE QAJAR DYNASTY,
1779-1925
The Qajars were a Turkish tribe whose campaigns of
conquest emanated from the southeastern sector of the
Caspian Sea, and culminated in the conquest of the Persian
Empire.

The Qajar Dynasty was established as the ruling

family of Iran by Aga Mohammad Khan in 1779.

The first

Qajar rulers employed force and terror in establishing
control over the country.

Moreover, the founders of the

Qajar Dynasty were determined to institute a strong central
government based upon an absolute monarchy as a central force
capable of maintaining control throughout Iran.

The early

Qajar rulers established the capital in the centrally located
city of Tehran, for it provided access to the·other regions

of the country.

Along with their initial determination to

establish a strong central government and exercise effective
control over the country, the founders of the Qajar Dynasty

proposed other goals, among them defining the boundaries of
Iran, requiring all regions of Iran to finance the central
capital, employing more foreign advisors, and maintaining the
clergy as intermediaries between the Qajar Throne and the

3

people, thereby gaining support for the T�rone, because the

4

people respected the advice and authority of the clergy. 1
In the early years of the Qajar period, the regime

efficiently pursued these goals.

With the pass�ge of time

the Qajar rulers weakened, for, by the beginning of the
third regime, that of Mohammad Shah (who reigned 1834-1848),
the rule of the Qajars had begun to decline.

Following the

initial reign of terror of the founders of the Qajar Dynasty,
the strength.of the central government ebbed, and the country

reverted to autonomous regions ruled by regional chiefs.

Although the founders of the Qajar Dynasty had acted to
establish a strong central government in Iran, subsequent
Qajar regimes were unable to maintain an effective rule over
Iran; thus, the Qajar Dynasty suffered a progressive
deterioration.

In this regard, an analysis of the fac�ors

contributing to the progressive decline of the Qajar Dynasty,
particularly from the latter part of the nineteenth century

onward, is appropriate, for such·a review will explain the

conditions which permitted the rise to power of Reza Khan
and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty.

The deterioration of the Qajar's ability to control and

rule the country was rela·ted to the decay of the moral

1Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965),
pp. 26-27.
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structure of the Throne, for the Qajar rulers became
increasingly preoccupied with their own comfort and leisure e
The financially depleted Throne began a practice of relying
upon methods of acquiring personal revenue which were
injurious to Iran, economically and politically.

For example,

the Qajar rulers sold concessions to foreign powers for
unequal returns to Iran; that is, the Qajars sold the natural
wealth of Iran, such as minerals and the fisheries of the
Caspian Sea, to concessionaires for less than the value of
the concession, and the royalties which Iran received were
relatively small.

The Qajars sold the concessions for

unequal returns to Iran because they wanted funds for their
own use and they were willing to make quick sales for ready
2
.
.
payrnent by prospect.ive concessionaires.
While the deterioration of the Qajar administration
was a continuing trend, by 1848 reforms were attempted by
Mirza Taqi Khan, Arnir-e Kabir (Great Amir), the Prime
Minister under Naser al-Din Shah (the fourth Qajar king, who

reigned 1848-1896).

Mirza Taqi Khan attempted to suppress

regional tribal revolts, to reorganize the armed forces, to
restrain the influence of the clergy in politics, and to
revive the strength of the Throne.

In addition, Mirza Taqi

Khan sought to reduce the interference by foreign legations,
2 Ibid. , p. 90.

particularly Britain and Russia. 3

6
Due to his eagerness for

reforms, and his prominence, Mirza Taqi Khan was envied by a
number of the Shah's councilors who, in their envy, falsely
reported that Mirza Taqi Khan intended to build up his own

position and eventually eliminate t�e Shah.

The suspicion

aroused by the councilors caused Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir-e
Kabir, to be dismissed in 1851, and in 1852 he was executed.
Following the death of Mirza Taqi Khan reforms ceased.

The

strength of the Throne declined, while the Qajars increasingly
relied upon foreign enterprise for revenue, thereby causing
an increasing amount of damage to Iran, economically, because
the natural wealth of Iran was being squandered in foreign
concessions, and politically, because foreign interference
in Iran weakened the country's independence. 4
One of the factors contributing to the decline of the
Qajar Dynasty was its inability to unify the nation,
especially in terms of inspiring loyalty to the central
government.

The power of the central government waned, and

as it did so, the various regions of the country ignored the

authority of the central government and established their own
rule under regional chiefs.

During the declining era of the

Qajars, the absence of an effective centralization of power
increasingly injured the position of the Throne.
3 Ibid. , p. 51.

While it

4Avery, Modern Iran, p. 67.
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is true that the Qajars were· unable to unify Iran, the
apparent disunity of the country was characteristic of Iran,
for Iran was composed of a plural society which lacked a
true unifying force.

The plural society of Iran consisted

of a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups whose
differences, in accord with regionalism and conflicting
group interests, contributed to the disunity of the country e
Thus, "disunity is a marked tendency in Iranian politics e " S
Moreover, especially regarding Iran, "no national government
can be regarded as stable in the absence of a reasonable
degree of national unity. 11 6

In the past, a sense of national

unity arose in Iran only when there was an overwhelming
issue which was felt throughout the entire country, or when
a strong leader inspired a sense of national unity.
Another factor contributing to the decline of the Qajar
administration was the expansive size of Iran, for this added
to the disunity of the country and to the Qajar's difficulty
in controlling the realm.

The great size of the country as

well as poor communications seriously limited the control

which the central government was able to maintain over the
provinces.

Such conditions were conducive to tribal

upheavals and raids, for the weakened central government was
unable to control tribal activities.
5rbid. , p. 210.
6Joseph M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 35.

8

In essence, the Qajars were confronted with a realm in
which a sense of unity would have been difficult to bring
about due to the variety of ethnic and linguistic types, the
expansive size of the country, and poor conununications.
Consequently, the sense of disunity prevailed throughout
Iran.

Moreover, the inability of the Qajar rulers to exert

control over the various regions of the country, especially
regions of tribal trouble, was a major factor contributing
to internal insecurity.
Other factors contributing to the decline of the Qajar
Dynasty were predominantly weaknesses related to the
disorganization of the Qajar administration.

The Qajars

were not concerned with introducing proper administrative
organization due to their own lack of knowledge of
administrative matters and lack of interest in improving
Iran.

The Qajar administration was arbitrary, and

administrative positions were occupied by Qajar family
members who often flouted the authority of the Shah, at times
by retaining revenue due to the Crown.?

Many of the Qajar

family members regarded their positions as means of
accumulating wealth, rather than as positions of responsi
bility to the central government and to the people.

The

Qajar administration was disorganized and functionally chaotic ..
7

Avery, Modern Iran, p. 24.

9

While administrative chaos was characteristic of the
Qajar period, fear, suspicion, and secrecy prevailed in the
Qajar Court and society.

During the Qajar period the system

of spy-police was instituted in the cities, and at times,
village landlords and others were forced to act as
informants.8 The people lived under conditions of oppression,
and their economic and social conditions progressively
worsened during the Qajar period.
The oppressed people turned to the clergy, who exerted
influence over the people and political decisions.

At times

the clergy exerted influence upon the ruling class and the
common people; for example, the 1820s was a period during
which the clergy manipulated the emotions of the masses and
influenced the decisions of the rulers. 9 During the period
1848-1851, Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir-e Kabir, attempted to reduce
the interference of the clergy in political matters; however,
the execution of Mirza Taqi Khan allowed the clergy to resume
their interference.

While both the Qajar Court and the

clergy were politically reactionary, from the 18 50s onward
there was a struggle for political influence between the two
elements.
Another factor contributing to the weakness of the
Qajar administration was the lack of a national unified
8rbid., p. 112.

9rbid., p. 44.

10
army.

Considering the size of Iran and the inadequate

communications, a national army was needed to control the
provinces, especially to control the tribal groupse

During

the Qajar period there was no effective centralization of
military power.

The armed forces consisted of separate

units: the regular army (Nizam), the Persian Cossack Brigade,
the Gendarroerie, and the South Persian Rifles.

In addition

to being composed of separate entities, the armed units were
also under different leadership; that is, the Persian Cossack
Brigade was under Russian leadership, the Gendarmerie under
Swedish officers, and the South Persian Rifles under British
influence.

Of the four units, only the Nizam, the regular

army, was effectively an Iranian force.

However, the Nizam

unit was disorganized and ill-equipped, and the loyalty of
'
'
.
Kab'ir,
its
troops was unre1'iable. lO Mirza
Taqi' Khan, Amir-e
had attempted to reform the organization and supply of the
armed forces, but the attempt was not successful, and little
change was brought about in the organization and
effectiveness of the armed forces.

Moreover, despite

attempted reforms in payment and supply of the armed units,

during the Qajar period no attempts were made to organize
a unified national army.
lOibid. , p. 79.

In view of the disunity prevalent during the Qajar

11

period, the lack of .a.national army capable of maintaining
nationwide·control, intensified the internal insecurity in
the countrye

In addition, the chaos resulting from the

disorganized Qajar administration was an element of
instability.
Of the various factors which contributed to the
disintegration of the Qajar period, foreign intervention is
often referred to as a major crippling element.

In view of

such an observation, the actual role of foreign powers in
Qajar Iran must be analyzed in terms of the possible
contribution of the foreign powers to instability and/or
stability during the Qajar period e
Prior to the eighteenth century, Iran had been of
interest to foreign states, mainly in terms of trade and
travel.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

Iran was of political interest primarily to France, Britain,
and Russiae

Western political interest in Iran had become

apparent in 1807 with Napoleon's proposal that Iran join
the reduc t·ion of
Franee agains
. t Bri"tain
' '
in Ind'ia. ll W'th
i

France's political aspirations in. Iran, Britain and Russia
held prime interest in Iran.

Britain's early interests in

Iran lay in the use of Iran as a lifeline to India; however,
Britain soon recognized the economic and political value of
11william S. Hass, Iran (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1946; rpte New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. 144.

12

Iran itself.

Russian interests toward Iran.centered

primarily around strategic concerns, economic interests, and

warm water ports. 12

The interests of these two powers in

Iran varied from time to time.

Of major importance, however,

is the fact that Britain and Russia were political and
economic rivals vis-a-vis Iran, and the effects of this
great power rivalry upon Iran ought to be considered.
In view of the fact that both Britain and Russia had
interests in Iran, neither power could dare to establish
overt control over Iran or to make Iran a colony without
irritating the other power and chancing the outbreak of a
war.

Thus, it may be said that during the nineteenth

century, a period of colonization in Asia and Africa, Iran's

independence was maintained due to a balanced rivalry which
existed between Britain and Russia�

In this respect, at

least, British and Russian operations in Iran may be viewed
as beneficial to Iran's independent status.13
Britain and Russia competed for economic concessions as

well as political privileges in Iran.

The competition

between them was possible because of the disorganization and

12Tareq Y. Ismael, Governments and Politics of the
Contemporary Middle East (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press,
1970), p. 155.,
13 Richard w. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 158.

13
decay of the Qajar administration.

The Qajar rulers were

concerned primarily with acquiring personal funds; therefore,
borrowing from foreign powers and selling concessions
provided ready funds for the Qajars to squander upon their
personal pleasure and leisure.

Indeed, it was not the

British and Russian powers and concessionaires who brought
about the deterioration of the conditions of Iran, politically
and economically, during the Qajar period.

On the contrary,

the existing weakness and disintegrating conditions under
the Qajar rulers allowed the foreign powers to step in and
take advantage of Iran.

Duri�g the Qajar period, the Qajar

rulers proposed that allowing Europeans to explore Iran for
prospective economic projects would bring wealth to the
Iranians.

The contracts granted for the concessions,

however, exemplified the reckless shortsightedness of the
Qajar rulers, for the concessions provided unequal returns
Moreover, the returns which Iran did receive were
squandered by the QaJars. 14 Unequal contract conditions were
for Iran.

I

apparent in the oil concession granted to the British, the

Caspian fishing concession granted to the Russians, and a

tobacco concession granted to a British firm; indeed, the

tobacco concession caused such riotious reactions from those

14T. Cuyler Young, "The Problem of Westernization in
Modern Iran, " Middle East Journal, II (January, 1948), 50.

14
in the Iranian tobacco industry, and from the Iranian public,
that the concession was withdrawn. 15
British and Russian interests involved various facets
of Iran's economy, such as banks and trade, as well as the
establishment of capitulation rights.

Indeed, the system of

capitulations, by which foreign nationals residing in Iran
were immune from Iranian jurisdiction and were subject to
the judiciary process of their respective nations through
their consulates in Iran, gave the foreign powers an
advantage, for they could easily acquit their nationals who
had committed crimes in Iran.

In addition, the practice
slighted the integrity of Iran's sovereignty. 16 The British

and Russians were interested in controlling Iran's natural
resources and the country's foreign trade.

Indeed, as the

Qajar rulers continued granting concessions, a greater
portion of Iran's economic resources came under foreign
control; however, the Qajars were unconcerned about the
political and economic implications of their actions.

The

seriousness of the situation w�s exemplified by the fact

that by 1906 Russia largely controlled, and received revenue:
from, Iran's customs administration, for this was granted to
15Alessandro Bausani, The Persians, trans. J. B. Donne
{New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 169.
16 Ismael, Governments and Politics of the Contemporary
Middle East, p. l55.
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Russia in return for a large loan which Russia had provided
for Mozaffar al-Din Shah (fifth Qajar king, who reigned
1896-1907) •17
In addition to dominating Iran's economic resources,
the foreign powers possessed great influence in the political
sphere, for Britain and Russia easily manipulated Iranians
in strategic ministries, such that particular interests of
the foreign powers were served.

In this regard, Britons and

Russians would offer compensation to ministers for assuring
the adoption of policies which favored the respective
interests of Britain and Russia.

The nature of certain

agreements also favored the interests of the foreign powers.
For example, in the 1828 Treaty of Turkomanchai between
Russia and Iran, Russia received all of the Caucasus; Iran
surrendered its claim to Armenia, and the Araxes River was
established as Iran's northwestern boundary with Russia; and
the system of capitulations was forced upon Iran. 18
Considering the preponderance of British and Russian

influence in Iran by the end of the nineteenth century, it

appeared that the sovereignty of Iran was weakening.

Such a

weakening of Iran's position, however, was the result of the
17cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 161.
18 Ismael, Gov�rnments and Politics of the Contemporary
Middle East, p. Iss.

16
internal decay of the Qajar administration.

The foreign

powers exerted pressure upon Iran and took advantage of the
economic prospects in the country.

The central issue,

however, was that disorganization and disintegration in the
Qajar administration, and the political chaos throughout
Iran, allowed the foreign powers to exploit the economic
resources and to accumulate concessions and privileges to
the point that foreign influence predominated in the
political and economic spheres during the late Qajar period.
The declining position of Qajar Iran disturbed groups
of Iranian nationalists composed of intellectuals, merchants,
and members of the clergy.

These nationalists objected to

the activities which were ruining Iran and enriching foreign
powers.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Iranian

nationalism was on the rise.

The nationalists were concerned

about the unfavorable effects which the administrative
disintegration and foreign intervention had upon the
situation of their own group.

For example, the clergy and

merchants were adversely affected by the Qajar's granting

concessions, such as that of granting state customs revenues

to Russia, and the intellectuals were disturbed from an
ideological viewpoint. 19 More importantly, the intellectuals,
merchants, and members of the clergy, as nationalists, also
19cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 14.

held a common goal: the establishment of a constitutional

17

monarchy by which they hoped to eliminate the absolutism and
disorganization of the Qajar rulers.

The nationalists

reasoned that by curtailing the absolutism of the Qajar
Throne, it would be possible to prohibit further foreign
. tervent'ion. 20 This belief was held because it was the
in
Qajar rulers who allowed the foreign powers to acquire such
influence and interests in Iran.

Furthermore, according to

the nationalists, ridding the country of foreign intervention
would allow the development of Iran for the benefit of
Iranians.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
constitutional movement was active.

In their struggle for

the granting of a constitution, the Iranian nationalists
turned to Britain for support.

Requesting such support from

Britain did not conflict with the goals of the nationalists,
for the request did not suggest that the nationalists were
·
21 Indeed, the
'
'
intervention.
·
to approve of foreign
wi· 11ing
Iranian nationalists sought British support because, to

them, the British represented the personification of liberal
democracy; therefore, it was logical to assume that the
British would support the implementation of a liberal
20J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 268.
21cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 162.

18
democratic ideology, along with the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy in Iran.
The Iranian nationalists envisioned the British as being
an "ideological messiah. 11 22

Such a viewpoint was revealed

in period propaganda, such as a statement made in 1901 in the
liberal nationalist newspaper, Hahl al-Matin:
Most of the state:smen of the world who have
studied political science and have written books
on the subject have concluded that the best form
of government is one founded upon the same princi
ples as is the government of England. 23
Just as the Iranian nationalists sought British support,
they detested Russia, for Russia represented despotism.
Furthermore, the nationalists believed that the Qajar Throne
and Royal Court were under Russian influence.

In essence,

the distinction which the Iranian nationalists made between
the British and Russian ideologies was an oversimplification,
based upon the nationalists' naive belief that "liberal
democracy was good and was personified by the British
government; absolute monarchy was bad and was personified by

Russia. 11 24

The oversimplified beliefs of the Iranian nationalists

distorted their perception of British and Russian reactions
cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 162-63. ·
23
Habl al-Matin [n. p. ], May 2 5, 1901, cited by Cottam,
Nationalism in Iran, p. 162.
22

24

Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 163.
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to the constitutional movement in Iran.

In this regard, it

was naive of the Iranian nationalists to assume that Britain
would support the constitutionalists simply on the basis of
their mutual belief in the ideology of democracy.

The

British were not particularly concerned about the form of
Iran's government; they were concerned, however, with
Britain's national interests.

During the period of the

Iranian constitutional movement, the British regarded
internal stability in Iran as important to Britain's national
interest, for the British believed that internal stability
in Iran was essential for safeguarding British political and
economic interests in Iran.

In this regard, as it appeared

that the granting of a constitutional monarchy would foster
internal stability in Iran, Britain favored the constitutional
movement.
The Russians also favored the granting of a constitution
in Iran.

The Russians regarded such a move as one which

would tend to bring about internal stability i.n Iran, and the
Russians felt, as did the British, that internal stability

in Iran was vital to the preservation of their political and
economic interests in the country.

Indeed, both the British

and Russian legations recognized the danger which the
disorganization of the Qajar Court presented to stability in
Iran, and both legations favored the reforms promised by the
implementation of a constitution.

In this regard, the

British and Russian Ministers urged the Shah to grant a

25
'
const·t
1 ution.

20

Regarding the subject of the Iranian

constitutional movement, the �ritish and Russians may have
differed in some respects, but they were "differences of
degree and not of kind. 11 2 6
Despite obstacles which the nationalists had to

overcome, a constitution was granted by Mozaffar al-Din ·shah
(fifth Qajar king, who reigned 189 6 -1907) on August 5, 190 6 .
Among other provisions, the constitution provided for a
national representative assembly (the Majlis), as well as a
secular legal system and civil courts, under the Fundamental
Law of 190 6 . 27
The mere granting of the constitution did not remedy the
disintegrating conditions of the Qajar administration,
however, as had been hoped by the Iranian nationalists, as
well as the British and Russians.

Indeed, opposition to the

constitution continued on the part of the Qajar Court and
other reactionaries.

The Qajars did not support the

constitution, nor did they intend to implement the promised

reforms. Regarding Britain and Russia, their main concern

was for internal stability to prevail in Iran, and the

constant struggle between the Qajars and the nationalists
25Ibid.

27

26

Ibid.

Arnin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, . 1921-1941
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 19 6 1),
p. 6 9 ·•
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perpetuated the unstable situation which Britain and Russia
wished to settle in protecting their own interests in Iran.
At t�e same time, Britain and Russia were concerned
with matters in Europe, especially Germany's activities
during the first decade of the twentieth century.

In order

to attend to their European concerns, Britain and Russia
decided to minimize their rivalry outside Europe.

With this

intention, Britain and Russia concluded an agreement in 1907,
the Anglo-Russian Agreement, by which, without the consent
of Iran, Iran was divided into spheres of influence.

The

northern section of Iran was to be under Russia's influence,
the southern section under Britain's influence, and there
was to be a buffer zone between the two sections. 28 An
important aspect of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, one which
limited Iran's autonomy, was that Britain and Russia were to
maintain internal security in their respective spheres of
influence, particularly in terms of tribal activities by
suppressing tribal raids and revolts.

In this regard, the

two powers contributed to internal stability in their

respective spheres of influence, which was important to the
operation of their interests. 29

28Bausani,
. The Persians,
p. 171.
,
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The Anglo-Russian Agreement irritated the Iranian
nationalists.

The nationalists were not surprised by such

an action by Russia, for they had always distrusted Russia.
Britain's role in the Agreement, however, shattered the
idealistic image which the Iranian nationalists had
previously held toward Britain.

The Iranian nationalists

felt that, while democracy prevailed in Britain, the British
acted hypocritically toward others.

Moreover, the

nationalists believed that Britain took part in the Agreement

because the British were more concerned about relations with
Russia than with the political structure of Iran.

Thus, the

Iranian nationalists replaced the myth of Britain as an
"ideological messiah" with the belief that Britain was
. . l. 30 Britain's purpose, however, had not been to
hypocr1t1ca

support any given ideology, but to guard British interests
and to contribute to stability in Iran.

A representative of

the British foreign office proclaimed to Iranians that the
Anglo-Russian Agreement would help guarantee Iran's

independence, for it would eliminate Anglo-Russian rivalry
in Iran; however, the Iranian nationalists feared that

Britain and Russia would actually move to partition Iran. 31
During the aftermath of the constitutional movement,

Britain and Russia maintained their hope that the
3oibid. , p. 165.

31 I b'1 d .

,
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implementation of the constitution would bring about
stability in Iran.

However, Mohammad Ali Shah (sixth Qajar

king, who reigned 1907-1909) did not support the constitution
and the nationalists' struggle continued.

In 1908

Mohammad Ali Shah initiated an attack on the Majlis building,
and at that point, with the aid of the Persian Cossacks led
by a Russian Colonel, the nationalists were temporarily
defeated. 32 According to Iranian nationalists, such action
represented Russian interference against the nationalists,
despite Russian claims of noninvolvement.
While Britain and Russia both favored the implementation
of the constitution as a means of instituting greater
internal stability in Iran, in April, 1909 Britain rejected
Russia's suggestion that both powers exert greater pressure
upon Mohammad Ali Shah in convincing him to comply with the
constitution.

Apparently the British believed that in the

event that the Shah disregarded British and Russian pressures,
the two powers would need to depose the Shah in order to
maintain their position, an action which would-in all

probability, .have prolonged the instability and injured
33 At that point, Britain reversed
' terest s in
' h in
' Iran.
Bri' tis
its position to support Mohanunad Ali Shah.

First, Britain

32Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p. 268.
33Cottam, Na t iona
' Iran, p. 170
'
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recognized that the goals of the nationalists conflicted
with the aims of the traditionalists, causing continued
struggling and instability; thus, Britain decided to back
the traditionalists, hoping that the traditional elements
would be able to bring about internal stability in Iran.
Second, Britain resented the hostile and antagonistic
attitudes of the Iranian nationalists toward Britain
following the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement.

Indeed, Britain

regarded the antagonistic nationalists as extremists, and
decided not to back them.34
In searching for a stabilizing element, the British
decided to support the traditionalists.

This prospect was

not feasible, however, because the existing Qajar
administration was ill-equipped to bring about stability.
Almost inunediately Britain's strategy was reversed, and
Russia and Britain arranged the deposition of. Mohanunad Ali
Shah in the Tripartite Protocol of September 7, 1909.
Mohanunad Ali was exiled to Odessa, and his twelve year old
son Ahmad became Shah (last Qajar king, who reigned,
1909-1925).

In his exile, Mohanunad Ali was to receive a

sizable yearly pension, as stated in the Tripartite Protocol,
provided that the ex-Shah did not engage in any political
34Ibid., p. 180.

'
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The disintegrating administration

under Mohammad Ali did not have the organization or ability
to bring about internal security in Iran.

With the deposition

of Mohammad Ali and the organization of a new government, as
well as British and Russian dominance in their respective
spheres of influence, the two powers hoped that internal
stability would be b+ought about.

In this regard, the most

suitable government for Iran, according to Britain and
Russia, would have been a government strong enough to provide
internal security, but not strong enough to "challenge the
privileged Anglo-Russian position 1136 in Iran.

In 1911

Mohammad Ali managed to attack Tehran in an attempt to regain
his position; however, he was defeated.

Although Britain

and Russia disclaimed any involvement with Mohammad Ali's
attack, the Iranian nationalists regarded the incident as
connected with Russian interference.

Consequently, the

nationalists felt that by defeating Mohammad Ali, they had
asserted their position before Russia. 37
The Iranian nationalists were disheartened with the

unreformed conditions of the postconstitutional period, for

the constitutional revolution did not remedy Iran's problems,
35Avery, Modern Iran, p. 140.
36 cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 168.
3
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nor did it bring the material progress which the·nationalists
believed was inherent in constitutional systems.

The

disillusioned nationalists blamed the foreign powers and the
traditionalists in Iran, for the failure of the constitutional
movement to solve the country's political, economic,.and
social problems.

The nationalists believed that no reforms

were being made in Iran because the country was controlled
by Britain and Russia, as was evidenced by the preponderance
of the foreign powers in their spheres of influence, as well
as the obvious foreign intervention in political and economic
matters in Tehran.

Interestingly, the Iranian nationalists

blamed the unreformed situation upon the inadequacy of the
Western concepts which were introduced by the constitutional
revolution; however, the nationalists did not take into
consideration their own inadequate implementation of the
Western ways. 38 Indeed, following the granting of the
constitution, there was little improvement in government,
due not so much to foreign interference, but to the

ineffectiveness of the central government.

The nationalists, bitter toward British and Russian

interference, were only concerned about ridding their
country of the foreign powers, rather than devoting

themselves to developing the organization and ability needed
38Young, "The Problem of Westernization in Modern
Iran, " p. 51.
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for.the proper administration of Iran.

British and Russian

influence remained in Iran, due to the predominance of the
two powers in their spheres of influence, as well as the use
of strategic Iranians to foster British/Russian interests.
Thus, the Iranian nationalists maintained their belief that
Britain and Russia actually intended.to colonize Iran.
Regarding Britain's intentions, Britain's main concern was
the maintenance of internal stability in Iran, for the
operation of British concessions and privileges in Iran
depended upon a stable situation in the country.

Russia's

intentions were basically the same as those of Britain;
however, Russia maintained that, due to turbulence in
northern Iran, Russia needed to retain troops in its sphere
of in
O fluence in order to ensure in terna1 securiI ty. 39 This
I

I

I

action made Iranians suspicious about Russia's intentions
toward Iran.
With the outbreak of World War I, the Iranians exhibited
their bitter attitude toward British and Russian interference,
for in both the British and Russian spheres of influence, the
Iranian nationalists revealed their pro-German attitudes.

Among government members in Tehran there was considerable
pro-German support, which irritated Russia.
marched into Tehran.

Russian troops

The Iranian go�ernment resigned and

39cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 178-79.
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was succeeded by governments which were easily manipulated
40 British and Russian positions in
by Britain and Russia.
Iran were such that Iran's declaration of neutrality was
ignored and foreign military bases were established in Iran
during World War I.
Anglo-Russian interference in the political .and
economic matters·of Iran continued, for the weak administra
tion of Iran permitted it, and the privileges and interests
of the two foreign powers were maintained.

The turning

point was reached, however, with two developments regarding
Russia and Britain.

First, Russian policy toward Iran was

altered by the Bolshevik Revolution, for in 1918 Soviet
Russia renounced the concessions and privileges held in Iran
by Tsarist Russia.

Indeed, the Soviets proposed to have a

new relationship with Iran, and discussions toward a
Soviet-Persian agreement began by 1920.
Meanwhile, Britain's influence in Iran increased, and
culminated in the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.41 The
weak 9entral government of Iran accepted the Anglo-Persian
Agreement, an action which provided the impetus for the
revival of the nationalist movement, for the terms of the
Anglo-Persian Agreement infuriated the Iranian nationalists.
4oibid., p. 179.
' t' .
41 Banani,
· The Moderniza
ion of Iran, 1921 - 1941 , p. 3 5 •
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The Agreement stipulated that Iran's government services
would be reorganized by British specialists; the Iranian
army would be trained by British officers, a loan would be

provided for Iran, and roads and railroads would be built. 42
As such, the implementation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement
would have made Iran a type of British protectorate, for the
political, military, and economic life of Iran would have
been overseen by Britain.

In view of the acceptance of the

Anglo-Persian Agreement, the political weakness of the Qajar
administration was exemplified, as was the preponderance of
Britain's influence in Iran.
Regarding the role of foreign powers in Iran during the
Qajar period, the contribution of Britain and Russia to
instability/stability during that period may be viewed from
two angles.

First, the two powers were eager for the

institution of internal stability in Iran in order to
safeguard their own political privileges and the smooth
operation of their concessions in the country.

The

preponderance of their political and economic position in
Iran, however, was a basis for agitation between the
Qajar Court (which allowed the foreign powers to take
advantage of Iran's economic resources), and the Iranian
nationalists (who wanted to develop Iran for Iranians).
42cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 18.

In

30
this sense, the.foreign powers contributed to the continual
struggle in Iran, and consequently, to the prevalence of
internal instability.
Secondly, the initial rivalry between Britain and Russia
provided for the maintenance of Iran's independence, for,
not wishing to chance a war with the other power, neither
Britain nor Russia would dare to colonize Iran.

In another

sense, Russia and Britain contributed to internal stability
in Iran,.following the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, for
Britain and Russia maintained internal security within their
respective spheres of influence,.which was necessary as a
stabilizing element.
Regarding the position of foreign influence in Iran,
the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement may be viewed as the main
factor in reviving the resentment of the nationalists toward
British interference in Iran.

Indeed, if Iran were to regain

its integrity, decisive action was needed at that point.

If

the nationalists allowed the disintegrated Qajar Throne to
turn Iran over to a foreign power, in effect, the opportunity
to restore the sovereignty of Iran might never be present
again.
While the sting of the Anglo-Persian Agreement was
sharp enough to revive the nationalists, in order to
successfully rid the country of the decayed administration
and foreign dominance, the movement needed a strong leader.
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The man capable of fulfilling this calling was Reza Khan, an
officer in the-Persian Cossack Brigade, who was ashamed of
the situation of his once proud country, and who was
decidedly opposed to the Anglo-Persian Agreement.

Reza Khan

was dissatisfied with the absence of law and order, the
declining power, effectiveness, and independence of the
central government, and, as a devoted soldier, he was
concerned about the military weakness of the country due to
the absence of a unified national army.

Moreover, Reza Khan

and the other Iranian officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade
resented the foreign domination of their country. 43
In this regard, Reza Khan first planned to rid the
Persian Cossack Brigade of the Russian officers who still
conunanded the force.

By 1920, Reza Khan had accomplished his

plan, thus making the Brigade a truly Iranian force, and
Reza Khan gained the conunand of the Brigade.

At that point,

Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai, a nationalist journalist, was
plapning a coup d'etat to eliminate the ineffective
government, and Reza Khan was willing to provide the Brigade
as the necessary force for a successful coup d'etat.

On

February 21, 1921, Reza Khan led the Cossack Brigade into
Tehran, met little resistance, and occupied the capital.

A

new government was formed, with Sayyed Zia as Prime Minister
43Ramesh Sanghvi, Ar g111ehr: The Shah of Iran (New York:
Stein and Day, 1968), p. ;l.
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and Reza Khan as Conunander of the Armed Forces.

The new

government asserted its position by quickly, and signifi
.
cantly, nullifying the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement. Next,
the new government signed a Soviet-Persian Agreement in which
Soviet Russia, among other provisions, confirmed its
repudiation of the privileges which had been held in Iran by
. 44 These decisive moves clarified that Iran
. t Russia.
Tsaris
intended to maintain a position of equality with the foreign
powers.

In addition, they revealed that, internally, the

control of Iran would be under the new government, while the
Qajar Throne, which was not removed by the coup d'etat, would
be accorded only a nominal position.
Within a short time, the ambitions of Sayyed Zia and
Reza Khan clashed.

Most notable among their differences was

Sayyed Zia's apparent receptiveness to British influence,
especially regarding British influence over Iran's armed
forces.

Reza Khan, on the other hand, was determined to

eliminate foreign interference, to develop Iran, and to make
the country truly independent.

In April, 1921, Sayyed Zia

was discharged from the position of Prime Minister and exiled
to Baghdad.

At that point Reza Khan could have assumed the

position of Prime Minister; however, he decided to accept
the position of Minister of War, and to concentrate his
44 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 246.
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efforts on one of his main concerns, namely bringing the
tribal raids and revolts under control.

At that early time,

Reza Khan was regarded by many as the one person capable of
establishing internal security in Iran.45
Understandably, the goals and achievements of Reza Khan
during the e�rly 1920s, aided in his rise to power.
Moreover, the policies of Reza Khan were needed by Iran at
that time.

His son, Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, wrote of his

father:
It seems that the era, the people, and the
pecessities of a nation demand that at a certain
time the right man be found in a particular
position: such a man as will profoundly affect the
fate of a country and modify the course of
history.46
Indeed, Reza Khan had begun to bring about changes in Iran.
One of Reza Khan's early achievements was the
establishment of a national army, w hich was vital to the
security of Iran; moreover, many of Reza Khan's
accomplishments were closely related to the successful
organization of a unified national army.

For example,

Reza Khan was able to bring about his early achievements by
establishing martial law, which made the Minister of War the
45oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 70.
46Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 38.
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chief authority in the country.

During Reza Khan's rise,

his suppression of tribal revolts, and his revival of
governmental authority caused the British to realize that
Reza Khan was the person capable of bringing about internal
. Iran. 47
stab 1' l 1' ty in
During Reza Khan's term as Minister of War, it was
apparent that the organizational changes which were brought
about were the result of Reza Khan's planning and action.
Ahmad Shah (the last Qajar king), who had always been a
powerless king, realized that his reign as. Shah might soon

be ending; thus, in October, 1923 he appointed Reza Khan as

Prime Minister, and made the Crown Prince regent, and
Ahmad Shah went to Europe, where he remained. 48
About the same time, in Turkey Mustafa Kemal and the
nationalist movement that he led had declared Turkey a
republic.

This development interested Reza Khan and a number

of reformist intellectuals in Iran,.who discussed the
possibility of dissolving the Dynasty and·making Iran a
republic.

As the rumor of making Iran.a republic spread,

favorable as well as unfavorable reactions were voiced.

The

most audible protests came from the clergy who were afraid

that such a change would do away with their privileged role
47Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 259-60.
48Ibid. , p. 264.
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under the monarchy.

The abolition of the Caliphate by the

Turkish Republic frightened the clergy further, for they
feared that Iran would follow Turkey's example and become a
secularized republic.

Meanwhile, the rise in Reza Khan's

popularity was matched by the intense decline in the
popularity of the Qajars.

Thus, on.October 31, 1925, the

Majlis deposed Ahmad Shah, ended the Qajar Dynasty, and
placed the control of·the provisional government under
Reza Khan.

Discussions concerning the form of government to be
established in Iran continued.

In consideration of the

clergy's strong protests against the establishment of a
republic, Reza Khan consulted the high religious dignitaries,
who, in their fear of possible secularization under a
republic, advised Reza Khan that a republic would be contrary
to Islam.

In view of this belief, as well as the fact that

Reza Khan had concluded·that Iran should retain the monarchy,
the discussion of establishing a republic ended.

In

December, . 1925, the Constituent Assembly revised article 36
of the Supplement to the Constitution, and designated
Reza Khan as the Shah of Iran by stating:

The Constitutional·Monarchy of Iran is vested by
the Constituent Assembly, on behalf of the nation,
in the person of his
�
. Majesty, the Shaha�§hah
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Reza Shah Pahlavi, ,and shall remain in his male·
progeny generation after generation. 49
Thus ended the disintegrated reign of the Qajar Dynasty
in Iran.

More importantly, with the establishment of the

new Dynasty, the Pahlavi, came the beginning of a new era in
Iran.
In. summarizing the situation of Iran in terms of
instability/stability during the Qajar period, it is
important to note that the Qajars were incapable of providing
a stabilizing force in Iran.

First, the country was

disunified, for throughout the expansive realm, the people
felt more aligned to their respective ethnic group, tribe,
or region than to the nation-as a whole or its central
institutions.

Indeed, the disunity overlapped into

insecurity, for the various tribes raided one another and
pillaged the villages.

The Qajars were unable to inspire

loyalty to the central government, particularly because the
Qajars were regarded as Turkish conquerors by the Iranians,
who felt no loyalty to such rulers.

The Qajars were further

handicapped because they did not have a unified national

army capable of controlling troublesome activities and

exerting governmental authority throughout the provinces.
Thus, the prevalent insecurity contributed to the instability
49

Iran, .The Constitution of 1906 and Its Supp lement
{Tehran:. [n. n. , n. d. ], p. 29, cite by Banan1, The
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, P� 4 3.
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of the period.

The Qajars remained on the Throne because

there was no other force ·able to take over, and, because of
the initial reign of terror of the founding_ Qajars, the

Iranians feared the atrocities which the Qa tar Throne was

capable of performing.

A progressive decline took place within the Qajar
Dynasty, particularly due to the administrative ineptitude
of the Qajars, for they were not concerned with establishing
an efficient administrative organization in Iran .

Indeed,

administrative-wise , the country was in chaos during the
Qajar reign.

In view of the political and economic chaos,

the Qajars looked for other sources of revenue for themselves,
for they were unable to manage . the development of Iran's
resources as a means of establishing national financial
security.

Consequently, the Qajars sold concessions in Iran

to foreign - powers, and received in return funds which they
used for their own pleasure.

Indeed , the Qajars were willing

to se1ll Iran's valuable resources for returns which were not

favorable to Iran; however, the Qajars were · satisfied with
funds that were sufficient for their personal u�e c
The interference of foreign powers, primarily Britain

and Russia, became a major source of controversy in Iran ,
for groups of nationalists opposed the Qajars' policy of

· allowing foreign powers to take advantage of Iran, politically
and economically.

Iran was being sold, piece by piece, to
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Britain and Russia, and the preponderance of the two powers
in the country was overriding.

In essence, the sovereignty

of Iran was weakened and the nationalists feared that
Britain and Russia might even partition Iran.

�y 1918 the

interference of Russia seemed to be subsiding, for Soviet
Russia renounced the privileges in Iran held by Tsarist
Russia.

Britain's influence increased, however, culminating

in the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement ·.

This action was

intolerable to Iranian nationalists, who refused to accept
the Qajars' allowing Iran to become a British protectorate.
The Qajar administration was too weak to maintain internal
stability in Iran, and they were unable, or unwilling, to

..

guard the sovereignty of Iran before foreign powers .

The

nationalists, however, were unwilling to allow the Qajars
to destory Iran ; therefore, the nationalists mobilized a
coup d'etat in 1921, and effectively took control of the
country.

Even this action was not enough, for the Qajars,

although impotent, remained on the Throne, and the Qajars

represented the ills brought upon Iran, for the Qajars and
their supporters had allowed Iran's situation to disintegrate
politically and economically.

The ending of the Qajar

Dynasty in - October, 1925, was the ending of a deteriorated
and unstable period in Iran's history.

The establishment

of the Pahlavi Dynasty in December, 1925, was the beginning

of a new and promising era . for Iran's future.

CHAPTER II
THE MODERNIZATION OF IRAN UNDER REZA SHAH,
1926-1941
On April 25, 1926, the formal coronation of Reza Shah
Pahlavi took place, during which Reza Shah crowned himself,
and his young son, Mohammad Reza was proclaimed Crown Prince.
From then onward, Reza Shah's philosophy and goals of
reforming the country became more apparent and increasingly
implemented in various aspects of government and society.
The overriding goal of Reza Shah was the reform and
modernization of his country, such that Iran would be
deveioped from within, and would - become independent of
foreign powers.

The most outstanding aspects of Reza Shah's

philosophy which made the reforms possible were secularization
and nationalism.

Though the nationalist spirit had existed

in Iran from earlier times, Reza Shah was the first leader
to unify the facets of Iranian nationalism into a single

force; furthermore, Reza Shah's nationalism was driven by

his pride in the pre-Islamic glory of Iran, and his belief
that the Iranian people would achieve such glory again. 1
1Ramesh Sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran (New York:
Stein and Day, 1968), p . 5 0 .
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Reza Shah's nationalist ideal set forth the goal of
ending Iran's dependence upon foreign states, as well as
ending foreign interference in Iran.

In the moderni zation

of his country, however, Reza Shah realized that Iran needed
to adopt certain aspects of Western technology and material
progress; therefore, 1 he planned to incorporate those
aspects. 2 However, ln order to obtain Western technology
and material progress, Iran needed to rely on foreign
advisors and technicians, and their presence allowed for
renewed foreign interference in Iran.

Therefore, in his

determination to make Iran truly independent of foreign
powers, Reza Shah made it clear that the foreign advisors
and technicians were only assistants in the country.
Reza Shah decided to use the foreign assistants only until
Iranians had acquired the technical and administrative
abilities to maintain a modernized country.
Reza Shah sought to modernize Iran through a vast series
of reforms which he initiated during his reign .

The first

major reform initiated by Reza Shah was the establishment of
a unified national army, for he viewed this as a prerequisite
to the achievement of his other main goals .

Reza Shah had

started to reform the army while he was Minister of War, and
2Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961),
p. 49.
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the maintenance of the army remained a priority proj ect
throughout his reign as Shah.

Reza Shah corrected the

inadequacies of the former system of separate armed units by
uniting the forces under one national system, and by
regulating supply and payment of the troops which had
formerly been unorganized.

Reza Shah realized that a modern

national army would be needed in modernizing Iran; in this
regard, modern training was needed for the army; thus,
Western professionals were employed to train an officer
corps, and a number of officer trainees were sent to Western
military academies. 3 In 1925, Reza Shah initiated the
Military Conscription Law ; which required a set number of
years of service to the state by all males over twenty-one.
One major effect of universal military service was to
introduce young men from the tribes and rural areas to urban
ways and to the nationalist plans of Reza Shah.

4

The reformed

military became important in Reza Shah's program of
centralizing and unifying the country.

The military provided

the security needed, for, as a political and military

element, Reza Shah's army was able to maintain the central
government's authority throughout the country. 5 Th�s, in
3John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1963), p. 60.
4 Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-194 1, p. 56 .
5Ibid. , p. 57.
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time, the military became a stabilizing element in the
country.

In creating the unified national army, Reza Shah

had disbanded the separate armed units and thereby eliminated
the influence which Russia and Britain had exerted over
particular armed units, namely, the Persian Cossack Brigade
and the South Persian Rifles.

With the establishment of the

national army, Reza Shah turned his attention to the reform
and modernization of other facets of political, economic
and social life in Iran.
Following the establishment of a national army,
Reza Shah attended to the reform of the civil administration.
The reorganization of the civil administration at the local,
provincial, and central government levels, was vital to the
management of the country, and to reviving the country from
the administrative chaos of the Qajar regimes.

Administrative

reforms were first initiated in 1922 (while the Qajars were
still nominally on the Throne, but the nationalists were in
control of the government), with the reorganization of the
Civil Service.
00

The new Civil Service required an - entrance

examination and specific qualifications, and regulated
promotions and salaries.

The revised Civil Service was an

improvement over the former arbitrarily run system, for the
reforms helped to reduce the inefficiency of the Civil
Service and favoritism in employment .

Other administrative

revisions included the 193 0 reform of the functions and
'
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sources of revenue for the administration and municipal
governments, with the stipulation that city revenue was for
use on local projects.6 In addition, the impractical
geographic and administrative divisions of the country were
reorganized in 1937, providing for more orderly management
of the country.

Traditionally, the country had been divided

into four large sections (ayalat-ha), which were subdivided
into many small sections (valayat-ha).

The reform provided

a more manageable division, for it created ten main sections
(ostan-ha) of the country, whic h were each divided into
several smaller sections (shahrestan-ha), and each shahrestan
was divided into a number of small sections (bakhsh-ha) •7
Another aspect of reform concerned the conditions of
political parties, for at that time, there were no real
political parties with defined programs.

There were small

groups of Majlis (national representative assembly) deputies
who held a common interest, but these were short term
interest groups, not actual political partiess8 Reza Shah
realized that in order to reach the people.with his
nationalist ideas, an organized political party would be
needed; thus, Reza Shah helped to establish political parties
6 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

7 Ibid., p. 60 •

8Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 196 ),
5
p. 271.
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and designated several high governmental officials to direct
them.
By 1927, there were four active political parties;
however, they survived only several months.

In 1939,

however, the Society to Guide Public Opinion (Sazoman
Parvarish-i-Afkar) was founded as a means of informing the
people about the government's plans, gaining support for the
government, and promotin·g nationalism.

The Society to Guide

Public Opinion had conunittees throughout the country which
distributed materials and talked to the people about the
government ' s plans.

The Society told the people to become

involved with the interests of the country.

The Society

promoted favorable public opinion toward the government and
was successful in reaching the people with the ideals of
reform and modernization. 9 Familiarizing the people with
the goals of reform facilitated the implementation of
modernization, for the plans were made understandable, and
hence more acceptable to the people.

In this regard, the

Society served a stabilizing function, by helping to reduce

misunderstandings during the modernization period.
One major aspect of Reza Shah's program was the reform
of the judicial system, which replaced the traditional
system with modern judicial concepts.

In this regard, the

9oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 76.
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main areas dealt with were the secularization of the Law,
the creation of civil courts, and the abolition of
capitulations.

The reform of the traditional system of

jurisdiction was vital in the modernization of Iran, for
Iran's system of Law was that of the Shiite sect of Islam;
consequently, the traditional legal system was dominated by
the clergy.

The reactionary clergy hindered the progress of

Iran due to their rigid interpretation of Islamic dogma,
which conflicted with modern trends and practices.

Thus,

Reza · Shah's judicial reforms were motivated by two goals:

first, to institute a modern and efficient legal system
organized according to modern standards, and second, to
weaken the powerful influence of the clergy.
Reducing the influence of the clergy in the judicial
system was a difficult task.

The Islamic system of Law was

based upon the code of Holy Law (Shariat) in the Koran, which
dealt with personal and community matters.

The Shariat was

considered to be Divine Revelations ; consequently, religious

scholars were required to interpret the codes and make legal
decisions, and the clergy were, therefore, the traditional
legal authorities.

During the constitutional movement in

Iran, eyen those members of the clergy who favored the
introduction of a constitution nevertheless protected the
position of the Shariat, and their own legal authority, by
using their influence to include in the constitution a
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provision stating that all new laws were to be in accord

with Islam, and to be approved by the · ulema (respected
theologians) •10 The position of the clergy was further

protected by the Fundamental Law of 1906, for it stipulated
that the authority of the clergy in legal matters was to be
maintained �

Although the constitutionalists attempted to

reform the judicial system by creating a civil code during
the latter part of the Qajar period, they were not successful
in practice, due to the ineffectiveness of the government,
the strong opposition of the clergy, and the lack of persons
qualified to tend a modernized legal system. 11
In view of the predominant legal authority of the
clergy, an effective modernization of the legal system would
have been possible only under a strong government capable of
defeating the religious opposition.

Reza Shah possessed the

strength and determination to modernize Iran's judicial
system, particularly by dislodging the clergy from the legal
arena, and by abolishing the system of capitulations.

Defeating the clergy was difficult, in view of their

influence and the justification of their legal authority in
the constitution.

Thus, in order to reduce the legal

influence of the clergy, the government modified the
10Banani, The Modernization of Iran , 1921-1941, p. 70.
11Ibid.
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constitution such that the government was given " greater
freedom in _ the rotation and removal of judges. " 1 2

This

action enabled the government to exert greater control over
the personnel of the legal system, and hence to limit the
role of the clergy in the system.
Reza Shah was increasingly successful in affecting
legal reforms.

For example, state courts, not shariat

courts, were given the dominant position in legal authority,
and in

1 92 6,

a new Penal Code further decreased the legal

role of the Shariat.

In

1 927,

a new Ministry of Justice was

established with a number of European educated officials
assuming positions formerly held by the clergy. 1 3

One of the most important enactments of the period was
the new Civil Code, for it was established to effectively
break the influence of the Shariat courts, and to abolish
the system of capitulations, whid1 Reza Shah 'regarded as
insulting to the sovereignty of Iran.

In preparing the new
!�;

, ·,

Civil Code of Iran, a translation of the Civil Code of
France supplied a modern system of jurisprudence.

However,

in religious matters, or those concerning personal status,
such as marriage, divorce, and family life, a secularized
version of the principles of the Shariat was used. 14 In
May,

1 92 8,

12

the first volume of the new Civil Code was

Ibid. , p • 76 •

13

Ibid. , p. 7 0 .

14 I b'1 d .

,

p . 71 •
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enacted. · The new Civil Code modernized and secularized the
legal system of Iran, thereby serving two main functions:
first, breaking the influence of the clergy and Shariat
courts in legal matters, and second, abolishing the system
of capitulations, thus rendering foreign nationals in Iran
subject to Iranian jurisdiction.

Indeed, this served to

assert Iran ' s position before foreign states.
The remnants of clerical influence in Iran's judicial
system were removed in 1936, for an enactment of the Majlis
required judges to have a degree from Tehran Faculty of
Law, or a foreign university with at least three years of
legal study. 15 Since most of the ulema {theologians) did
not hold these qualifications, the clergy was effectively
removed from the legal arena.

It must be noted that

Reza Shah was determined to terminate the clergy's control
of the legal system because the clergy's reactionary
interpretation of the Islamic system of beliefs prevented
the introduction of a modern legal system.

Moreover, Iran

needed a modern secularized judicial system to provide for

the legal needs of modern day Iranians and to provide a basis
upon which the system of capitulations could be abolished,
for foreign powers · had insisted that their nationals in Iran
could not be subject to Iran ' s traditional Islamic legal
15 Ibid. , p. 73.
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system.

Thus, Reza Shah and his reformists were not opposed

to religion, as such, but they were opposed

to

the

interference of religious authorities in legal and political
matters.
In this respect, Reza Shah had been successful in
overcoming the strong influence of the clergy by approaching
the matter from different angles; that is, he weakened the
position of the clergy in several areas.

Reza Shah's

dislodgement of the clergy from the legal arena has been
described above.

A second area in which Reza Shah effectively

weakened the position of the clergy was their financial
situation.

Reza Shah secularized the religious endowments

(waqfs) which traditionally had provided the clergy with a
considerable amount of land and wealth.

Thus, the clergy

lost the wealth and power formerly provided by the waqfs,
and many clerics needed to obtain lay positions, or state
aid.16 Reza Shah used the wealth of the secularized waqfs
for reforming the educational system of Iran.

The position

of the clergy was also weakened by the modernization of the
educational system, for the clergy had controlled the
traditional system of education in Iran, but they were not
qualified to maintain a position in the reformed system.
16william s. Hass, Iran (New York: Columbia University
·Press, 1946; rpt.· New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. 157.
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The reform of Ira�'s educational system was a vital area
of Reza Shah's modernization program.

Reza Shah realized

that in order for the efforts toward modernization to be
appreciated by the Iranians, the Iranian masses would have
to be educated.

The people needed the fundamentals of

education in order to function in the modernized societye
The situation of education in Iran was an obstacle, for the
illiteracy rate was high, and the traditional system of
education in the country was rudimentary.

Traditionally,

basic education was ' controlled by the clergy, and was limited
to bright boys, thus eliminating females and less talented
boys.

In order to receive a higher level of education

students needed to go to a private tutor, and beyond this
level there were only seminaries for those studying for the
clergy. 17 Modern systems of education were introduced to
Iran in - the nineteenth century by foreign religious
missionaries and founders of military schools.

The presence

of these schools did inspire the establishment of such
schools by Iranians.

The country was in political and

economic decline at that time, however, and major reforms
' d not take p 1 ace dur.1.ng the Q aJar per.1.0 d. 18
1.n educat 1.on
•
d.1.
I

I

I

O

As a result, the clergy, who protested the introduction of
17aanani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, P o 66.
18 Ibid. , p. 89.
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Western educational methods, maintained their control over
education, and the income which it provided for them.
With the accession of Reza Shah, the reform of the
educational system, including the establishment of a state
school system throughout the country, became a major project.
Under Reza Shah a reorganized Ministry of Education brought
about such reforms as the organization of the various school
facilities into one educational system, increased educational
funds, establishment of teachers' trai�ing colleges, and
employment benefits for teachers. 19 Organizing one
educational system included bringing the foreign missionary
schools and Iranian private schools under the supervision of
the Ministry of Education.

This action served to provide a

uniform school program, as well as a unified educational
system.

In addition, it allowed Reza Shah to assert the

sovereignty of Iran by regulating foreign schools in the
country. 20
Another important aspect of educational reform during

Reza Shah's reign was the introduction of adult education

programs in 1936.

Reza Shah recognized the importance of

the education of the population to the modernization of the
country, for education was a means of reaching the population
19Avery, Modern Iran, p. 275 : and Banani, The
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 94.
20Avery, Modern Iran, p. 278.
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with · the ideals of modernization and nationalism.

The first

year of the adult education program included courses in
reading, writing, the history and geography of Iran, hygiene,

and ethics, and the second year included arithmetic, poetry,
and practical studies, such as agricultural machinery and
electricity. 21 By instituting adult education programs,
Reza Shah was able to reach a substantial segment of the
population.

Reza Shah's educational reforms also included the

establishment· of technical colleges, founded by the various
ministries of the government, and the establishment of the
provision that any foreign concessionaire must assist Iranian

citizens in ·acquiring the education needed for the operation
of that concession. 22 In this manner, Reza Shah was assuring

the preparation of Iranians for the independent development
and maintenance of their country, which would progressively
eliminate the reliance upon foreigners for technical and
scientific innovations.

In addition, a number of students

were annually sent abroad to acquire Western training and
concepts.

Upon their return home, these students were

helpful in spreading · a knowledge of Western technology and
21Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 19 21-1941, p. 104 $
22Avery, Modern Iran, p. 279 ; and Banani, The
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 98.
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customs through their exposure to other Iranians who had not
gone abroad.

Another high point in the · modernization of

education was the establishment of the University of Tehran
in 1935 .

The university provided a modern education for

students within Iran, and these students further spread the
ideas of modernization and nationalism among their fellow
Iranians, often by speaking at community meetings. 23 The
educational reforms were Reza Shah's method of providing the
Iranian people with modern concepts; moreover, the expansion
of education brought the ideas of nationalism to the
population, thereby instilling a sense of unity in the
Iranian people.

In addition, the education of the people

made them more capable of managing the various matters of the
country, which reduced the dependence on foreign personnel
and provided a stabilizing force against the interference of
foreign states.
One of the areas which greatly benefited from the
reforms of Reza Shah's reign was the condition of public

health in Iran.

Before Reza Shah, only the foreign

missionaries . tended to matters of public health .

In their

indifference toward concepts of public health, the Qajar
authorities did not enforce laws dealing with it.

Moreover,

the lack of physicians and medical facilities, as well as
23Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p .. 105.
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superstitions instilled by the · reactionary clergy, were
obstacles to suitable public health conditions during the
Qajar per�od.

Under Reza Shah, decisive reforms in public

health conditions were· made and enforced.

For example, the

Pasteur Institute was established to carry out research and
public health projects.

In addition, meat and food

production were regulated ; also, standards for licensing
physicians were enforced, and a medical school was
established in Tehran.

Moreover, by weakening the influence

of the clergy, some of the superstitious obstacles to public
health treatment were overcome ; and programs for treating
and controlling communicable diseases were established. 24
The reforms in public health were important in improving
the standards of health and hygiene in the country.

In

addition, the people were reached with modern concepts on
personal and community health care ; the medical facilities
were improved, and the quality and number of physicians
increased.

These reforms were important aspects of the

modernization of Iran, for a chronically unhealthy population
would have been unable to contribute to the overall operation
of a modernized state.

Another vital area which was reformed during Reza Shah's

reign was the economic situation of the country.
24Ibid. , pp. 62-64.

Ira�'s
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economy was one of the country's weakest points at the time
of Reza Shah's accession, for the inefficient Qajar rulers
had not developed the economic administration of Iran, and
they had allowed . the foreign powers to take advantage of
Iran's economic resources.
ailing economy.

Reza Shah planned to revive the

One of the first steps was employing the

American team of financial experts led by Arthur Millspaugh,
to reorganize Iran's economic situation by instituting a
system for tax collection, centralizing the treasury,
attracting foreign capital to Iran, and creating viable
legislation dealing with the revival of Iran's economy.
Millspaugh's programs raised the revenue which Reza Shah
needed to carry out the reform of the military system and to
establish internal security.

Mil.lspaugh's programs succeeded

in nearly balancing Iran's budget for the year 1923-1924, by
implementing an effective system of taxation, which was his
most memorable achievement in Iran e 25 After Millspaugh's
mission ended in 1927, other financial advisors from foreign
states were employed by Iran ; however, none held the
influence of Millspaugh and his team. 26

One far reaching aspect of economic reform was the
founding of the Bank Melli Iran (National Bank of Iran) in
25Avery, Modern Iran, p. 262.
� 6Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p . 117.
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1927, for up to that time the banks in Iran had been British

or Russian concessions • . Thus, establishing the Bank Melli
Iran was another means of decreasing foreign dominance in
the country.

Another achievement- was the establishment of

an Economic Committee which encouraged · economic advancement
through governmental and private projects in communications
and transportation.

In addition, attempts were made to

reach the Iranian people with modern economic concepts
concerning savings and investments, for most of the people
tended to hoard any ·savings, rather than put their money into
circulation.

Some people, however, did put their money into

buying land, the symbol of secure wealth.

Taking this into

conside�ation, the government began selling state lands to

the people, and in·this way, acquired revenue for the state e27
The . economic reforms concerning foreign trade, such as

Iran's declaration of tariff autonomy and the introduction
of state control on foreign trade and foreign exchange,

favorably affected the economy of Iran, and also served to

increase Iran's freedom from the economic interference of
foreign powers.

The declaration of tariff autonomy also

served to assert Iran's position internationally.

Formerly,

Iran did not control its own tariff duties, for the 1828
Treaty of Turkomanchai had imposed upon Iran a near free
27

Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 307-09.
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trade ·policy regarding Russian goods ; that is, Iran could

levy only a nominal customs tariff on Russian imports.

In

addition, in the early 1900s, the Qajar regime granted a
concession to Russia in which the Russians receive� the
revenue from Iran's customs.

These arrangements prevented

Iran from controlling its tariff policies and from receiving
the customs revenue.

In 1928, however, the declaration of

tariff autonomy asserted Iran's independence of foreign
domination and provided an important source · of revenue for
Iran. 28
Additional improvements in Iran's position in foreign
trade · were introduced in 1931.

Formerly, Iran was

disadvantaged by the fact that Britain exported a great deal
to Iran but imported little from Iran, and from the fact that
Iran depended upon the Soviet Union as the main importer of
Iranian produce.

Thus, the Soviet Union was able to dictate

trade policies with · which Iran was required to comply in

order to avoid losing the Soviet market.

In 1920, the

Soviet Union had established a state foreign trade monopoly

(the state acted as the controlling agent in foreign trade) ;

however, countries bordering the Soviet Union from the
Black Sea to Mongolia were exempt from this restriction.
As a result, Iranian merchants had direct access to Soviet
28Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 116.
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markets.

The Soviet Union, however, ended this privilege

for Eastern merchants in 1930.

In order to adjust to the

new Soviet policy, and to initiate government management of
trade , Iran established its own foreign trade monopoly in
the form of governmental regulation through control of
quantities and requiring import and export licenses.

At the
same time, Iran established foreign exchange controls. 29
It was hoped that state control of foreign exchange would

foster economic independence and a favorable balance of
trade for Iran. 30
Reforming Iran's economic situation was an integral
part of the modernization program of . Reza Shah's period.
The economic solvency achieved by Millspaugh's financial
reforms provided revenue for internal reforms.

Moreover,

Iran was able to eliminate British and Russian domination
of the country through establishing governmental control over
vital economic functions, such as tariff administration,
foreign trade and foreign exchange.

One of the areas in which reforms were initiated during

Reza Shah's reign was agriculture.

Such reforms were

primarily in the introduction of modern agricultural

techniques, and the development of agricultural land.

The

agricultural reforms of the 1930s, however, affected only a
29 Ibid. , pp. 129- 31�
3oibid. , pp. 130- 31.
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small percentage of the agricultural sector and mainly
benefited the landowners.

Agricultural improvements resulted

from the use of modern machinery and· modern methods of pest
control, animal breeding, and soil conservation.

Assistance

in agricultural projects was provided by the Industrial and

Agricultural Bank, founded in 1937.

Agricultural and veterinary

advancements were encouraged, from 1929 on, by the
Agricultural College at Karaj, and the Veterinary Institute
founded at Hisarak in 1939. 31
Despite the introduction of modern agricultural methods,
one important aspect of agriculture which was not reformed
during Reza Shah's reign was the traditional land tenure
system.

The traditional land tenure system was a type of

feudalism in which most of the peasants lived o n the land
which they cultivated for the landowner, and the peasants
received a share of the crops from the land.

Reza Shah

proposed certain reforms in the structure of land tenure,
in particular, with respect to landlord-tenant relationships

and distribution of shares of crops.

However, such proposals

were · opposed by the powerful influence of the landlords,
especially those in the Majlis.

Indeed, in view of their

profitable position in the landlord-tenant relationship, the
31Avery, · Modern Iran, p. 312.

landlords did not want to disrupt the status quo. 32
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While

the introduction of modern agricultural methods provided a
number of improvements, the basic problem in the agricultural
system, the traditional land tenure system, remained
unchanged.

In their serf-like position, the peasant

cultivators were the last to benefit materially from the
agricultural reforms, while they were the group most in need
of improved conditions.

The main achievement of the

agricultural improvements was to stimulate greater
agricultural production, for domestic use as well as export,
which aided Iran internally as well as in foreign trade.
Regarding the agricultural population, the agricultural
improvements had little effect upon the position of the
landowners or the peasants.

In view of the fact that the

system of land tenure was not reformed, the landowners
retained their power and influence in the country, and the
peasants remained subservient to the landowners.
During the reign of Reza Shah, efforts were directed
toward reforming and modernizing industry and construction.
One of the major projects was the construction of the
Trans-Iranian Railway.

Reza Shah financed the railway

without foreign funds by establishing, in 1925, a government
tax on tea and sugar, and using the tax revenue to finance
32Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 21.
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the construction of the railway.

While Iran needed the

technology of Western countries in the construction of the
railway, Reza Shah designated that firms of several countries
should be employed, thereby avoiding the preponderant
influence of . any one country in the project. 33 The

Trans-Iranian Railway was completed in August, 1938, and

was viewed with nationalistic pride by Reza Shah, for the
completion of the railway was accomplished through the use
of Iranian revenues, not foreign loans.
In terms of industrial improvements, the government
encouraged industrialization and the establislunent of private
industry, primarily through · industrial bank loans and low

tariff rates for the importation of such capital goods as

industrial machinery, as well as a five-year tax exemption
for private factories.

Despite such governmental

encouragements, private industry did not greatly expand,
mainly because the people did not want to invest in such
projects.

State involvement in industrialization, however,

did promote ' industry, primarily in textiles, sugar refining,
and food production, with the intention of developing the
country and improving the welfare of the population.

By

1936, light industry had been expanded in state and private
factories, primarily through the organizational work of the
33Avery, Modern Iran, p. 303.
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Department of Industry and Mines.

The goal was to decrease

Iran's need for import� and to increase the country's exports,
thereby, furthering Iran's independent and self-reliant
.

.

position. 34

One area possessing great potential for development in
Iran was the oil industry.

During Reza Shah's reign, the

oil resources remained under the control of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company (AIOC), as it had been from Qajar times.

The

presence of the AIOC provided some benefits to Iran, such as
the introduction of Western technology and training programs
for Iranians in the·technical and managerial aspects of the
oil industry.

However, the preponderance of a foreign power
ists. 3 5
. the 01
·1 in
. dustry 1rr1
' ·tated a num ber of nat'iona1·
in

Reza Shah, although eager for freedom from the presence of
foreign powers in Iran, concluded that Iranians needed more
time to develop the operational expertise in the oil
industry, and that the AIOC was adequately developing the
oil industry in Iran.

Therefore, he decided that the AIOC

would remain until Iran was technologically and politically
prepared to assume full control of the oil industry at some
indefinite point in the future.
34Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941,
pp. 138-39.
3 5 I b"d
1 ., p. 142 •
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In striving for the modernization of his country,
Reza Shah instituted a number of reforms which were not
oriented toward production, but served to modernize the
social structure of Iranian society.

One such reform was

the abolition · of traditional titles, in June, 1925.

With

the. abolition of titles, the use of family names was
initiated.

Reza Shah, at that time Reza Khan, assumed the

family name "Pahlavi" in recognition of the pre-Islamic

glory of Iran, for "Pahlavi" refers to "Ancient Iranian. 11 36
Reza Shah abolished the use of titles as a means of fostering

a sense of social equality in Iran.

In . following through

with modernization and the theme of equality, in 1928,
Reza Shah initiated reforms in dress, in which men were to
wear Western style clothes.

This reform ignored the protests

of the clergy, who did not favor Western style clothing.
Another important social reform was the change in the
status of women.

In bringing his country into the modern

world, Reza Shah realized that the women must be freed of

the restrictions placed upon females by traditional Islamic
standards.

This was necessary because the traditional

practices prevented one-half of the population from actively

participating in the society, a situation whioh not only
denied the women of their rights, but also robbed the
Ale�sandro Bausani, The Persians, trans. , J. B. Donne·
{New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 176 a
36
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country of their contribution to the society.

One of the

first steps was banning the veil, for the veil represented
the exclusion of women and their exclusion from the rights
'
' ty. 37 In 1934, fema1e schoo1
and responsi' b 1" l 1" ties
of socie
teachers were required to abandon their veils .

By 1935, most

of the women, . with the exception of the older women, were not
wearing the veil, and Reza Shah instituted reforms which
provided Iranian women with Western style clothing, education,
and the rights and responsibilities of society.

Reza Shah

encouraged the socialization of women into society and
reminded the women that along with ' their newly acquired rights,
they must accept the responsibil�ti�s of sociJ ;y. � �-

Reza Shah intended to bring about a feeling of equality and

unity ; therein lay his reasons for abolishing titles,
introducing Western style clothing and reforming the status
of women in Iran.
Of great importance in Reza Shah's modernization program

were· the changes in foreign relations, for they served to
establish Iran ' s position internationally as well as
internally.

Reza Shah was determined to rid Iran of

interference by foreign powers, which had weakened the
37Hass, Iran, p. 105.
38 wilber, Contemporary

Iran, p. 75.
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position of Iran over the decades.

Early in his reign,

Reza Shah declared that through technical education and
specialization, Iranians would obtain freedom from the need
for foreign advisors.

One of the first actions taken to

establish Iran's position vis-a-vis foreign powers, was the
abolition of the capitulations; moreover, other changes
revealed that the foreign powers would lose their special
privileges in Iran.

For example, foreign legations were

limited in the display of their flags; restrictions were
placed upon foreign businesses in Iran; and members of the
Iranian foreign service were restricted f�om marrying
foreigners.

Another indication of Reza Shah's establishing

Iran's position, was the required use of the ancient name
"Iran" for the country, rather than Persia, as well as the
required use of the Persian language on official
correspondence. 39
In modernizing Iran, Reza Shah realized that the use of
Western technical advisors would be necessary for a while.

In this regard, Belgians were used in reforming the customs

administration; French experts were ·used in reforming the
legal system; Americans were used to reform the economy;

Swedish and Italian officers were used in training the army

and navy, respectively; and Germans were used in technical
39 Ibid. , pp. 72-73.

fields. 40
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Reza Shah refused to employ British or Russian

advisors, for these countries had exerted the type of
dominance in Iran which Reza Shah was determined to . end.
In reforming foreign relations, Reza Shah was concerned
about existing foreign concessions in Iran, which he intended
to do away with .

In this sense, one of the major concerns

was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

The AIOC. held a

monopoly over Iran's oil industry, which deprived Iran . of

the control of the oil in the country, and provided Britain
W1. th pr1· v1' leges 1'n Iran. 41 Consequently, Reza Shah had two
purposes in reforming the position of the AICO; first, to

gain for Iran the country's r i ghtful share of revenue from
the oil industry; second, to reduce the influence of Britain
in Iran.
By 1932, Iran's concern about the AIOC's control of the
Iranian oil industry had peaked.

At that point, Iran

presented the problem to the League of Nations.

Following

Iran's presentation, which maintained that the AIOC did not ·

give Iran a fair share of the oil revenue, Iran's royalties

were increased somewhat; however, the increase was not
42 In order for Iran to establish its integrity,
suff 1c1ent.
I

O

and to receive a fair revenue from the oil industry, the

41 I b 1' d . , p . 55 •
40Marlowe, Iran, p. 52.
42
Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 142.
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country's only recourse was to cancel the 1901 concession
agreement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, maintaining that
the present Iranian government could not be held to an
agreement· made before the constitutional regime.·

The Iranian

government proposed negotiating a new agreement with the
AIOC, which would provide · terms more favorable to Iran, as
·
43
well as a greater share of the · oil revenue.
Following the conclusion of the new agreement with the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1933, Iranian nationalists
resented. the government's allowing the AIOC to remain in
Iran.

Reza Shah, however, had considered the needs of his

cou�try and he realized that in the operation of the oil
industry, Iran needed the technology and expertise of the
AIOC.

Moreover, Reza Shah i,ntended to assure the training

and preparation of Iranians in the operation of the oil
.
industry before considering the nationalization of the oil
industry in Iran. 44 �isagreements concerning the oil
industry continued, and in 1940, Iran presented to the AIOC
grievances concerning payment of royalties, with an

ultimatum threatening cancellation of the AIOC's oil

concession.

In 1941, the AIOC agreed to Iran's demands;

43Marlowe, Iran, p. 57.
44wilber, Contemporary Iran, . pp. 79-80.
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however, the issue raised British resentment toward Iran at
a crucial point in time, that is, during World War II. 45
Regarding the attitude toward the Soviet

Union during

Reza Shah's reign, Soviet Russia initially appeared to be

a more favorable neighbor than Tsarist . Russia had been, f6r
Soviet Russia had renounced the concessions in . Iran acquired
by Tsarist Russia, and ��is had been confirmed in the
Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921.

There were, however, a

number of disquieting issues between Soviet
Iran.

Russia and

For example, while the Soviets had renounced Russian

concessions in Iran, the Soviet-Persian Agreement stated
that those concessions should not be given to any other
prospective concessionaire.

Also, by the Soviet-Persian

Agreement, Soviet Russia established the right to send troops
into Iran in the event that another power emanating from
within Iran, threatened Russia. 46
Another issue between Soviet Russia and Iran concerned
the fis�eries on the Caspian Sea, for these were important
to both countries.

In 1924, the Soviets suggested that a

company should lease the fisheries, and that the Soviet and

Iranian governments should receive equal shares in the
shares in the company.

Such a suggestion was initially

45Ibid. , p. 80.
46 Elgin Groseclose, Introduction to Iran (New York:
Oxford University Press� . 1,17) , p . 135 .
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rejected by Iran, upon the insistence of Arthur Millspaugh,
the financial advisor of Iran.

However, after the Soviets

exerted pressure upon Iran, and following the resignation of
Millspaugh in 1927, Iran accepted the Soviet proposal of
leasing the fisheries. 47
The issue of trade was also a contested matter between
Soviet Russia and Iran, for, as Iran depended upon the Soviet
market to buy Iran's agricultural produce, the Soviet Union
imposed trade policies which favored . the Soviet Union, but
Iran was unable to reject them without risking the loss of

its main export market.

Iran, however, released itself from

the trade relationship, and by 1938, Germany became an
important trade partner of Iran • . During the major portion

of Reza Shah's reign, Soviet Russia did not appear to be a
political or military threat to Iran, for the Soviets were
preoccupied with other political matters, including the rise
of Germany, rather than with prospects of expansion in the
Middle East. 48 Germany had become a major trade partner and
technical advisor to Iran.

Moreover, Reza Shah viewed such

a relationship as a means of breaking Iran's connections with
Britain and Russia. 49
·
48Marlowe,
47Ibid. , p. 137.
Iran, p. 57.
49J. c . Hurewitz, Middle East Politics (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p . 273 .
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With the outbreak of World War II, Reza Shah declared
Iran's neutrality in a war that seemed to be remote from his
country.

The Iranians reacted with a general favor toward ·

Germany, for the Iranians resented the decades of British
and Russian preponderance in Iran, as well as the remaining
position of Britain in southern Iran and the shadow of
Russia on Iran ' s northern border.

Indeed, the Iranians

considered Germany to be their "enemy's enemy. 11 5 0

Iran's sense of remoteness from the war ended in May,
194 5 , with the occupation of Iraq by Britain, due to a revolt
of Iraq's Prime Minister Rashid Ali, who was an anti-British
nationalist.

Reza Shah then became concerned about Iran's

neutrality, for the war was close to Iran at that point e

At

the same time, Britain was concerned about German nationals
in Iran who might collaborate with Iraqi rebels and sabotage
British oil fields in Iraq.

Indeed, Britain and Russia both

asked Iran to reduce the number of German technicians and
other German nationals in Iran. 5 1

Iran's neutrality was further threatened by Germany's

invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, for at that point, the
viability of using Iran as a supply route to the Soviet Union

was recognized.

Indeed, Prime Minister Churchill had

declared that Britain would aid Russia, as President Roosevelt
50
51

sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p.
Marlowe, Iran, p. 6 5 .

5 8.
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had stated for the United States .

Of three possible supply

routes to the Soviet Union, only the route through Iran was
feasible.

The Murmansk route, passing through the North

Atlantic and North Sea, was dangerous because Germans occupied
the Norwegian coast .

Passing through Turkey was unlikely,

because Turkey, as a neutral state, had refused passage of
supplies to Russia, and Turkey was able to maintain its
neutrality .

In addition, passing through the Bosphorous was
dangerous. because Germans were in the area . 52
Thus, Iran was chosen as the supply route, and despite
the country's neutrality, Britain and Russia planned to
invade Iran .

During this period, Britain and Russia

maintained thit they were concerned about the presence of
Germans in . Iran, and the two powers sent several Notes to
Iran requesting the expulsion of German nationals.

However,

the two powers did not mention their need of Iran as a supply
.

rou t e to Russia . 5 3

In this sense, Britain and Russia had not

presented the full situation to Reza Shah.

Therefore, it was

difficult for him to evaluate the necessary course of action,
but Reza Shah had decided to expel the German nationals from
Iran . 54 Considering the Allies' need for the route over
52Sanghvi,
' Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p . 61
53

Ib1' d . , . p . 66 •

54 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p . 72.
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Iran, it appears that Britain and Russia would have carried
out their planned invasion of Iran, even if the Iranian
government had reacted more readily to the Allies' demand of
expulsion of the German nationals, for the apparent reasoning
behind the Allies' invasion was primarily to use Iran as a
supply route, not as a reaction to the presence of German
nationals.

Thus, on August 25 , 1941, Britain and Russia

invaded Iran, with Russia coming from the · north and Britain

, coming from the west and southwest.

Iranian forces presented

resistance ; however, \ Reza Shah's army was prepared only for
maintaining internal security, not for _ matching those of
Britain and Russia. � 5

Thus, Iran's resistance ceased on

August 27, 1941.
During his reign, Reza Shah had been preparing his son,

Crown Prince Mohammad Reza, for the time when he would assume
the Throne.

Thus, the Crown Prince was familiar with his

father's political philosophy.

Crown Prince Mohammad Reza

felt that the invasion of his country was unjustified, and

that the Allies should have presented their need for a route

through Ir�n to Reza Shah.

Moreover, the Crown Prince

reasoned that if Reza Shah decided not to comply with the
Allies' request, he probably would have resigned the Throne .
to his son and allowed Mohammad Reza to accept the Allies'
55

sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, pp. 68-69.
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plans, because as a strong central figure, Reza Shah could
not compromise his position to the Allies' plans.

However,

in the interest of Iran, he could have allowed the young
Mohanunad Reza to assume the Throne and to comply with ·the
56
·Allies.

Iran signed an armistice agreement with the two powers

by which the northern section of Iran came under Soviet
supervision, . and the southern section . came under the British.

Moreover, Iran was to expel the nationals of states at war
with Britain and. Russia, and Iran was to facilitate the
ime,
transportation
of supplies
.
"
to Russia.
. 57 At the same t·

the remaining German nationals in Iran were being rounded up.
A number of the Germans escaped.

Britain and Russia blamed

this on the Iranian government, and the two powers sent
troops into Tehran.
Britain and Russia assumed that sending troops into
Tehran would force Reza Shah out of power.

Indeed, Reza Shah

decided to abdicate the Throne in favor of his son,
Mohanunad Reza, for, as he told his son, the· people had always

regarded Reza Shah as an independent and powerful king who
56Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, pp. 72-73.
57sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 71.

would protect their interests.

Therefore, he could not be
the nominal leader of an occupied country. 58
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Thus, Reza Shah abdicated the Throne on September 16,
1941, and went into exile, first to Mauritius.

As the

climate was not suitable for him, he was taken to
Johannesburg, South Africa, where he corresponded with his
son but did not advise him on political matters. 59 Reza Shah
died in July, 1944, and in May, 1950, Iran honored him in a
state funeral.
In accordance with Iran's constitution, Mohanunad Reza
had become Shah as soon as Reza Shah - had abdicated.

However,

he was required to · read and sign the oath of loyalty, which
was accomplished in a simple ceremony ·. 60

In summarizing the situation of Iran during Reza Shah's
reign, it may be said that Iran was coming of age in terms
of modernization and stabilization under Reza Shah.
Reza Shah's program of modernization included the elements
necessary in modernizing a country, and these elements in

combination served as a stabilizing force in Iran.

Reza Shah

built upon each accomplished reform to aid him in revising
other aspects of the country.

For example, Reza Shah acted

58Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 74.
9
S Ibid • , p. 75 •
G O Sanghvi,
' Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 77 •
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upon the first problem of the country's unstable situation
by establishing a unified national army.

Next, Reza Shah

used the national army to quell the tribal revolts and raids,
which had contributed to internal insecurity.

With the

settling of the tribes, a major source of instability had

been eliminated .

Indeed, the national army aided in unifying

and centralizing the country, by which the various regions
of the country came to recognize the authority of the central
government.

This was a major stabilizing achievement of

Reza Shah, for with the effective centralization of the
country, Reza Shah was then able to spread his plans for
modernization and his ideals of nationalism.
Reza Shah was also successful in reforming the civil
administration of the country, which had been chaotic under
the previous regime.

Through the reorganization of the

country into more manageable political divisions, and through
the reorganization of the administrative branches of
government, Reza Shah brought about a more orderly and

efficient management of the country ' � affairs, which

contributed further to the stabilization process.

Reza Shah's reform of the Civil Code, the judicial system,
the Civil Service, and municipal administration made these
facets of the bureaucracy contribute to more efficient
management of the civil administration.

The bureaucracy

became more important in . the overall administration of the
country.
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Regarding the position of the Majlis during the period .
of Reza Shah's reforms, the Majlis complied with Reza Shah's
wish for the adoption of legislation which would make the
reforms possible.

On the topic of land reform, however, the

Majlis would not comply, for most of the Majlis deputies

were · either landowners or were under the. influence of large
landowners who did not want the system of land tenure to be
changed.

Thus, on this matter, the will of the Majlis

prevailed during Reza Shah's reign.

The format of the

Majlis, that is, the practice of deputies forming unorganized
political factions, remained basically unchanged, despite
Reza Shah's attempts to introduce organized parties into the
Majlis.

..

Another major reform which modernized Iran was the

secularization of the judicial system, for this reform
weakened the influence of the reactionary clergy, . and

provided Iran with a modern legal . system, as well as a basis

upon which to abolish the system of capitulations, thereby

establishing the position of Iran before foreign states.

• Shah also
,. promoted the modernization · and stabilization
Reza

of his country by reaching the people with the ideals of
the reform, and providing them with : an understanding of the
government's goals.

Reza Shah reached the people with his

plans through the Society to Guide Public Opinion, as well

•
as• the expansion
and modernization of the educational system.
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Through the introduction of technical education and
specialization there were increased career opportunities for
students returning from abroad, and Iranian students began
to have the opportunity for technical education and training
at home.

Politically, this was an important step in freeing

Iranians from the need for foreign advisors and from having
to employ foreigners to operate Iranian industries.
.

Reforms

in the· area of education and public health, . served to improve
and modernize the conditions of the people, thereby
contributing to the stability of the country.

The social

improvements in the conditions of the people were ·particularly
evident in the reformed status of women, which provided for
a larger segment of the population participating in the
modernizing functions of the country.
An important series of reforms which was essential to
the stabilization of Iran, was the reorganization of the
national economy, for during Reza Shah's reign, the economy
and the financial situation
and became productive.

of the country were developed

In this respect, the reforms in.

agriculture, industry, and banking, as well as foreign trade,
revived the economy of Iran.

Reza Shah had been determined

to reform the . conditions of Iran's foreign relations, and in
this goal he succeeded in gaining . international recognition
for Iran's position.
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Regarding the political aspects of Reza Shah's reforms,
Reza Shah had emerged as the first strong central political
figure for quite some time.

Reza Shah's reign reorganized

and centralized a country that had been administratively
chaotic for decades.

Reza Shah and his reformed army and

administration brought internal security and modernization
to Iran.

Of great political significance was Reza Shah's

having raised the position of Iran internationally.
Reza Shah prepared Iran for independent development and
eliminated foreign interference and domination of the
country.

Through such achievements as the abolition of

capitulations, Reza Shah made· it possible for Iran to deal
on an equal basis with other countries.
In retrospect, the modernization and stabilization of
Iran had been effective throughout Reza Shah's reign.
However, the Second World War was a major destabilizing
force in Iran, for Britain and Russia were determined to
occupy Iran and to use the country for· their own stategic
needs.

As a result, the stability achieved in the country

by Reza Shah was interrupted by the British and Russian
invasion and occupation of Iran in 1941.

CHAPTER III
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REIGN OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH,
1941-1953
The invasion of Iran by the Allied Powers and the
I

subsequent abdication of Reza Shah had thrust �ohammad Reza
Pahlavi into the position· of Shah of Iran.

The dominant

presence of the occupying powers, however, made it seem as
though the Allied Power� were actually the center of
authority. 1 Mohammad Reza Shah cooperated with the Allies,
in the best interest of Iran.

The legal basis for the

Allied presence in Iran, as well as the expectations of both
Iran and the Allied Powers, were negotiated, culminating in
the · Tripartite Treaty of 1942.

The Treaty stated that the

purpose of the Allied presence in Iran was for transporting
troops and supplies into the Soviet Union, and the Treaty
stipulated that Iran was to cooperate in every way to provide
the necessary facilities and labor.

Furthermore, tQe Treaty .

stipulated that the Allied forces were· to be withdrawn within
six months following the end of World War II. 2

1Ramesh Sanghvi, Aryamehr : The Shah of Iran (New York:
Stein and Day, 196 8), p . 91.
2Ibid. , pp. 83-85 .
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Ironically, the Treaty stated that the presence of
Allied forces in Iran was not an occupation; furthermore,. it

was declared that the " territorial integrity, the sovereignty
and the political independence. of Iran" 3 would be respected
by Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the Treaty

stated that the administration of and life in Iran would be
disturbed as little as possible. 4 The activities of the
occupying powers, however, violated the provisions of the
Treaty, for the Allied Powers overstepped the rights they
had gained and treated Iran as a defeated enemy.. 5.

Britain

and the Soviet Union interfered in Iran's internal matters
and dominated the workings of the country.
The Allied Powers were · able to dominate internal matters

such as legislation, communications, and transportation,
primarily because of the absence of a strong indigenous
leader or group, for initially, twenty-two year old
Mohammad Reza Shah was yet inexperienced . in maintaining

control over the country.

Although the young Shah gradually

gained such expertise, the situation in occupied Iran was

similar to that following the · l907 Anglo-Russian Agreement,

for the Soviet Union occupied the.northern provinces of Iran,
3

Ibid. , p. 83.

4 Ibid. , p. 85.

5sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran { Berkeley :
University of California Press, 196 6) , � - 86.

and Britain occupied the southern area, while there was a
neutral area containing Tehran between the two zones.
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The

occupying powers carried on activities typical of wartime
occupation, such as spreading propaganda, bribing officials
and politicians, and interfering in internal matters in
order to further their respective interests.

These

activities were carried on in the occupied zones as well as
in the neutral area of Tehran.

As Britain and the Soviet

Union were traditional rivals in Iran, and each held
traditional interests in the . country, their interference

and �anipulation in Iranian matters were · intense.

Each of

the Allied Powers sought to further its respective interests
in Iran during the occupation. 6
Considering the political and social instability which
prevailed following the abdication of Reza Shah, the Allied
Powers were concerned with the security of their interests.
During the occupation, one of the primary interests of the
Allied Powers in Iran was the security of the transportation
of supplies to the Soviet Union.

Britain and the Soviet

Union, and later the United States, were anxious for the

prevalence of enough internal stability in Iran to · ensure
the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union.

Beyond this

6John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1963), p. 68.
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common cause, however, the Allied Powers held different
concerns in Iran, and employed different methods to secure
their interests.
Concerning Britain's interests and activities in Iran
during the occupation, Britain was concerned �bout long-term
stability for Iran .

Although Britain and the Soviet Union

were wartime allies, they were ideological rivals, and
Britain wanted a stable postwar Iran capable of standing
firm before the Soviet Union.

Britain did interfere in

Iran's internal matters, such as influencing the choice of
parliamentary deputies, and censoring the mail and news in
Iran, and Britain was concerned with political control in
Iran.

Britain, however, was not interested in permanently

dividing Iran, as was the Soviet Union.

Britain considered

its presence as temporary, and envisioned postwar Iran as
independent, but sympathetic to Western interests. 7 Britain
was concerned about the integrity and stability of Iran
mainly in terms of preventing the growth of pro-Soviet

communist forces, as well as Soviet designs, in Iran. · For
this reason, Britain tended to support the conservative

elements in Iran, such as the Muslim clergy, for the British
believed that strong conservative elements would forestall
the growth of pro-Soviet · communist forces.
7Ibid . , p. ·70.

Britain also
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sponsored the return of pro-British political exiles, the
release of pro-British political · prisoners, and the

establishment of the anticommunist, pro-British, National
Will (Eradeh Melli} Party, led by the returned political
exile, Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai. 8 While the Soviet Union
had designs on the northern section of Iran, Britain

considered the strengthening of the Iranian government as
a means to ward off the Soviet Union.
Regarding British propaganda releases in Iran, Britain
maintained information services such as the Public Relations
Bureau, as well as an information program on Radio Tehran,
and an English newspaper.

In these information services �

Britain - publicized achievements of the Allies, particularly
Britain; however, despite the rivalry between Britain and
the Soviet Union, British propaganda did not criticize the
Soviet Union.

On the contrary, Bri'tish policy was· aimed at

convincing the Iranians that there was complete unity among
the Allied Powers. 9 Such a line of propaganda did not
convince the politically aware Iranians that complete unity
existed among the Allies, for Soviet propaganda was critical
of Britain.

As a result, the Iranians viewed Britain as

8Ibid. , p. 74.
9G�orge Lenczowski, Russia and the West in . Iran,
1918-1948 (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1949} ,
p. 258.
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weaker and more· defensive than the Soviet Union ; -therefore,
the Iranians concluded that Britain was· mainly i nterested in
a smooth relationship with the . Soviet Union, and that Britain

might o_btain such a relationship through political compromise
10
In essence, the Iranians feared
with the Soviet Union.
the Soviet Union and tended to distrust Britain.

The

distrustful attitude toward Britain existed, despite the more
open atmosphere which existed in the southern zone, compared
to that in the Soviet occupied zone.

Regarding the differences between ,the respective British

and Soviet zones, · Britain considered its presence in Iran as
temporary, necessary only for the conditions of war, while
the Soviet Union revealed a tendency to remain �n .its zone .

Britain did not control the local civil administration in
the southern area as the Soviet Union did in the northern
area.

Within the British zone, people traveled freely, while

in the Soviet zone travel was restricted.

In addition,

Britain, as well as the Unit�d _ States, shipped in s_upplies
of grain which were needed in Iran to cope with a food ·
shortage - caused by war conditions.

The food shortage was

particularly severe · in southern Iran, for the Soviets had

placed a ban on transporting foo4, especially grain, from
the northern provinces, where it was grown, . to the south,
lOibid. , pp. 260-61.
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where it was needed.

The British shipment was not well

publicized, and the situation was twisted by the Soviets and
the press, who labeled as a "gift, " shipments of grain which
the Soviets finally released to the southern area of Iran. 11
Britain was concerned that stability prevail in Iran,
in order to ensure the delivery of military supplies to the ,
Soviet Union.

In addition, Britain was concerned about the

security of British oil installations in the southern area.
Tribal raids and rebellions were a major threat to the
security of the supply lines a rtd t h e British o il
installations.

Britain, therefore, aided the Iranian

government in. negotiating a settlement with the rebellious
tribes who wanted land which they considered to be tribal
property, to be restored to tribal ownership.

The tribal

rebellions in the southern area were quelied by 1943, which
helped to bring about internal security. 12
,The presence of British forces in Iran was indeed
motivated by military needs, as Britain claimed, and not by
intentions to remain in Iran.

This was evidenced by the

willingness · of Britain to withdraw its troops in May, 1945,

following a favorable turn in the war. · Britain ' s intentions

to withdraw at that early date was dampened, . .however,
11 Ibid. , pp. 194-95.
12 Ibid. , p. 248.

86
because of the Soviet Union's refusal to leave Iran earlier

than six months after the end of the war, as designated in
the · l942 Treaty.

Britain did not wish to allow the Soviet

Union the greater freedom in Iran which British withdrawal
would have provided. · Britain, however, did take the initial

steps of terminating its censorship and information programs

in Iran, . and of� gradually withdrawing British troops and
completing the move before March, 1946, as designated . in the
Treaty, which was not the case with the Soviet Union . 13
As has been stated, both Britain and the Soviet Union.
interfered in the Iranian · political sphere during the

occupation, and both exerted a degree of domination over

their respective zones.

The intentions and maneuvers- of the

Soviet Union, however, exhibited a much greater degree of
domination and control by the Soviets in the - northern zone,
as compared to the British in the southern zone.

The

Soviet Union actually held plans for postwar interests in
Iran.

Such ambitious intentions were revealed in the 1940

Four Power Pact which was secretly concluded by the
Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan.

In the Four Power

Pact, the Soviet Union declared that the area south of the

Soviet Union, toward the Persian Gulf, was within the realm

13Elgin Groseclose, An Introduction to Iran (New York:
.
Oxford University Press, 1947) , p. l85 .
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' terests. 14
' t in
of Sovie

Thus, Soviet intentions to cultivate

its interests in Iran were facilitated by the wartime

occupation of ·the country.

The occupation of the northern

zone of Iran provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity
to exert political, military, and economic domination in the
area.

In this regard, the Soviets assumed full ·control in

the area by ignoring the Iranian government's sovereignty
(despite · the 1942 Treaty), undermining the local Iranian

authorities, and taking over the administration of the
zone. 15 Indeed, the control which the Soviets held in the ·
northern zone of Iran indicated the Soviet- union's intention
to influence changes in the . social, political, and economic
modes in the area, and eventually to absorb the northern zone
of Iran into the Soviet system.
In addition to Soviet plans for future interests in
Iran, the Soviets, like the British, wanted a degree of
internal stability in Iran sufficient for the security of
the military supply lines to the Soviet· Union.

Unlike the

British, however, the Soviets wished for an Iranian

government which . was weak enough to be dissolved for the
16
In this
future fulfillment of Soviet plans in Iran.
14Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948,
p. 193.
1 5Marlowe, Iran, p. 70.

16Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965),
p. 34.
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regard, . the Soviets were· adept at undermining the solvency
and authority of the Iranian government, and they employed a
variety of methods in doing so.

For example, the Soviets

disregarded Iranian customs duties at the northern border;
the Soviets required the Iranian government to provide the
Soviets with materials and facilities at a reduced cost; in

addition, the · soviets made the Iranian government pay for
any materials provided by the Soviets in the name of
protecting Iran's security.

Moreover, the Soviets abused

a number of Iran's economic resources, such as copper �ines,
the Caspian fisheries, and the grains, foodstuffs, and
livestock of the northern provinces. 17
Regarding the food situation, the occupation - of Iran
had brought about a food shortage in the country; however,
grains and foodstuffs were grown and available in the

northern provinces.

The Soviets, however, had confiscated

the grains and food supplies for the use of Soviet soldiers
and would not allow foodstuffs to be sent to the southern
area, where it was needed.

This action aggravated the food

shortage in Iran, which led to bread riots and heightened

the general sense of instability.

The Soviets eventually

allowed shipments of grain to the southern area, thereby
17Groseclose, An Introduction to Iran, p. 185.
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creating a favorable image· of · the Soviets before the Iranian
people. 18
Another method used by the Soviets to increase their

influence in Iran, . and to weaken the authority of the central
government, . was to support the return of political exiles
and the release of political prisoners who would be useful
in Soviet plans.

In this regard, in September, 1941 a

group of Marxist sympathizers who had been imprisoned in
1937 on the · basis of the 1931 anticommunist act, was released.

Although this group, led by Taghi Erani and referred to as
"the 53" because. of the number arrested, did not openly
refer to Communism in its program, the group initiated the
growth of a well organized party, later identified as a
communist party, called the Party of the Iranian Masses

(Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran), and commonly �eferred to as the
Tudah Party. 19 By early 1945, the Tudah Party had effectively
organized its leadership, membership, secret meetings, and
clandestine publications o

By that point, the Soviets were ·

using the Tudah Party to organize · demonstrations and riots

against the Iranian government, and to infiltrate the Majlis.
Such tactics stimulated a degree of chaos and instability.

18Avery, Modern Iran, p. 354.
19Ervand · Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran
:
the Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat, " International Journal
of Middle East Studies, I, N o. 4 (1970) , 299 .

90

Soviet antagonism toward . Iran was intensified in 

September, 1944, for the Soviet Union wanted to obtain an oil
concession in northern Iran.

Except for Tudah members, the

Iranians were against such a concession, and the Majlis
declared that no concessions would be given to any country
dur.ing the wartime occupation.

In addition, a Majlis

leader, Mohammad Mossadegh, encouraged the Majlis to prohibit
any government official or minister from negotiating oil
concessions with any foreign country, without Majlis
approvai. 20 Although official discussions about oil
concessions were quieted for a while, the issue had irritated
the Soviets.

As a result, the Soviets initiated further

antigovernment demonstrations through the Tudah Party.

In

addition, the Soviets criticized Britain and the United
States for having influenced Iran's decision on the oil
concession .

Such criticism may have resulted because

Britain did not openly oppose Iran's negative decision on

the concession, and the American Ambassador · to Tehran stated
that Iran had the right to refuse to grant such a
concession. 21 Indeed, the Soviets certainly disproved the
myth of Allied unity, through the Soviet s' anti-British

20Yahya Armanjani, Iran (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 156.
21Marlowe, Iran, p . 76.
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and anti-American propaganda.

The issue of the oil

concession did not disappear, and it became important
immediately following World War II.
Indeed, the Soviets wielded great power in their occupied
zone ,through political and _ military control.

The · Iranians

of the northern area feared the strength of the Soviet
occupiers.

Consequently, the Soviets attempted to win - some

degree of approval through propaganda.

For example j in

Tehran, the Soviet Embassy utilized press conferences · to

promote a favorable image· of the Soviet Union.

In addition,

the · Soviets sponsored radio broadcasts, theatrical
performances, literature, and a hospital.

Furthermore, the

Soviets enforced good behavior and performance of good . deeds
on the part of Soviet soldiers in Iran.

Such tactics were in

the interest of enhancing the image of the Soviet Union in ·

Iran. · Alert Iranians were aware, however, that such ploys

were elements of Soviet propaganda, and fear of the Soviet
power prevai· 1ed. 22

Despite Soviet attempts· to elicit a favorable response

from the Iranians toward the Soviet Union, anti-Soviet ·

feelings surfaced in the Iranian government,· the Royal Court,

the Army, the Muslim clergy, and the anticommunist National
Will Party.

Under the 1931 anticommunist act, the Tudah

' and t'he West in
22 Lenczowsk 1,
' Iran, 1918 - 194; 8 ,
. Russia

p . 204 .
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Party activities were illegal. · T.hus, the government had the
right to suppress Tudah activities .

In Tehran and the

southern region , the . Iranian government was able to dampen
communist activities through military or police action
against the Tudah Party, . such as dispersing their
demonstrations, raiding Tudah headquarters, or suspending
their press • . In the northern zone, the authority of the

central governme�t was ignored, however, and the local police
had no power, for the Soviets controlled the northern

provinces and supported the growth of Tudah activities. 23
In addition to the - Soviet and British occupation of
Iran, the United States also sent forces, supplies, and food
to Iran, . after the initial Anglo-Soviet occupation of the
country.

Although the Soviet · Union and Britain formalized

their . presence in Iran through the Tripartite Treaty of

1942, th� United States did not sign the Treaty, perhaps
because the United States preferred to be disassociated with
Britain and the Soviet Union, for these two countries were
disliked and distrusted by Iranians. 24 In May, 194 2, the

United States sent supplies to Iran under the Lend Lease Act,
and by 1943, basically noncombatant American troops · were

sent to Iran as the Persian Gulf Command, and those troops ·
23rpid. , p. 235.
24
Avery, Modern Iran, p. 352.
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were · �o aid in the transportation of supplies to the Soviet
Union.

Although the United Stat�s . was not party to the 1942

Treaty, . the presence of the American forces in Irqn was
j ustified, for they were· under the " overall British

command. 11 25

The United States was concerned that internal stability

prevail in Iran, in order to ensure the supply line. to the
Soviet Union.

Moreover, the United States was concerned

about the postwar independence of Iran, . in terms. of the
country's ability to withstand conununist maneuvers.

This

concern became increasingly apparent after the 19 44 oil
concession decision, f�r the United States then became more
involved in Iran's internal affairs, in order to counter
the. intense pressure of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the

United States felt that Britain was not doing enough to
bolster Iran's resistance to Soviet pressure. 26 For example,
while Britain did not openly oppose · Iran's refusal to grant
the Soviet Union an oil concession, Britain did not campaign
strongly against the Soviet request, for Britain felt that

if Iran felt . strong enough to refuse a Soviet concession,
Iran might one day cancel the British oil concession in

southern Iran.
Joseph M. · Upton, The History of Modern Iran
(Cambridge: Ha�vard· U�iversity Press, 1970) , p. 82.
26Marlowe, Iran, p. 76.
25
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American interest in Iran . prompted Iranians to feel
that the introduction of a third power in Iran would break
the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry . for· control in Iran .
The Iranians also saw the United States as a source of
economic and military aid.

For its part, the United States .

provided financial aid as well as expert advisors to help
Iran stabilize its economy and society.

The presence of

American troops and advisors was more· palatable to Iranians
than was the presence of the other two powers.

Although the

American Office of War Information did provide some American
propaganda in the form of an American. newspaper and general

information, such devices were on a smaller scale than those
27
.
. or the Soviet.
.
.
Union.
o f Britain
·
Indeed, the receptive attitude of Iranians toward

American . operations and personnel provided a basis for
favorable relations between the United States and Iran.
Further, the United States seemed to have no long term
designs on Iran, which made Iranians more comfortable with

America's wartime presence in their country.

Indeed, the

main concerns of the United States in Iran were maintaining
Iran's security and stability and thwarting communist

encroachment.
27Lenczowsk'1, Russia
' Iran, 1918
' and the West in
. - 1948,
pp. 278-79 .
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Concerning the interference of the occupying powers in
domestic Iranian matters, one of the · important methods by

which they wielded control was through influencing the Majlis
( the national representative assembly).

Such a practice

included influencing the selection of candidates and
officials who suited the respective interests of the

occupying powers, and the dismissal of some other officials.
For example, in the election of the Fourteenth Majlis in

1944, the Soviet · Union exerted great influence in the choice
of candidates

from the north.

Although nine Tudah

candidates were elected to the Majlis, the Majlis . was
composed mainly of conservative elements of society.

The

Majlis, in fact, rejected the credentials of a major Tudah
figure, Jaafar Pishevari, who had been elected to the . Majlis
from Tabriz.

The remaining eight Tudah · members resented this

action; consequently, the Tudah deputies exhibited their
discontent by opposing every cabinet until the spring of

1945,· when the Soviets approved of the proposed cabinet. 28

With the added irritation of the 1944 oil concession dispute,

the Tudah members, and the Soviets, exerted troublesome
pressure in the Majlis and the country.·

The Majlis was typically made up of many factions

rather than true · political parties.

However, as the Tudah

28 zabih, The Cormnunist Movement in Iran, pp. 87-88 D ·
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Party became more well organized, the other members of the
Majlis realized that the communist movement was growing in
strength , and that the only way to counter the communist
movement would be organization.

Thus, the pro-British

National Will Party became more· cohesive in its policies.

As it were,· the political parties actually identified with
one of the occupying powers.

The British and Soviets had

influence over members of the Maj_lis mainly because such
deputies traditionally offered their allegiance to the

center of power, and while in Reza Shah's time they had been .
" loyal" to Reza Shah, during the occupation, the Allied
Powers were the apparent sources of power. 29
Iq essence, the Majlis was not a strong or cohesive
body during the wartime occupation .

The selection of

candidates was influenced by the Allied Powers, as was the
action taken by certain deputies as members of the Majlis.
The Majlis, as well as the ministries, were characterized
by frequent turnovers, which reflected the instability of
the political arena in Iran.

In view of the interference and domination on the · part

of the Allied Powers, the Allied Powers clearly acted as
though they had occupied a defeated country, despite the
terms of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942.

Furthermore, such

attitudes and actions prevailed . despite the promises made
29sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 91.
.

,
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by the· Allied Powers at the Tehran Conference in November,
1943, at which Chruchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt reiterated
their acknowledgment of Iran's sovereignty, . integrity, and

independence.

M oreover, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the

United States acknowledged Iran's contribution to the war
effort against the enemy.

The Allied Powers also promised

to compensate Iran for the economic problems caused by the

·occupation.

These promises encouraged Mohammad Reza Shah's

belief that Iran's effective independence would be
restored. 3
Furthermore, Mohammad Reza Shah was emphatic

°

in his · stand that the Allied Powers · withdraw within six

months after the war.

· Depsite the conditions of occupation, Mohammad Reza
.
Shah maintained his position as constitutional Monarch. In
the · best interest of the independence of his country,

however, the Shah cooperated with the Allied Powers� . In
addition, the experience gained by Mohammad Reza Shah during
the wartime occupation brought a deeper understanding to the
young Shah.

In particular, he came to the conclusion that

the traditional neutrality was not a viable . policy for
maintaining Iran's independence.

Furthermore, the attitudes

and actions of the Allied Powers· during the occupation

reinforced Mohammed Reza Shah's awareness that the

30Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (New
York: McGraw-Hill, · 1960), pp. 8 0- 81.
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Soviet · Union harbored ambitious plans . toward Iran, and that

positive · alliance with the other powers was perhaps one of
Iran's best barriers against Soviet aggression. 31
The effects of the Allied Occupation in Iran were
basically destabilizing.

Initially, the absence of Reza

Shah left a gap in the central authority of the country, for
there was no strong figure or cohesive group capable of
maintaining control.

Many of the people · reverted to

practices which were . common before the reforms of Reza Shah
took place, such as wearing traditional clothing and the
veil, and engaging in. superstitious practices. 32 More
importantly, the administration and legislation reverted to
the weak and disorganized conditions typical in pre-Reza Shah
times, such as the _ prevalence of clerical influence in
political matters and the decline in the effective authority
of the government. 33 As in other occupied countries,
bribery and corrupt · activities spread .

The majority of

Iranians, however, resented the occupation · of their country
by Britain and the Soviet Union, particularly because of

the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry for control in· Iran.

From such resentment grew the strong, though unorganized,

31oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) , p . 109.
32Armanjani, Iran, p. 151.
33 wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 107.
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nationalistic feelings of the Iranians, which were to prevail
after the · war.

In addition, the unstable atmosphere in Iran

was heightened by the anti-West and antigovernment
demonstrations incited by the Tudah Party.
In addition · to the degeneration of political life as

a result of the occupation, the economy also deteriorated,
as evidenced by the great decline in industrial output and
the high rate.of inflation.

Elements contributing to the

economic decline were the monopoly of the transportation
system by the · Allied Powers, the printing of excess paper
currency, great rise in prices, and expenses imposed upon
Iran by the · occupation. 34 In addition, the needs of the
Allied troops and the Soviet ban on sending food to the
southern provinces aggravated the food shortage and led to
bread riots, which further reflected the instability of the
period.

In essence, the occupation was characterized by

Anglo-Soviet domination of the country, . with the indigenous

officials lacking coherent organization and leadership .

Moreover, the frequent turnover of officials reflected the

prevalent instability in the land.

Thus, in terms · of stability and instability, the

occupation · of Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union marked a

period of political, economic, and social instability in the
34Groseclose, - Introduction to Iran, PPe 174, 180.
.
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country. · Internally, there was little organized leadership
in the Majlis or the ministries.

The collapse of the economy

intensified the unsta.ble situation, in which the people

resented the· violation of their land by the occupying powers.
Regarding the attitudes of the latter, the Soviet Union
held ambitions toward Iran, which were apparent in the
far-reaching control which the Soviets wielded i n the
northern zone, having ignored Iranian authority.

With such

intentions, the Sovi'ets sought to weaken the Iranian
government, and the Tudah Party served as the domestic agent
of the Soviet government.

Although the Soviets realized

fhat a degree of internal stability was necessary. in Iran,
in order for supplies to reach the Soviet Union, the Soviets
felt that such stability could be limited, thereby making
Iran a potentially easy target for Soviet plans.
Regarding such Soviet plans, Britain recognized Soviet
intentions.

Therefore, Britain was mainly concerned about

maintaining stabiiity in Iran as a barrier against Soviet
moves in the country.
Soviet satellite.

Britain did not want Iran to become a

In addition, Britain was concerned about

the security of the supply line to the - Soviet Union, as well ·
as the security of British oil installations in southern
Iran.

Britain was concerned about internal stability for

these two reasons.

Britain attempted to support internal

stability in Iran _by supporting the conservative and
nationalist elements, and the National · Will Party.
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Regarding the position of the United States as a third
ally present in Iran, . the United States was also concerned
about the security of the supply line to the Soviet Union .

Moreover, the United States wanted the stability of Iran to
be firm enough to withstand . Soviet · ambitions toward the
country.

In time, the United States came to replace Britain

as the Western power most actively involved in maintaining
Iran's stability through economic, . military, and advisory
aid.

With the ending of World War II in August, 1945, the
Allied troops were, according to the Tripartite T�eaty of
1942, to be withdrawn from Iran by March, 1946.

The British

and Americans readily complied with the Treaty ; in fact,
those two powers had begun gradually withdrawing their troops
at a much earlier date .

The Soviet Union, however, refused

to withdraw its troops by the designated date, and this
action was entangled with a significant occurrence in Iran,
namely, the uprising of separatist movements in the northern

province of Azarbayjan.

The uprising reflected the political

instability in Iran, as well as the Soviet Union's role in
promoting that instability.

In August, 1945, armed ·Tudah supporters backed by

Soviet troops occupied governmental buildings in Tabriz, the
capital of Azarbayjan.

The Tudah rebels, intending to

control Tabriz and the area, then issued a manifesto
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demanding provincial autonomy and recognition of , Azari-Turki
as the official language of the province.

The revolutionaries

demanded such recognition on the - ground that the people of
Azarbayjan formed a separate."nationality"
with a distinct
.
heritage, language, and lifestyle, and, as such, the

Azarbayjanies had the right to local self-determination.
Although · the rebellion was quelled within . several weeks, and
the local Iranian governor officially regained control, this

incident was a preview of the intensified revolution to
come. 35

The leader of the Azarbayjan separatist movement was

Jaafar Pis hevari, a communist who had formerly lived in the
.
3
Soviet Union for a number of years. 6 It was more than
coincidental that the leader of this movement was a Soviet
inspired communist, for the Soviet Union was the force which
agitated the Azarbayjani revolutionaries to rebel against
the central Iranian government for the autonomy of the
province of Azarbayjan.

The Soviets incited the separatist

movement because they believed that an autonomous Azarbayjan,

under a Soviet supported regime, would provide a base for
Soviet· interests in Iran.

Moreover, the Soviets believed

35Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948,
pp. 286-87.
36Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 115.
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that , eventually, an· autonomous Azarbayjan could be absorbed
into the· Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as part of the
Azarbayjan Soviet Socialist Republic.
In September, 1945, Pishevari dissolved the local Tudah
Party in Azarbayjan and reorganized the members into the
newly formed Democratic Party of Azarbayjan (Firqah-i
Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan) •

Pishevari explained that he dissolved

the local Tudah· Party because he felt that the Tudah Party
did· not represent the needs of Azarbayjan. 37 A more probable
explanation is that the Soviet· Union directed Pishevari to
dissolve the local Tudah Party and to organize the Democratic
Party of Azarbayjan, because the connections of the Tudah
Party with Soviet interests were well known, and, since the
Soviet Union did not want to be openly associated with the
Azarbayjan insurrection, the Tudah Party could not have
directed the separatist movement.
The revolutionary leadership in Tabriz presented its
program to the central Iranian government, and negotiated

for provincial autonomy within the state of Iran, as well as

the use of Azari-Turki as the official language.

In

addition, the Democratic Party of A zarbayjan called . for .

additional representatives in .the . Tehran Majlis, and for the

37Abrahamian, " Communism and Communalism in Iran: the
Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat, " p. 291.

formation of a Provincial Council.38
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The central Iranian

government would not agree to the demand of autonomy, nor
the recognition · of Azari-Turki· as the official language , on

the basis that such a move · would make a multinational system
in Iran, which contrasted the unitary system in the Iranian
Constitution. 39 With the rejection of their demands, the
revolutionaries rebelled and gained control of Azarbayjan.
On December 12, 1945, the rebels proclaimed the "Autonomous
Republic of Azarbayjan, " with· a legislative assembly and ·

Pishevari as Prime Minister. ·

The apparent success · of the rebellion in - Tabriz

encouraged an uprising among separatist Kurds of western
Azarbayjan.

The Kurds regarded themselves as distinct from

Azarbayjanies of Turkish heritage. · Consequently, the Kurdish
separatists felt no loyalty to the revolutionary gov�rnment
in �abriz.

Thus, on December 15, 1945, the independence of

a Kurdish peoples' republic was declared, with the town of
·
Mahabad as its center. 40 In January, 1946, a Mahabad Chief,
Qazi Mohammad, . was elected president.

38L. P e Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran,
.
1941-1948, " Middle East Journal, . II I, No. 1 (1949), 56.
39 zabih, The Communist Movement in.Iran, p. 102.
.
40Archie Roosevelt, Jr. , . "The Kurdish Republic of
Mahabad, " Middle East Journal, I, No. 3 (1947), 257.
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The separatist movements were initially successful in
declaring autonomy for the Azarbayjan and Kurdish regions.
While it is true· that there was a small amount of support
for autonomy within the proYince, apparently, the success
of the rebellion could not have 'f:Bnaen achieved by the· militant
separatists alone, for the level . of indigenous support for

the move was not great enough, nor was the supply of arms.
The rebellion initially achieved its goal of autonomy
because the Soviet Union. supported the move · and protected
the rebels.

The Soviet Union· intended to eventually absorb

Iranian Azarbayjan into the U. S. S. R. , and, had there been
other indications of Iranian Azarbayjan's willingness to
join the U. S . S. R. , the linguistic ties between the · Iranian
Province of Azarbayjan and the Azarbayjan .soviet Socialist

Republic would have been an additional element facilitating
the absorption of Iranian Azarbayjan.

The Soviet Union

was further encouraged in its plan by the spark of separatist
feelings and the conununist groups in · the prov�nce of
Azarbayjan. 41 The Soviet troops backed the insurrection by

preventing Iranian troops from entering Azarbayjan, and the
Soviet Union protected the puppet regime in Azarbayjan by
maintaining the - Soviet troops in the province.

The presence

41Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964) , pp. 118, 125.
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of the Soviet troops aided the rebel regime in instilling a

•
reign
o f fear over ,the province. 42'
I

Soviet interference in the province of Azarbayjan·was
p rotested by the Iranian government, for such actions on the
part of the Soviet Union were clearly contrary to the terms
of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942.

Britain and the United

States joined Iran in protesting the Soviet· Union's action
of p r eventing Iranian troops from entering Tabriz in order
to quell the December, 1945, rebellion.

The two Western

powers and Iran also protested the Soviet support of the
rebel regimes of Azarbayjan· and the Kui-dish "republic."

In

January, .1946, the Iranian government protested before the
Security Council of the United Nations, where an intense
debate followed.
While the debate continued in the United Nations the
Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, went to Moscow to
negotiate with the Soviet leaders, Stalin.and Molotov.
The goal of Iran was to make the Soviet Union.terminate its
support of the rebellious regimes and to make the Soviet
Union abide by the date set for evacuation of troops
(March 2, 1946).

Through heated negotiations, an agreement

was finally reached on April 4, 1946, .in which the Soviet
Union agreed that the situation in.Azarbayjan was an internal
42sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 129.
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Iranian matter, and that the Soviet troops would be evacuated
from Iran by May 9, 1946.

Iran, through Prime Minister Qavam,

agreed to discuss an oil concession in the north, to be

formed as an . Iranian-Soviet company ; however, this agreement
was tentative, and was to be finalized by action of the
Fifteenth Majlis (which at that point had not been elected).
Iran also agreed to consider the program of the Democratic
·
Party of Azarbayjan. 43 Thus, the Soviet Union promised
before the Security Council . that Soviet troops would be
withdrawn, . and, indeed, by May 9, 1946, Soviet troops had

been evacuated.

Consequently, the Pishevari regime and the

Kurdish "republic" were· abandoned by their Soviet sponsors.
Such a conclusion to . an initially enthusiastic Soviet·

intervention implies that the Soviets realized that they had
little to gain by continued support of the regimes, or by
maintaining Soviet troops in Iran.

On the other hand, the

Soviets felt that the situation could be used in pressuring
Iran into agreeing to the long aw�ited oil concession in the

northern area of Iran.

Another major factor which prompted the Soviets to

withdraw their support from Azarbayjan was that the Pishevari
regime had lost its initial popularity, for many of those

who originally backed the separatist movement . had become
43washington Post, April 6, 1946, p. 2, col. 2.
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dissatisfied with the rebel regime, for they realized that

the Pishevari regime did not fulfill the early promises,
such as introducing social and land reforms. 44 The Soviets
then realized that maintaining an autonomous region
sympathetic to Soviet interests, would be difficult, due to
the lack of any real indigenous support for the rebel

regimes.

Thus � the Soviets withdrew, realizing that they

had more · to gain in the . promised oil concession than in

maintaining Soviet troops and a precarious autonomous region

in Iran .
With the Soviet withdrawal, the way was clear for the
Iranian government to regain control of the Azarbayjan
region .

In preparing for the recovery of Azarbayjan, the

Iranian · goverriment announced that the upcoming elections
would be held throughout Iran, including Azarbayjan Province,
and the Mahabad region , and that in order to supervise the
elections and maintain order, Iranian troops would be sent
to Azarbayjan .

Azarbayjan.

On December 10, 1946, Iranian . troops entered

Pishevari and his followers· attempted to resist,

but without Soviet backing the Pishevari regime was totally

weakened.

Moreover, the people of Azarbayjan welcomed the

Iranian . troops and actually attacked the leaders and members
of the Democratic Party of Azarbayjan. 45 In the incident,
4 4 cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p . 128.
.
45Ibid. ,
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some of the Party leaders, including Pishevari, escaped to

the Soviet Union. · Following the recovery of Azarbayjan, the

Iranian Army regained control of the Mahabad region.

In

this case, the three main · Kurdish leaders were hanged by
Iranian authorities and others were arrested.

The Kurdish

tribes did not resist the Iranian Army, for they had . not

been enthusiastic about the Soviet supported puppet regime.

Nor were the tribes particularly loyal to the central Iranian
government, for they preferred to be left to their own tribal
governing, unhampered by any centralized government.
The Democratic Party of Azarbayjan explained that it
had retreated, resulting in the collapse of the regime,
because it seemed that engaging in armed resistance would
arouse Anglo-American intervention on the Soviet border.
The Party said that it would be more reasonable to retreat
and to return when conditions were more suitable, that is,
when the peasants and laborers could be organized into a
revolutionary force. 46 The Democratic Party of Azarbayjan,
in effect, admitted that the majority of the population of

Azarbayjan had not been behind the separatist movement.

lack of indigenous support for the · Pishevari regime was

The

related to the fact that the interests and goals of the
majority of

the

population of Azarbayjan conflicted with the

46 zabih, The Communist Movement · in Iran, pp. 117-18.
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policies and goals · of the Soviet inspired separatist
movement.

Although the people of Azarbayjan were · proud of

their cultural - heritage, and had always wanted recognition
of their distinct background and dialect, as opposed to
blending with all other Persians, the majority of the
population of Azarbayjan did not support the movement for
autonomy.

While initially a segment of the population of

Azarbayjan was impressed with· Pishevari's promises of social
and land reforms, and had backed him, many . of his original
supporters soon became aware of the superficiality of his
promises, withdrew their support, and joined the majority
of Azarbayjanies in welcoming the troops of the central
Iranian government.
Thus, with· the collapse of the Democratic Party of
Azarbayjan, the Tudah Party was the only effective communist
party in Iran.

Following the Soviet · defeat in Aza�bayjan

however, the Soviet Union . had temporarily stopped using the

Tudah Party as an active Soviet agent; that is, for a while,
the Tudah Party did not actively sponsor Soviet interests in

In addition, an ideological split in the Tudah Party
developed. 47
Iran.

The Azarbayjan insurrection reflects the political

instability prevalent in Iran at the end of World War II .
47Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran, 194119 4 8, " p. 60.
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Support for establishing regional autonomy existed among
Azarbayjan activists who, above all, wanted recognition of
their distinct heritage and culture.

This movement was

fanned without difficulty by Soviet agitation and the
reorganization of the local Tudah Party into the · Democratic
Party of Azarbayjan.

The relative ease with which a region

of a country could be agitated and led into a rebellion. in
the name of autonomy was an indication of the prevailing
political instability.

Furthermore, the fact that the

Soviet Union was able, at least in the short run, to prevent
the central Iranian government from quelling the rebellion ,
and that the Soviet Union blatantly interfered and maintained
puppet regimes in Tabriz and Mahabad, reflected the
preponderance of the Soviet Union and the apparent lack of
authoritative power on the part of the Iranian government.
The situation did alter, however, for, despite the fact that
the Soviet Union was the dominant power in the north, and
that Iran was a small, occupied country, Iran did manage to
maintain sufficient internal stability and · rally support from

the West to secure Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran.

Thus, the ability of Iran to prompt the withdrawal of Soviet

support · from the rebel regimes, and the evacuation of Soviet
troops from Iran, reflected sources of stability and strength
in Iran.
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One of Iran's sources of strength was British and
American support of Moharrunad Reza Shah in his protest against
the Soviets.

Second, Iran exhibited a degree of internal

strength with its bargaining power, for the tentative
promise of an oil agreement . by Prime Minister Qavam, to be
finalized by the Majlis, gave an advantage to Iran.

This

advantage resulted from the Fifteenth Majlis' refusal to

ratify the oil agreement . made by Prime Minister Qavam, for
the Majlis maintained that the Prime Minister had no legal

right to conclude any such agreement.

Furthermore, the

American Ambassador to Tehran, George V . Allen, had said that
the American people would support Iran's right to sell or to
refuse to sell Iranian resources.

The Majlis, encouraged by

apparent American support, confidently rejected the oil

agreement. 4 8

The Soviets had wanted the oil concession

enough to abandon their puppet regimes, . yet, the Iranians
had managed to insert a condition that the concession would
be final only upon ratification by the Majlis.

Thus, Iran's

ability to prompt the Soviets to withdraw revealed that Iran
had a degree of strength and stability enabling it to deal

with a power such as the Soviet Union.

Those elements of

strength were Iran's Western allies and its bargaining power.
48

!.

Marlowe, Iran, p. 83.
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Another pocket of stability, which was to prove of
great value in the future, was the loyalty of the Iranian
Army to Mohammad Reza Shah.

Mohammad Reza Shah was able to

recover Azarbayjan through the use of the Army, . which
followed the Shah's directions, entered Tabriz, fought the
resisting separatists, and regained control of the province
of Azarb�yjan for the central Iranian government.

Thus,

Iran in the post World War II years exhibited instability;
however, the country had elements of stability which could
be relied upon.
Of great significance to the matter of stability in
Iran was the situation of the communist movement in the
country.

The movement dated back to 1918.

With the . rise of

Reza Shah the communist movement went underground, and in
1931 communist activities were banned by law.

Many communist
.
.
' to exi· 1e. 4 9
party mernbers were 1mpr1sone
d, and others went in
Important were the arrest and imprisonment in 1937 of Taghi
Erani and his followers, for when his group was released

from prison in 1941 (minus Erani, who had died in prison),
it was they who formed the Tudah Party.

Indeed, the record

of the Tudah activities between 194 1 and 1946, revealed the
trend of the communist movement in Iran.

Although the party

initially disclaimed any connection with the Soviet Union,
4 9wilber, Contemporary Iran, pp. 135--36.
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and avoided mentioning Communism in party policies, the true
nature of the Tudah Party was gradually revealed, and the
identity with Soviet interests became more apparent by
1943-44.

Moreover, the connection between Soviet interests

and the Tudah Party (and its offshoot the Democratic Party
of Azarbayjan) wis openly apparent in the Azarbayjan
insurrection of 194 5 , which was a high point in ·the communist
movement in Iran, despite the 1931 ban on communist
activities which was legally in effect at · that period.

The

Azarbayjan insurrection was due to Soviet agitation, for the
Soviets wanted an autonomous Azarbayjan to be the Soviet
foothold in postwar Iran; moreover, the Soviets were planning
to absorb the Azarbayjan region into the

u.s .s.R.

Thus,

during that period, the communist movement was " a serious
threat. to the political stability 11 5 0 of Iran.
While the Soviet occupation of northern Iran . had

revived communist activity in Iran, . the withdrawal of Soviet
support from the Azarbayjan regime and the evacuation of

Soviet troops.from Iran had the reverse effect.

Party declined.

The Tudah

The Tudah Party's active campaign of

supporting Soviet interests in Iran temporarily ceased, and

this coincided with an ideological factioning within the

party, which was mainly over the degree to which the Tudah
50

Ibid. , p. 14 0 .
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Party should be involved with Soviet interests.

The

Democratic Party of Azarbayjan was still in existence, but
for all practical purposes, the party had collapsed.

The

Tudah Party managed to stay alive, despite · the defeat, and
in one respect, the withdrawal of Soviet· troops had aided
the Tudah Party, for anticommunists could not continue to
proclaim that the Tudah Party was merely a tool of the
Soviet Union, surviving only by the · protection of Soviet

troops.

Indeed, this · situation prompted the Tudah Party

to attempt to convince the Iranian people that the Tudah
Party was purely an indigenous Iranian organization and was
not connected with the Soviet Union. 51 This policy became
an important element in the post 1946 tevival of the Tudah
Party.

The Tudah · Party made great efforts to revise its

organization, in terms of its leaders, members, and
activities, in order to remedy the decline it had
experienced, and to solve the party £actioning.
The revived Tudah Party · became more active.

The

postoccupation period was ripe for Tudah activities, because
the party preached social reforms and appealed to the

working class, weary of the economic and social burdens with
which they were burdened .

Iran's political and economic

instability, which followed the withdrawal of the Allied
51 zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, pp. 123-24.
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forces, was used by the Tudah to promote support for the

party, for · the Tudah · Party called for the nationalization of
Iran's industries and the division of large agricultural
holdings in its appeal for followers. 52 Such methods gained
the support of workers and students for the Tudah Party
until 1949.
In February, 1949, an unsuccessful attempt was made to
assassinate Mohammad Reza Shah.

This incident prompted the

government to prohibit communist and other antimonarchical
activities.

Thus, the Tudah Party, and its organ, the

United Central Council of Unified Trade Unions of Iranian
Workers (the United Council), were · banned.

Such a move was

justified because the would-be assassin was a· member of a
union affiliated with the United Council.

Martial law was

proclaimed, and Tudah· members were arrested ; however, the
main party leaders fled to communist countries. 53 The
government was concerned with suppressing the extremists
and strengthening the stability of Iran.

Thus, an era of

underground activities by the communist movement began.

The

Tudah Party and its publications were clandestine until
1951, when restra ints were somewhat relaxed .
52Marlowe, Iran, p. 87.
53
zabih, The Conununist Movement in Iran, pp. 164-65.
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The relationship of the communist movement in Iran to
the situation of stability in the country is significant.
One of the most destabilizing actions inspired by the
communist movement in· Iran was the Azarbayjan separatist
movement of 1945.

The ties of the Tudah Party to the Soviet

Union were a great threat, for the success of the insurrection
would have provided the Soviet Union with a permanent
foothold in Iran.

While the communist . movement was defeated

by the withdrawal of Soviet· troops from Azarbayjan and the
recovery of the province by the central Iranian government,
the Tudah Party revived its activities by 1948.
Indeed, the revival of the Tudah·at that time was a
special threat to Iran's stability, for the Tudah Party
attempted to promote itself as an indigenous force, unaligned
with the Soviet Union, and as a proponent of prosperity and
social equality for the Iranian.masses.

The Tudah Party

became well organized and was gaining strength in the
unstable postwar period.

In 1949, the renewed ban on

communist activities effectively dispersed the Tudah Party,
sending the party underground, while the leaders were·
arrested or went into exile.

The Tudah Party rose again,

however, because during the period of Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh, the communist party took advantage of the
relaxation of restraints on communist activities.

During

the Mossadegh period, the Tudah Party used a number of

\
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front organizations on · the surface, and continued its
involvement in demonstrations and riots with the intention
of undermining Iran's stability and the Monarch's authority.
The period of Prime Minister Mossadegh, the early 1950s,
was the most trying period for Iran in terms of stability
and instability.

The issues and political figures who arose

during that period led to the climax of a 1953 coup d'etat i
which marked the turning point in Iran.

An analysis of the

issues which led to the 1953 coup d'etat reveals that there
were a number of interwoven issues involved.
Firstly, in the aftermath of World War II, Iran was an
economically and politically exhausted country.

Despite the

problems brought to Iran by the Allied occupation, the
withdrawal of the troops also brought economic problems, such
as unemployment, and consequently frustration.

The situation

was ripe for the growth of extremist groups of the left and
the right .

The most notable leftist group was the Tudah ·

Party, and the most notable rightist group was the Devotees
of Islam (Fidayan-i-Islam) • 54
In the deteriorated economic conditions of postwar Iran,

definite economic planning was necessary.
54ArmanJan1,
' ' Iran, p. 160

Mohanunad Reza Shah
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felt that increased oil revenues would provide funds for
economic development.

American advisors drafted a national

development program for Iran designed to promote the
development of industry, oil production, agriculture, and
other fields.

This program was adopted by the Iranian

government in July, 1949, as the First Seven Year Plan, to
be directed by the Seven Year Plan Organization, and to be
financed by government revenues from the oil industry. 55 In
addition, Mohanunad Reza Shah hoped to receive increased
financial assistance from the United States.

At that time,

however, the United States would not increase the financial
aid it was already supplying under the Truman Doctrine.

Such

a rejection initiated anti-American feelings, and strengthened
the position of the Majlis coalition of nonconununist
nationalists known as the "National Front.· "

In addition,

the rejection prompted agitation for an increase in oil
revenues, since this would be the source of finance for the
Seven Year . Plan . •

By 1948, there began negotiations to revise the 1933

oil agreement, between the Iranian government and the

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

There arose great

controversy over the oil situation with both leftists and
rightists exerting pressure on the Majlis.

Even

55Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 138.
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Mohammad Reza Shah, whose concern was for the development of
his country, was criticized by extremists.
heightened throughout the country.

Emotions were

In February, 194 9, an

attempt . was made· on the life of Mohammad Reza Shah.

This

shocked the people into realizing that, had Mohammad Reza Shah
been assassinated, Iran would have plunged into a state of
anarchy. 56 Because extremists were connected with the
attempted assassination, the Tudah Party and all
antimonarchist activities were ba nned.

In consideration of

the political conditions, the Majlis voted to strengthen
Mohammad Reza Shah's constitutional powers.

In this regard ,

a Senate was established, to which Mohammad Reza Shah
appointed one-half of the members.

In addition,

Mohammad Reza Shah gained the right to dissolve the Majlis
and order new elections.
The main controversy of the period was the revision of
the oil agreement with the AIOC, and most visible in the
controversy were the member groups of the National Front,

whose articulate leader was Mohannnad Mossadegh.

Mossadegh

himself was of a wealthy landowning family, and he had been

involved in political life from his early adult years.

nationalists within the National Front were · from many

56Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York: William
Morrow, 1965), p. 388.

The
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different segments of Iranian society, and they included
religious clerics, merchants, professionals, and students,
who were of various political and economic backgrounds, such
ps nonconununist leftists of the intelligentsia, members of
the working class and of the upper class.

The National Front

was a conglomeration of various groups loosely labeled as a
coalition because of their avowed hatred for the foreign
influence in Iran.
cohesion.

The coalition, however, lacked any real

There was no well defined policy, aside from

ousting the foreigners, especially the British.

Although

there was no formal organization within the National Front,
there were political groupings which made up a Left Wing,
center groups, and a conservative Right Wing, as well as
Nati6nalist extremists.

The center and conservative Right

Wing was the focal point of the National Front, because
Mossadegh was identified with this segment. 57
Related to the National Front ' s hatred of foreign
influence was Mossadegh's proposal that Iran neither grant
concessions to any country, nor allow the influence of any
country in Iran.

This would have created a situation in

which all foreign countries would have been excluded from
Iran.

Therefore, this policy was referred to as "Negative
57cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 265-66.
.
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Equilibrium" or "Negative Neutrality.11 58

As a force

attempting to eliminate foreign influence in Iran, .the format
of the . .National Front was that of negative objectives.

In

this regard, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company became the target
of the National Front, for, as the Soviet request for a
northern oil concession had been rejected in 1947, a balance
would exist only if the oil of Iran were nationalized and
the British company expropriated.

The time was ripe for

the National Front's objectives, for Iranians were
dissatisfied with the unequal treatment, and the unequal oil
returns, imposed upon Iran by the AIOC.

Indeed, the National

Front grasped the opportunity to agitate against the AIOC,
and to champion Iranian nationalism through.the call for the
nationalization of IranJs oil.
Aside from the National Front's aversion to foreign
influence, the National Front groups had other reasons for
initiating agitation against the AIOC.

For example, groups

of conservative landlords and clerics who maintained
religious endowments (waqfs) were opposed to Mohammad Reza
Shah's plan to distribute the Royal Estates to the peasants,
and such groups, interested in maintaining the feudal system,
turned the attention of the people from land reform to the
emotional issue of the nationalization of oii. 59 In
58
59

Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p.

8 4.

sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 172.
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addition, members of the Majlis managed to escape an
anticorruption inquiry, which was being waged by
Prime Minister Ali Razmara, by focusing attention·on oil
.
60
d.1scuss1ons.
Moreover, it has been stated that Mossadegh used the
emotional issue of the nationalization of oil and the
ousting of the British as a means of propelling himself ·into
a position of popularity and power.61 Mossadegh and the
National Front easily directed the attention of the Iranian
people toward the oil issue because the Iranians disliked
the British.

The Iranian people were willing to back a

leader or group who would rid Iran of the British co�pany,
and secure for Iran its rightful oil revenues.

Indeed, such

feelings explain the support which the Iranian population
initially gave to Mossadegh, for he promised them a more
prosperous life, free of the British overseers.
Negotiations between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and
Iran were carried out in order to revise the 1933 oil
agreement.

A Supplemental Agreement, which proposed a

fifty-fifty sharing of the oil profits, was drawn up by the
AIOC, and was submitted to the Majlis in February, 1951.
The Majlis Oil Commission, .of which Mossadegh was the
60Avery, Modern Iran, p. 417.
61Marlowe, Iran, p. 92.
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chairman, was to consider the Supplemental Agreement and
offer its recommendations to the Majlis.

Mossadegh could

not argue for the nationalization of oil on the basis of the
benefits that might be derived from such a move, for
nationalization would not have been an economic asset at that
time, due to Iran's inability to operate the oil industry at
that time.

Indeed, Mohammad Reza Shah, who did not oppose

the principle of nationalization as such, realized that Iran
did not then have the financial or technical ability to
operate the oil industry. 62 The views of Mohammad Reza Shah
on the situation revealed the Shah's concern about the
economic development of Iran.

Mossadegh, on the other hand,

championed the nationalization of oil on an emotiona·l basis,
for he wanted to expropriate the British and to gain personal
popularity. .
Due to the emotions of the time, the Supplemental
Agreement was rejected, and the Majlis Oil Commission
proposed the nationalization of the oil industry.

Prime Minister Razmara opposed the move, for he realized

that Iran was not then capable of operating the oil industry.

On March 7, 1951, Razmara was murdered by a member of the
religious fanatical group, the Devotees of Islam.

Shocked

by the action, the Majlis quickly approved the nationalization
62sanghvi,
Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 179.
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proposal, which a number of Majlis deputies actually
opposed. 63 The . deputies had been intimidated, however, by
rioting mobs which had been incited . by Mossadegh, and, in
order to appease the extremists, ·the deputies approved the
nationalization.
The Nationalization Law was not recognized as legitimate
by Britain.

In an attempt to ensure the continued production

of the oil industry, the new Prime Minister, Hossein Ala,
suggested that a compromise be arranged, in which the
foreign technicians would operate the nationalized industry.
Mossadegh would not accept any compromise.

Mohammad Reza Shah

had approved the Nationalization Law, because Iran could not
remain under the unequal treatment of the AIOC; however,
Mohammad Reza Shah intended that the foreign technicians
should maintain the industry.

Extremists opposed this, and

rioted in the southern oil fields, after which Britain
closed the oil operations on April 15, 1951. 64
The postoccupation years had been characterized by

instability, and this was reflected in the instability of

the successive governments.

Mohanunad Reza Shah ·felt· that

the popular support of Mossadegh would help to stabilize the
government and to affect the changes related to the
63 I b l.' d . , p . 179 •
64Pahlavi,
' M 1.ss1.on
'
'
for My Country, p. 90
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nationalization· of the oil industry.

Mohammad Reza Shah

decided to nominate Mossadegh as Prime. Minister, for Mossadegh
had said that he would implement the important reforms needed
to improve the lifestyle of Iranians.

Thus, on April 29,

1951, Mossadegh became Prime Minister, and asked for two
months to enforce the Nationalization Law. 65
In May, 1951, Britain was still willing _ to work out the
oil problem and to recognize the principle of nationalization.
However, Britain wanted AIOC personnel to operate the
industry.

Mossadegh, meanwhile, had devised a Nine Point

Law, which provided for a Board to affect the nationalization
of the oil industry and the expropriation of the AIOC.
Britain maintained that the expropriation of the company
conflicted with the terms of the 1933 oil agreement, for that
concession was not to be broken by unilateral action; rather,
disputed matters were to be arbitrated. 66 The Iranian
government, however, declared that nationalization by law
repealed any agreement with private concerns. 67 With

determination to follow through with nationalization, Iran

formed the National Iranian Oil Com P3-ny (NIOC), in June,
1951; however, the NIOC could not maintain efficient

65sanghvi,
' Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 180
66
Avery, Modern Iran, p. 418. 67 Ibid. , pp. 420-21.

operations in the · oil industry, and the oil revenues
dwindled.
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By July, 1951, severe- economic decline had begun.

In July, 1951, the United States, concerned with the
production of oil, encouraged Iran and Britain to negotiate
and to devise a working formula.

For this· purpose,

Averell Harriman was sent as a special envoy to Iran, and
Richard Stokes represented British interests.

The

negotiations floundered .on the point of the operation of

the oil industry, for, although Britain had conceded the
principle of nationalization and had agreed that AIOC should
be an agent of the NIOC, the AIOC would not concede to the
expropriation of the company's oil installations.

Moreover,

Britain did not want the British technicians · to work under

a contract · with NIOC, for Britain wanted the employees'

contracts with AIOC to remain in effect, with mainly Britons
maintaining the operation of the oil industry. 68
The negotiations failed, apparently, because Mossadegh
would not agree to any terms, except complete control of the
oil industry by the Iranian government, for Mossadegh was

determined to crush Britain's position in Iran, despite · the

adverse effects upon Iran's economy.

Mossadegh wanted

recognition of Iran's right to nationalize the oil industry
and to expropriate, with compensation, the AIOC.

Therefore,

68Alan w. Ford, The An lo- Iranian Oil Dis ute of 1951g
p
1952 (Berkeley: The University o f Ca l'f
i ornia Press, 1954 ,
p:g6, cited by Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 214.
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no compromise would have been acceptable to him, not even
the fifty-fifty proposal offered by Britain, an agreement
which probably would have prevented the economic collapse
which followed.

The July negotiations and the dispute

inflamed heightened emotions and incited riotous
demonstrations by National Front supporters as well as Tudah
supporters.
By September, 1951, there appeared to be no hope of
reaching a compromise in the oil dispute.

Therefore, the

actual nationalization of the oil industry came into effect,
with the expropriation of the AIOC.

Although Mossadegh felt

victorious over the assertion of Iran's position, Britain
had not relinquished all hope of regaining its role in the
Iranian oil industry.

Following the breakdown of

negotiations, Britain appealed to t�e International Court

of Justice (ICJ ) · on the basis of the provision for
arbitration in the 1933 oil agreement.

Mossadegh did not

recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ, however, and Britain

then submitted the matter to the Security Council of the
United Nations, where it was debated in October, 1951. 69
For its part, the United Nations decided to await the

International Court of Justice's decision on the position of
an international organization in the oil dispute.
69Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, pp. 92-93.
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than idly wait for a decision, Britain initiated several
measures to apply economic pressure to Iran, such as freezing
Iran's sterling balance, and canceling British licenses to
export certain materials from the United Kingdom to Iran. 70
While such measures were an inconvenience for Iran, they were
somewhat alleviated by the Soviet Union's exporting items
to Iran.
The most drastic British technique, however, one which
effectively crushed Iran's oil industry at that time, was
Britain's cutting the market for Iranian oil.

Britain had

informed possible buyers of Iranian oil that anyone
purchasing oil from NIOC would be sued for knowingly
possessing stolen goods, for Britain had warned them that the
oil belonged to the · AIOC.

Since the oil tankers would not

accept Iranian oil, and Iran owned no oil tankers, Iran could

Consequently, Iran received no revenue
from the 01· 1 in
. dustry. 71 The revenue from the 01· 1 in
. dustry
not export its oil.

remained lost until 1954, after Mossadegh was no longer
Prime Minister.

Due to the loss of oil revenues, the Seven

Year Plan for Development collapsed.
The collapse of the oil industry adversely affected
Mossadegh's position, for, as the situation worsened, the
7 o Sanghvi,
. . Aryamehr : The Shah of Iran, p. 191
71Marlowe, Iran, pp. 94-95.
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members of the Majlis· became more open in their disapproval
of Mossadegh's policies.

In May, 19 52, the Majlis rejected

the National Front's candidate for its president.

In July,

19 52, Mossadegh told Mohanunad Reza Shah that as Prime Minister,
he could not maintain order unless he was given plenary
powers for six months.

Mossadegh wanted to rule by decree

without consulting the Majlis, and he wanted the position
of Minister of War, which would give him control of the
armed forces.
such powers.

Mohanunad Reza Shah refused to grant Mossadegh
Consequently, Mossadegh resigned on July 16,

1952, and was replaced by Ahmad Qavam.

Due to the

demonstrations that occurred, however, the Shah asked Qavam
to resign and Mossadegh was reappointed.

The Majlis then

went along with Mossadegh's request for plenary \ powers, as
the deputies had been intimidated by the rioting crowds.

At

about the same time, the International Court of Justice
returned its decision that it had no jurisdiction in the oil
dispute between Iran and the AIOC, which Mossadegh regarded
as a persona1 vie
. tory.72
Nonetheless, Mossadegh's "victory" meant further
political and economic decline for Iran, for no reversal in
the oil shutdown would be forthcoming.

Mossadegh's plenary

powers were indeed wide-ranging, for he took charge of the
72Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 95.
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Ministry of War, and he ruled by decree in such areas as
banning strikes by government workers, placing restrictions
on newspapers, and declaring martial law.

In October, 1952,

Mossadegh cut Iran's relations with Britain, while in
January, 1953, he directed the Majlis to dissolve the Senate.
In addition, Mossadegh obtained a six month renewal of his
plenary powers, and he dissolved the Supreme Court.

Next,

Mossadegh initiated a referendum on the question of
dissolving the Majlis, during which the people were
·
73
·
for disso
'
1ution.
·
in
· to voting
· ' dated in
· timi
Real support for Mossadegh was dwindling, however, and
by spring, 1953, a split had occurred in the National Front.
A number of former Mossadegh supporters, notably Ho�sein Maki,
Mozaffar Baqai, and Abolqassem Kashani, defected from the
National Front.

With the defection of these leaders, a

number of their followers became anti-Mossadegh.

Indeed, in

February, 1953, a crowd rioted before Mossadegh's house,
causing him to take refuge in the Majlis building. 74

Mossadegh was not completely abandoned, however, for those

who naively thought that Mossadegh's prime concern was
73Marlowe, Iran, p. 98.
74 cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 277 , 280.
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ridding Iran of foreign imperialists, continued to s�pport
h.1m. 75
As opposition to Mossadegh grew, and support for him
declined, the role of the Tudah Party in relation to Mossadegh
became significant.

Mossadegh and the Tudah Party shared

mutually ambivalent feelings toward each other.

The

initial relationship between the Tudah· Party and Mossadegh
was one of animosity.

The National Front had adopted an

anticommunist policy in order to attract American aid, a
policy which turned the Soviets and the Tudah Party against
Mossadegh and the National Front.76 For its parti the
United States had told Mossadegh to amend the oil dispute
before increased aid would be given.

This rejection

strained America's relationship with Mossadegh, and as that
relationship became increasingly strained, Mossadegh's
relationship with the Tudah Party became less so.

By July,

1952, Mossadegh had relaxed the restraints on the banned
Tudah Party, and the government reduced the ban on,communist
activities.

In a like manner, t�e Tudah press had eased its

criticism of Mossadegh following July, 1952.
Although the legal ban on conununist activities still
existed, it was �ot enforcied, and the Tudah Party took
advantage of the relaxed restraints.
75 Ib'd
1 . , p. 280.

The Tudah Party

76 Ibid., p. 222.
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utilized front organizations for open activityj while the
party itself worked underground. 77 The Tudah Party then
adopted a more revolutionary program, which included the
.increased training of military cadres, for the Tudah leaders
had ultimate plans of usurping power, and the military
network of the party was to play a vital role. 78 . The Tudah

had actually infiltrated the Iranian military, and maintained
an organized milit�ry network until the fall of Mossadegh.

In order to gain influence in Iran, the Tudah Party pretended
to support Mossadegh's nationalist policies; however, the
Tudah Party did not actually acknowledge the National Front
as an ideological partner.

The Tudah was only using Mossadegh

as a step to reach its own goals.

The Tudah Party wanted to

destroy Iran's Western ties and to have Iran aligned with
the Soviet Union.

To do so, the Tudah Party intended to take

advantage of the chaotic conditions in the government, and
the anti-Western aspects of Mossadegh's nationalism. 79
Indeed, Mossadegh's relaxation .of anticommunist restraints

had facilitated the expansion of the communist organization,

and had allowed the Tudah Party to advance closer to its
goal.
77 zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, . p. 16 7.
78 Ibid. , p. 177.
79 Ibid. , p. 190.

1 34
One of the main reasons for Mossadegh's relaxation of
restraints on communis.t activity was his belief that greater
freedom for communist activities in Iran would prompt the
United States into providing more aid to Iran in an effort
to prevent Mossadegh from turning to the communists.

On

May 28, 195 3, Mossadegh implied, in a letter to
President Eisenhower, that without increased American aid,
Mossadegh would have to turn to the.communists for aid.
Mossadegh was unsuccessful in his attempt to alter the policy
of.the United States, for, in a return letter of June 29,
1953, President Eisenhower rejected his request, and declared
that Iran must determine its own foreign and domestic
policies in.the best interest of the country. 80 Eisenhower's
reply resulted in a further decline of Mossadegh's popularity,
for the Prime Minister's inability to acquire funds for Iran
was exposed.

Mossadegh became increasingly dictatorial, and

somewhat paranoid, as exhibited by his living in the Majlis
building for refuge, for he feared that.he might be .
. ted. 81
assassina
One of Mossadegh's goals had been to undermine the
authority of the Shah.

In this regard, Mossadegh had

designated a committee in the Majlis to determine ways to
80
, Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 22 3-24.
81
'. Avery, Modern Iran, p. 436.
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limit the Shah's power as Commander in - Chief of the Armed
However, the Majlis would not consider such a
tactic. 82 Mohammad Reza Shah realized that Mossadegh hoped
Forces. ·

to overthrow the Shah and to destroy the Pahlavi Dynasty.
Iran was declining into greater political and economic
instability and action was needed to prevent further decline
at the hands of Mossadegh.

The impetus to action came with

the apparent illegality of a referendum initiated by
Mossadegh to formalize the dissolution of the Majlis in
August, 1953. 83 On August 13, Mohammad Reza Shah issued a
decree dismissing Mossadegh and naming General Fazlollah
Zahedi as Prime Minister.

Mossadegh would not accept the

decree, and he arrested the messenger who delivered it.

Such

actions initiated the coup d ' etat by the · Army and· the people
against Mossadegh, and in support of Mohammad Reza Shah.
Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen left for Baghdad, then flew
to Rome.

Mohammad Reza Shah explained that it had been

prearranged that' if Mossadegh used force to resist the
decree, Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen would leave the
country, in order to force Mossadegh and his force to " show
their real allegiances, 11

84

and thereby aid in defining the

82Cottam,
.
Nationalism in Iran, p. 281.
83 zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 199.
. M 1ss1on
" .
for My Country, p. · 104
Pahlavi,

84

opinion of the Iranian people .

It would, in effect, . give
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Iran an opportunity for a true referendum on the country's
support for Mohammad Reza Shah .
On August 16, 1953, General Zahedi led royalist retired
Army officers against Mossadegh's tank-guarded estate.

The

attack was unsuccessful, and was followed by two days of
demonstrations and riots, much of which was incited by the
Tudah Party .

At that point the Tudah was involved in

pro-Mossadegh demonstrations .

However, on August 19, the

Tudah-inspired mobs turned against Mossadegh and the Tudah
members were instructed not to be involved . 85 The communists
had abandoned Mossadegh, for they realized that there was
very little genuine support for Mossadegh, and that he would
be defeated .
The Army, loyal to Mohammad Reza Shah, resumed its

fight, reclaimed areas of Tehran, and at the same time,

segments of the Iranian people joined the Army in the fight
against Mossadegh .

The people wanted to depose the

dictatorial Prime Minister- who had ruined Iran's economy and

had allowed the communists to reorganize and gain influence
in the country .
rule Iran .

The Iranian people wanted their Shah to

For this goal they were willing to risk their

lives and fight Mossadegh's forces . · The Army and the
85Avery, Modern Iran,
p . 439 .
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people captured Mossadegh, and on August 22, 1953, .
Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen returned to Tehran and to
the rejoicing of the Iranian people. 86
Mossadegh was tried, convicted, and imprisoned, and
was then placed under village arrest.

Through the trials,

the inner nature of Mossadegh's period was revealed,
including the infiltration of six hundred Tudah officers
into the Iranian Armed Forces, as well as the Tudah plan to
eliminate Mossadegh once he had overthrown the Pahlavi
Dynasty and establish a communist regime.

It has been noted

that the communists deserted Mossadegh because of the uprising
against him, for the determination of the Iranian people to
fight against Mossadegh made the Tudah members realize that
Iran was not a ripe target for a communist takeover. 87 With
the ending of Mossadegh's period, the ban on the Tudah Party
and communist activity was strictly enforced, with the
imprisonment of many communist leaders and party members.
The characterization of the August, 1953 , revolution

as a coup d'etat of the Army and the people has been prefaced
by some observers with a claim that the overthrow of

Mossadegh was made possible by the · involvement of the
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

One widely

86 sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 210.
87Pahlavi,
' '
' M 1ss1on
for My Country, p. 105
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circulated account of such alleged involvement was an article
written by Richard Harkn�ss and Gladys Harkness in the
. · Post. 8 8 The article proposed that the
Saturday Evening
overthrow of Mossadegh was initiated by CIA officials who
paid local agents to induce Iranians to fight against
Mossadegh.

Although the alleged involvement of .the CIA was

a controversial and unclear matter, a more careful observation
of the events would reveal that the Harkness and Harkness
article had distorted the facts, and was filled with ·
" puerile innuendoes. 11 89

The allegations in the Harkness and Harkness article
have been refuted, and, although it was possible that some
local leaders may have been p�id to fight against Mossadegh,
the great number of Iranian people who joined the fight
surprised General Zahedi, and those people were not paid to
Those Iranians were determined to crush Mossadegh,

fight.

a.long with any possibility of having a communist government
in Iran.

Moreover, the Harkness and Harkness article erred

in no� recognizing the spontaneous development of the events

of August 19, 19 53, for, " Mossadegh could not have been

Richard Harkness and Gladys Hark�ess, " The Mysterious
Doings of the CIA, " The Saturday Evening Post, November 6,
19 54, pp. 66-6 8 , cited by Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, .
pp. 2 2 7 - 2 9 .
88

89

cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 229.
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overthrown if s ignif icant e lements of the population had not
lost fa ith in hi s leadership . 11 9 0

Mohanunad Re za Shah dealt

with the allegations by s tating that .it wa s pos s ible that
payments could have been made in some cases .

However ,

Mohanunad Reza Shah believed that the spontaneous partic ipation
of such a large number of Iranians in the f ight aga inst
Mos sadegh indicated that those who j oined the fight were not
paid to do so .

Mohanunad Re za Shah noted that loyal men ,

women , and children risked their lives to overturn Mos sadegh ,
an_d that money could not have been an inducement to make· them
ri sk their l ive s .
nationalism . " 9 1

The people were inspired by " indigenous

The period of the Mos sadegh premiership wa s overwhelmingly
an unstable time in Iran .

The po litical and economic

ins tability was mainly the result of the disruptive pol icies
of Prime Minis ter Mos sadegh and his stubborn re fusal to
compromise , even in the interest of Iran .

Mo s sadegh had

brought about the nationalization o f oil , de spite · the
warning s of the Shah and oil experts that Iran was not then
capable of mainta ining the oil industry .

The resultant

economic deterioration a ffected the pol i tical and soc ial
s ituation , and brought about greater frustration and
9 o ibid . , pp . 2 2 7 , 2 2 9 .
91

f or My Coun t ry , p . 1 0 6
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instability.

Mossadegh had planned to use the world's need

for Iranian oil · as a bargaining weapon in inducing Britain
to agree to his terms.

However, Mossadegh had misj udged the

situation, for the world soon adj usted to operating without
Iran's oil.

Moreover, Britain would . not agree to Mossadegh's

terms, and retaliated against Mossadegh's nationalization
through economic pressures.
Mossadegh was mainly concerned with securing power for
himself, and was not greatly occupied with the stabilization
of Iran, although he had promised Mohammad Reza Shah that
such would be his goal as Prime Minister.

Mossadegh,

however, adopted destructive policies in foreign and domestic
matters.

Mossadegh actually wanted dictatorial powers, and

he used various tactics to attempt to undermine the authority
of the Shah.

In his quest for personal power, Mossadegh

sought to make the Shah reign, not rule.

Mossadegh's

struggle for power adversely affected the stability of Iran.
The intensity of Mossadegh's attempts to undermine the
authority of the Shah and to gain personal power led to the
collapse of political and social stability by August, 1 953,

at which point a revolution of the Army and the people

removed Mossadegh from power and reestablished the stabilizing

authority of Mohammad Reza Shah.
Another trend in Mossadegh's policies which adversely
affected the stability of Iran was the relaxation of
· restraints on communist · activities.

Because of the relaxed
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conditions, the Tudah Party became well organized during
Mossadegh's period, and it gained strength in the midst of
the political and social chaos caused by the economic · decline
and confusion following the nationalization of oii. 92
Mossadegh's relaxation of restraints against communist
activities made it possible for Tudah members to infiltrate
the military, which brought the communists · closer to their
ultimate goal of taking over the government of Iran.
Although Mossadegh would not work openly with the Tudah
Party, for he feared such an alliance would shatter his
support, Mossadegh did deal with the Tudah and relax
restraints upon them. 93 The Tudah Party was thereby able
to work more openly in demonstrations and riots against the
political and social structure of Iran, thus, increasing the
intensity of the un�table - situation in the country.

Such

activities were an added impetus for the people of Iran to
fight against Mossadegh in August, 1953, for they feared the
Tudah would become overly powerful, and the Iranian people
were determined that they did not want a Tudah government

coming into power.

Mossa�egh hoped to use the scare of Communism as a
bargaining tool to obtain more American aiq.

Indeed, this

92 11 Man of the Year: Challenge of the East, " Time,
January 7, 1952, p. 20.
9311 Mossadegh's Role in the Events of 1951-3 in Persia, "
.
Central Asian Review, IX, No. 3 ( 1961} , 305.
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was a negative policy of " strength through weakness, 1 1 4

characteristic of Mossadegh's term.
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Mossadegh's negative

policies did not work, however, and the United States would
not be prodded into fulfilling Mossadegh's requests.

This

loss of bargaining power, along with the other fiascoes of
Mossadegh's term caused the Prime· Minister to lose · a good

deal of support.

The prime reasons for Mossadegh's fall,

however, were his quest for personal power and his disregard
for the interests of Iran.

Mossadegh's power-seeking

.policies caused economic collapse in Iran, as well as
increased political and social instability.
T.he return of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi on August 22,

1 9 53, was a joyful day for Iranians.

A new era began for

Iran, an era in which Mohanunad Reza Shah strengthened his
position such that he was able to rule effectively and not
merely reign.
In sununary, the period between· 1941 and 1 9 53 was
characterized by political, economic, and social instability
in Iran.

The occupation of Iran by Allied forces in 1941

marked the beginning of an era of instability in the

country, for the actual independence of Iran was hampered by

the domination of the country by Britain and the Soviet· Union.
94

· " Mossadegh-Prophet or Buffoon, " New York Times,
September 28, 1952, Sec. VI, p. 16.
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Furthermore, the economic and social problems brought to
Iran with occupation were destabilizing elements of the war
years.

An additional threat to Iran's stability was

exhibited in the Soviet influenced separatist movement of
Azarbayjan in 194 5, which, if . it had lasted, would have
resulted in Azarbayjan becoming a satellite of the Soviet
Union, and in further Soviet domination over other provinces
in Iran.

Iran was able . to oust the Soviets in 1946 through

effective bargaining and the support of Iran's Western
allies, which revealed a degree of strength on the part of
Iran.

During the period 1941-1953, there were intermittent

resurgences of communist activities, which comprised a major
destabilizing force in Iran.

Following the August, 1953,

coup d'etat, however, the communist movement was quelled

through , the strict . enforcement of the ban on communist
activities.

The climax of instability during that period

arrived with the rise of Mossadegh, whose destructive
policies, especially his policy on oil nationalization,

brought increased economic collapse as well as political
and social instability in Iran.

With the fall of Moss�degh

in August, 1953, Mohammad Reza Shah began an effective
revival of political and economic stability in Iran.

CHAPTER IV
THE RULE OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH, 1953-1973
The return of Mohammad Reza Shah on August 22, 1953,
was a time of rejoicing in Iran; moreover, it marked a
turning point in the country.

Mohammad Reza Shah realized

that, i� the interest of stabilizing his regime and the
country , the Shah must effectively rule, not reign while
other forces interfered with the control of the co�ntry.
In order to establish himself as the undisputable ruler,
Mohammad Reza Shah needed to strengthen his position such
that his rule would not be challenged by the destabilizing
forces of the communists and the National Front extremists .
The Shah utilized a number of methods in strengthening and
stabilizing his rule and the country between 1953 and 1962.

By 1962, the gradual process of strengthening and stabiliz ing

the Shah's rule was _ virtually completed with Mohanunad Reza

Shah's success in launching and carrying out his land

reform program, which had been opposed by several powerful
elements in the country.

In 1963, the "Revolution of the

Shah and the People" was initiated, and the reforms brought

about during the decade of the Revolution, . under the ·

stabilizing influence of Mohammad Reza Shah, served to

stabilize the political, economic, and social spheres in Iran.
144
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Mohammad Reza Shah built the strength of his rule with
political, ec;:onomic, military, and social means.

The support

for the Shah was �trengthened in October, 1953, by the Shah's
resumption of the distribution of the Royal Estates to the
peasants who worked the land, a step which formerly had been
disrupted by Prime Minister Mossadegh. 1 The Royal Estates

included about two thousand villages, all · of which were to be
redistributed to the peasant cultivators.

Mohammad Reza Shah's

distribution of the Royal Estates elicited a favorable
response from the peasants and others favoring the
redistribution of land to the peasant� who worked on the land.
One of the methods used to increase the stability of the
Shah ' s regime was to weaken the destabilizing forces of
opposition.

In this regard, anticommunist (anti-Tudah) and

anti-National Front campaigns were important in crushing the
influence of those opponents of the Shah's regime.

Following

the August, 1953, coup d'etat, a number of National Front
leaders were arrested and several were imprisoned ; 2

Regarding the anticommunist campaign, the prosecution of
the illegal communist movement was intensified following

the

1 954 d iscovery o f Tudah · infiltration in· the military. 3
1Peter Avery,, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965),

p. 44 3.
2

Donald N. Wilber, . Contemporary Iran (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) , p. 147.
3sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley:
University o� California Press, 1966) , p. 209.
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The s tability of

the Shah's regime was h eightened 

through the repression of subversive organizations which
Mohammad Reza Shah noted, are restrained by other free
nations also in the interest of security. 4 Through the
suppression of the opposition forces, the organization of
the National Front was scattered by the mid-1950s.

However,

the National Front supporters managed to form a secret
organization called the National Resistance Movement. 5

Thus,

the National Front, though weakened, survived and managed
to carry on opposition to the Shah's regime, apparently
because the government was more tolerant toward the National
Front supporters than toward the Tudah members.
By 1955, the organization of the Tudah Party was ·
effectively dispersed, for there was no tolerance for the
outlawed communist movement. 6 Mohammad Reza Shah explained
that in dealing with ex-communists, punishment was enforced
for traitors and murderers, while other ex-communists "who
have repented and begged to serve their country and king 11 7

have been permitted to do so, for Mohammad Reza Shah

4 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mis.sion for My Countri
(New York: McGraw-Hill, . 1960), p. 2 09.
5wilber, Contem12orary Iran, p. 148.
6 zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 208.
7Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 129.
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maintained that such a policy of social justice was the
"fundamental key in combating internal communism. 11 8
Other effective instruments in suppressing the
subversive opposition forces were the reorganized loyalist
forces of the military and the Security and Information
Organization ( Sazeman Ettelat Va Amn�at Keshvar), referred
to as SAVAK. 9 SAVAK was the special department for security
in Iran.

SAVAK functioned as one of the Shah ' s instruments

for maintaining internal security and stability by checking
"any activities directed against the State, 11 1 0 whether such
.
activities were by Iranians or foreigners. SAVAK was
responsible for monitoring and eliminating communist
activities in the country.

Mohammad Reza Shah explained

that as long as subversive communist activities persisted
in Iran, SAVAK would be necessary, for the Shah was
determined to prevent destabilizing . activities by

8Ibid. , p. ·1 3 0 .
9James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran { Columbus, Ohio·:
Charles E. Merrill, 1 972) , p. 13 9 . ,:·
sAVAK is frequently compared to similar agencies
in the United States and most other countries.
Mohammad Reza Shah has explained that other countries have
several organizations designed to check activities directed
against the State (such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency in the
United States). In Iran, the operation is more concentrated,
for SAVAK is the main organization which perf9rms this role
in the country. Ian McIntyre, "Men of Power: The Shah of
Iran, " The . Listener, December 5, 1 9 7 4 , p. 7 2 3 .
10

.
subversives.

11
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SAVAK was effective in · rooting out many

subversives, and continues its duties in Iran.
The military forces have been a viable in�trument in
countering subversive activities, and a source of strength :
and stability for Mohammad Reza Shah's regime.· The military
has consistently supported Mohammad Reza Shah, enhancing and
strengthening · his position.

The military's support · added to

Mohammad Reza Shah's confidence in his position as effective
ruler. 12
The military forces were expanded and better equipped
during the 1950s to assist them in effectively maintaining
internal security and defense.

The expansion of the military

was made possible by the improved financial situation brought
about by American aid and by the resumption of revenues from
the oil industry in 1954.

Indeed, prospects for economic

development depended upon settling the oil dispute with
Britain and upon obtaining financial assistance from the
United States.

While aid had come to Iran in 1952 under

President Truman's Point Four Program, . financial and

technical assistance was increased after the · fall of
Mossadegh.

The increased assistance was significant

11 11 0il, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " Time,
November 4, 1974, p. 34.
12Hafez F. Farmayan, " Politics During the Sixties: A
Historical Analysis, " Iran Faces the Seventies, ed. Ehsan
Yar-Shater (New York: Praeger , 1971) , p. 89.
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considering the earlier · rejection of Mossadegh's request for
increased aid in. June, 1953.

The continuation and increase

of financial and military assistance was welcomed in Iran
because such aid helped Iran to overcome its financial
13
deterioration, caused by the oil dispute.
The United States was willing to increase its aid to
Iran in . order to encourage economic development and
stability, and in this regard, to prevent the Soviet Union
from promoting its influence in Iran.

Indeed, the United

States had been alarmed by the apparent communist influence
during Mossadegh's period.

Therefore, the U. S. government

decided to provide· increased economic assistance to
Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, for the assistance would
strengthen Mohammad Reza Shah's regime and Iran's economic
situation and thereby decrease communist influence. 14 In
providing economic and military assistance, the United States
had replaced Britain as the main adversary of Soviet
15
interests toward Iran.
Initially, the United States had
intended to assist Iran in maintaining a military force ·

designed for keeping internal security in Iran; however,
13Pahlavi,
'
for My Country, p. · 130
'
' M 1ss1on
14John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1963), p. 102.
·
15Wilber, Contemporary
· Iran, p. 195.
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Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to expand the armed forces into a
large, well equipped military for stability and defense.
Mohammad Reza Shah utilized the American financial aid, and
military training and equipment, in developing the strength
of Iran ' s military.
In addition, . Iran was able to utilize the resumed

revenues f r om the oil industry.

In August, 1953, Iran

agreed to resume_ negotiations for the settlement of the oil
dispute with Britain.

The September, 1954, agreement

replaced the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with·an
international oil consortium composed of American, British,
French, and Dutch companies, with the National Iranian Oil
Company and the Iranian government as owner of the
concessions and all oil produced. 16 The agreement granted
to the international oil consortium the rights of exploration
and sale of oil from a limited zone, for a period of
twenty-five years with the option for renewal for three
Iran was to receive one-half of the oil
income . before taxes. 17 The economy of Iran was revived

five-year periods.

through the oil - revenues, which were used, along with the

American aid, for economic development and reorganization

16Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 107.
17Ramesh Sanghvi, Ar amehr : The Shah of Iran (New York:
Stein and Day, 1968), p. ;44.
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of the military forces.

This provided for greater stability

in Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, wh�ch was a cumulative ;
ongoing process throughout the decade following the Shah's
return in August,

1 9 53.

The strengthening of Mohammad Reza Shah's position as
the effective ruler of Iran during the

1 9 50s'

corre�ponded

with the Shah's building up the strength and stability of
the country.

One policy which served to enhance Iran's

position was the Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism,
which Mohammad Reza Shah developed gradually following

1 9 53.

Mohammad Reza Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism, as
opposed to Mossadegh's destructive policy of negative
nationalism, was defined as, "devotion to, or advocacy of,
national interests or national unity and independence. 11 1 8
Mohammad Reza Shah explained that Positive Nationalism
promotes "maxi�um political and economic independence 11 1 9 in
accord with the interests of the country, including freedom
to conclude alliances which support the interests of Iran.

Mohammad Reza Shah realized that the traditional policy of

passive neutrality would not suffice in the modern world ,

for Iran's experience in World War II proved tha t declared

neutrality would · not necessarily protect Iran from world
18
19

Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p.
Ibid • ..

1 25.
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conflicts.

Consequently, Mohammad Reza Shah decided that

the country must rely on true "nationalist sentiments, " 2 0
that is, the true interest of the country, which included
utilizing those foreign skills and services which would not
impede Iran's independence or interests.
The policy of Positive Nationalism was apparent in
Iran's decision to join the Baghdad Pact (referred to as
CENTO after 1958), in October, 1955.

In this respect, the

interest of Iran was served in the alliance with the
neighboring countries and Britain against possible Soviet
aggression.

Iran deliberated over joining the regional

pact ; however, several factors prompted Iran ' s decision to
join.

Among them, Mohammad Reza Shah felt that the Baghdad

Pact was one source · of protection against aggression,

through . military and cooperative international security� 21

The feeling that such security was needed was underscored by
President Gama! Nasser's statement that were Turkey attacked
by the Soviet Union, Nasser would allow the Suez Canal base

to be reactivated ; however, he would not do so if Iran were
attacked . This motivated Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. 22
Another motivating force was the United States, which
encouraged Iran to join the Baghdad Pact, for, althqugh the
20
22

rbid. , p. 126.

21 Ibid. , p. 3 0 6.

E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition (New York:
American Universities Field Staff, 1968) , pp. 210-11 .
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United States was not a member of the Pact, the United States
supported the concept of a regional defense pact.

Moreover,

the United States contributed to the financial support of
the Pact.

In this regard, military and civil advisors in

Iran felt that Iran would receive ·increased economic and
defense assistance from the United States if Iran joined the
Baghdad Pact. 23
Another factor which prompted Iran . to join the Baghdad

Pact was Mohammad Reza Shah's realization that passive
neutrality was not an effective means of defense. 24 In this
regard, a nation could not expect to remain untouched by
world issues and conflicts ; consequently, alliances would be
needed to· guarantee assistance in the event of aggression
on the part · of an enemy.

The history of Soviet designs

toward Iran presented ..an image of a risk-filled future· and
possible Soviet· interference.

For its part, the Soviet Union

protested that the Baghdad Pact was aggressive, and that
Iran should not join.

Iran did not wish to provoke the

enmity of the Soviet Union, for that would have conflicted
with Mohammad Reza Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism.
Therefore, in a 1956 meeting with Nikita Krushchev in ·

Moscow, Mohammad Reza Shah explained that the · Bagh,dad Pact

·
·
·
23Sanghvi, Aryamehr:
The Shah of Iran, p. 249.
24T. Cuyler Young, " Iran in Continuing Crisis, " Foreign
Affairs, XL, No. 2 {1962), 291.
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25
was a nonaggressive " collective defense against aggression .11 ·
In addition, while Iran did hold a friendly attitude toward
the Soviet Union, Iran could not dismiss the history of
Soviet aggressive moves . ·

M9hammad Reza Shah, however,

assured Krushchev that, as Shah, he would not allow Iran to
26
:' t Union.
'
'
take aggressive
steps toward th- e Sovie
In Iran the National Front supporters were · opposed to

Iran's membership in the Bagq.dad Pact, for they considered
the organization to be an . Anglo-American device for

controlling Iran's government . · In addition, as·opponents of
Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, the National Front supporters
also opposed institutions or policies which strengthened the
Shah's regime .

In view of the strength which membership

in the Baghdad Pact provided Mohammad Reza Shah's government·,
the National Front supporters had an additional - reason for
opposing Iran's membership in · the · Pact . 27 The main issue

concerning the Baghdad Pact was Mohammad Reza Shah's belief

that, as a deterrent to Communism and aggression in the
area, . the Baghdad Pact served Iran's interests . 2 8 Such a
policy was in keeping with Positive Nationalism .

In

addition, Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact served to
25

' Mission
'
'
Pahlavi,
for My Count ry, p . 120

26 Ibid .

27Richa�d W . Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh· Pr�ss, 1964) , p . 31 .
28Pahl. avi,
'
'
' · M ission
for My Country, p . 121
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strengthen Mohammad Reza Shah's regime in Iran,.and Iran's
position in the region.
Another development which strengthened.Iran's position
was the 1959 Mutual Aid Agreement between Iran and the
United States.

The Mutual Aid Agreement·also affected the

attitude of the Soviet ·union. toward Iran.

The Soviets were

oppo�ed to Iran's concluding the agreement with the United
States, as they had opposed the Baghdad Pact, for the Soviets
said that such agreements appeared to be directed against
the Soviet·Union.

In order to counterbalance Iran's

membership in the pacts, the Soviet Union projected a
friendly attitude and suggested that Iran conclude a
nonaggre�ion pact of thirty to fiftt years, with the Soviet·
Union.

Iran did not accept.

However, the Soviet·Union

eased the practice of broadcasting and publishing propaganda
against Iran, in an effort to affect better relations between
the two countries.

In this regard, the Shah accepted the

Soviets' invitations to visit the Soviet Union, and he did
so in 1961 and 1965.29 While an.atmosphere of peacef�l
coexistence prevailed between· Iran and the Soviet Union,
there remained the traditional sense of distrust toward
Soviet intentions, considering the Soviets' .former interes.t,,
29Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, pp. 216-17.
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in Iran's oil fields, . as well as the Soviets' interest in
warm water ports. 30
In the late 1950s, the Iranian government · was concerned

about corruption in Iran's official circles.

In order to

eliminate corrupt activities, an anticorruption campaign
was launched in 1958.

The campaign tried to curtail

practices in which Parliamentary deputies rendered decisions

on issues solely on the. basis of their own personal interests
or gains.

In addition, the campaign tried to eliminate

deputies'
. acceptance of bribes by requiring government

officials to file reports on their income and properties. 31
A central concern in the stabilization of Iran was the
economic development of the country.

In this regard, the

Seven Year Plans for Development under the Plan Organization
were important.

While the First Seven Year Plan had

collapsed due to the lack of funds following the cessation
of the oil industry in 1951, the resumption of the oil
industry in 1954 brought the opportunity to implement a

· Second Seven Year Plat>- for Development.

In 1956, the - Second

Seven Year Development Law gave the Plan Organization

authority in developing agricultural and industrial
production, mining, communications, and other fields.

The

30sepehr Zabih, " Iran Today, " Current History (February,
1974), p. 66.
31Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 476-78.
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Second Seven Year Plan was not allocated all of the oil

revenues, but was given 60 percent ; in 1959, . a set annual
allocation · was established.

There were a number of successful

projects carried out by the Plan Organization between 1956
and 1962, which raised the Gross National Product 6 percent
a year. 32 In 1962, the Third Development Plan began with a
goal of increasing economic growth · and social development.
While the - Development Plans c�ntributed to the improvement
of �hysical, social, and economic conditions in Iran, . the
1

programs for development were possible only as a result of
the resumption of oil production, for the revenue from the
oil was the source of funding for the Plan Organization.
The years following the resumption of the oil industry
were prosperous for Iran, for the country benefited from

the· oil - revenues, American ·aid, economic development, and

improved internal stability and security.

Amidst the

apparent prosperity, however, · arose a number of economic
problems caused by the rapid economic growth.

For example,

a number of the economic problems of the late 1950s and

early 1960s were : a high rate of inflation, high real estate
prices due to land speculation, uncontrolled credit causing
cases of bankruptcy, a great deal of imported luxury items
affordabl� only by the wealthy, and continuous· tax evasion
32wilber, Contemporary Iran, pp. 174, 177.
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by many influential people.
in foreign loans.

In addition, there was a deficit

The problems were largely the result of

the lack of management and direction of the rapid economic
growth, for the government needed to apply controls which
would direct the · economic growth toward beneficial goals for
the country.

That is, the country needed an · economic
stabilization program. 33
The United States was concerned about Iran's economic
situation.

Therefore, the United States made· Iran's

receiving additional aid conditional upon the country's
implementation of an · effective economic stabilization
program. 34 In 1961, an economic stabilization program was
introduced under the direction of Prime Minister Ali Amini.
The program inc luded steps to conserve foreign exchange,
such as restrictions on importing luxury items and on travel.
abroad. · Iran proved that it was capable of implementing
financial stabilization, and the United States assisted Iran
in . this endeavor with sizable loans . 35 By July, 19 61, the
' ' had passed. 36
economic
' crisis
33Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis, " pp. 280-81.
34Avery, Modern Iran, p. 491.
.
35Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis, " p. 281.
36 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 494.
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While the economy was in . the. process of stabilization,

there were other problems which needed to be dealt with in
the · country.

The main problem was the need for agricultural

reform, for the landowners·had not followed Mohanunad Reza
Shah's example of selling the land to the peasant cultivators.
The central problem in Iran's agricultural system was the
land tenure, which was similar to that of medieval feudal
systems ; that is, the landowner controlled the land as well
as the peasant cultivators who lived and worked on the ·
land.

The reform of the agricultural system was to be of

paramount importance.

Moreover, �he process by which

agricultural reform came about under Mohanunad Reza Shah's
leadership, was to demonstrate clearly that Mohanunad Reza Shah
had attained a position of strength as the effective leader
of his country.

.
Mohanunad Reza Shah had always believed that in order

for Iran to become a truly modern and developed country, the
traditional system of land tenure, which had been in

existence for many centuries, needed to be reformed. · In the

traditional system, a relatively small number of landlords

owned most· of the arable land.

In this respect j 56 percent

of the cultivated land was held by 1 percent of the

population ; of this land 33 percent was held by large .

proprietors who compromised one-fifth of the agricultural
population, while 10 to 12 percent of the cultivated land was
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held by small landholders.

Moreover, the landlords also

controlled the villages and the peasant cultivators.

In

addition, most large landowners did not live on their land;
rather, the large absentee· landlords often lived in the
towns and delegated the management of the property to village
bailiffs.

The absentee landlords had little interest in

the welfare of the peasants or the development of agriculture.
For their part, the peasant cultivators, who received a
share of the crop for their livelihood, lived at subsistence
level, and were unable to save due to low crop yield and
their indebtedness to the landlords and others. 37 The
traditional system of landownership benefited the large
landowners, while the peasants suffered.

The system . had

persisted because the large landowners held not only wealth .
and social prestige, but also political influence and power
.
in the country. 38 The influence and power of the large

I

landowners was possible because the Parliament was largely
made up of landowners or deputies who were controlled by the

landowners.

In addition, the wealth of the large . landowners

also provided them with prestige and influence.

Thus, a

strong force was required to alter the landownership system
37w. B • . Fisher, The Cambrid e Histor of Iran, Vol. I,
.
¥
The Land of Iran ( Cambridge : Cam�ridge University Press,
1968), pp. 68 6-87.
38 Ann K. s . Lambton, " Land Reform and the Rural
Cooperative Societies, " Iran Faces the Seventies, . ed.
Yar-Shater, p. 9.
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which was detrimental to the majority of Iran's agricultural
population.
The force needed to reform the· system was
Mohammad Reza Shah.

The Shah had distributed his Royal

Estates to the peasant cultivators, making them the owners
of their own land.

The Shah had hoped that other landowners

would follow his example and sell their lands to the
peasants.

However, the landowners were not willing to sell

their lands, which they considered a source of wealth and
influence.

In the interest of those living on the· land, and

the modernization of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah was determined
to reform the agricultural sector.of the country.

It has

been observed that, "the transfer of ownership from the·
landlords to sharecroppers is essential to the political
stability and economic progress of underdeveloped
countries. 11 39

Thus, the introduction of land reform would

have been a step toward strengthening the framework of Iran's:
agricultural society, because the peasant cultivators would
become independent of the landlords' dominance.and they
would be more productive citizens as owners of their own
In another sense, simply redistributing the land would

land.

not, in itself, have been enough to improve the conditions
of the peasants, for other reforms in the peasants' lifestyle
39

Wi'lber, Contemporary Iran, p. 180
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were also needed in order for the· peasants to learn to manage
their own lives and the productivity of their land. �O

For

example, the peasants needed to be freed from the political
·dominance of the landlords and from dependence upon the
landlords for loans and material ·needs. 41 In this respect,
Mohammad Reza Shah introduced a number of reforms·which not
only affected the system of land tenure, but affected the
economic, social, and political elements of Iranian society
as well.
Mohammad Reza Shah's first step was to secure the
passage of a land reform bill.

In December, 1959, the Shah's

plan was formed into the Law on the·Limitation and Reform:of
Landed Property, which was designed to limit landowners'
estates to one village of farming area, . and to allow the·
government to purchase the excess land and to sell it to the·.
peasant cultivators. 42 The concept was opposed by the
l�ndlords.

Consequently, in May, 196p, the landlord

dominated Majlis rendered the Bill meaningless through
several· amendments which favored the landlords.

For example,

landlords were given the right to transfer their property
40Norman Jacobs, The Sociolo

of Development (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 1ll
41 I b'd
1 . , p. 145 •
42 Sanghvi,
· Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, .p. 266
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to their heirs within two years of the. enactment of the
Land Reform Bill; also, the landlords were allowed to sell
their land at their own price before the law came into
effect. 43 With such amendments, . the purpose of the Land
Reform Bill would not prevail.·

The situation was a test between the influence of the
landlord dominated Majlis and the strength of the Shah.

The

outcome proved that the Shah was the strong leader needed by
Iran, for the Shah exercised his constitutional powers to
overcome the opposition.

In accord with the constitution,

Mohammad Reza Shah dissolved the Majlis on May 9, 1961.
Following this, Prime Minister Amini's Cabinet approved the
original Land Reform Bill in January, 1962.

Minister of

Agriculture Hassan Arsenjani was to direct t�e implementation
of the land reform.

Many of the opponents of the land refonn

realized that the Shah's position was firm, and they
surrendered their fight. · Others, however, maintained their
opposition to the plan, while still others were skeptical

about the government's ability or determination to implement
the land reform program. 44
The land reform was carried out in segments of the

country during different time periods, not simultaneously
4 3 Ibid. , pp. 165-6 6.
I

44 Ibid. , p. 267.
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throughout the country, because of the shortage · of trained
land reform personnel.

Despite such operational problems,

the first stage of the land reform was successfully carried
out beginning in March, 1962.

The success was possible

because the plan for the redistribution of the land was
uncomplicated; that is, the landowners could retain one
whole village, or, since a village was traditionally divided
into six units (dang) , a landowner could retain six separate
dangs from different villages, and the excess land was to be
bought by the goverrunent and sold to the peasants working
and living on the land.

Since the peasants became the

owners of the same plot of land they had been living on, the
complications of surveys were avoided.
Large landowners and tribal landowners attempted to
thwart the goverrunent's land reform program.

In November,

1962, a land reform official was murdered in the province of
Fars, where there was resistance to the land reform.
Consequently, the goverrunent accelerated the land reform

program in Fars, and took action against the resisters.

Such

action made the opposition in the other districts less
resistant to the land reform. 4 5 Although many landowners
attempted to evade· the land reform provisions, the program
4 5Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties :· A Historical
Analysis, " p. 102.

was carried out with relatively few disruptions.
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16 5
In

January, 1962, the Land Reform Law initiated the breakdown
of political and social power of large . landowners, because
the landowners ' traditional symbol of wealth and power, their
large land holdings, had been redistributed.

Moreover, their

influence in the Majlis had been cut . because the peasants,
free of the dominance of the landlords, would no longer
allow the former landlords to control the votes of the
peasant population.

Although the Land Reform Law would be

submitted to the next Majlis, it was believed that no Majlis
would revoke the Land Reform Law because the people would
not elect those who stood for privileged treatment of the
· 47 Indeed, the Shah and his government, not
landed elite.
.,
the traditional landed class, were to receive the support

..

of the masses •

In retrospect, the period between 1953 and 196 2 was a
time during which Mohammed Reza Shah coo�dinated his sources
of support and concentrated upon strengthening his position

as the effecive ruler of Iran, steps which were taken - in the

interest of his country.
through several means.

The Shah's position was strengthened

To summarize, important among. these

46 Lambton, "Land Reform and the Rural Cooperative
Societies, " p. 22.
47wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 188.
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were the suppression of the subversive forces of the
opposition, the reorganization and expansion of the Security
and Information Organization (SAVAK) as an instrument for
security and the elimination of subversive activities, and
the expansion of the military, which was loyal to
Mohammad Reza Shah.

Another aid in stabilizing the Shah's

regime was the increased revenues from the resumption of oil
production, for these revenues improved the financial
situation in Iran.

In addition, aid from the·united States

in the· form of finances, as well as military equipment and
training, assisted Mohammad Reza Shah in strengthening the
economic base and military forces which supported his regime.
Throughout the 19 50s, the Shah progressively strengthened
his position as the effective ruler, such that by the end
of the decade, Mohammad Reza Shah was undisputably the
unchallenged ruler of Iran.

The proof of Mohanunad Reza Shah's

firm position was established in 1962, for the Shah overcame
the opposition o·f landlords who opposed the land reform

program.
The process of strengthening Mohammad Reza Shah's rule
was a source of stability for the country, for, as. the
effective leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah became more
apparent, a sense of security and stability began to emerge
in the formerly unstable country.

With the stabilization

of the Shah's pos,ition, Mohammad Reza Shah was able to

introduce policies which contributed to the stabilization
process in the country.
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For example·, the Shah's policy of

Positive Nationalism enabled him to deal with other countries
and carry out policies at the international level in the
interest of Iran.
Pact in 1955.

In .this regard, Iran joined the Baghdad

In 1959, Iran concluded a Mutual Aid Agreement

with the United States, which provided additional security
for Iran's position.

Internally, Iran's position was improved

and strengthened through the implementation of the
Development Plans, which served to increase Iran's industrial
and agricultural output.

In addition, the 1961 economic

stabili zation program provided the necessary controls for
management of Iran's economy, which had been in an
inflationary, mismanaged condition.

The most significant

internal policy which initiated the effective reform and
modernization of Iran was the land reform program of 1962. ·
The reform reversed the traditional agricultural · system in ·

which th� large landowners control 4e�lthe land as well as
the peasants, for the reform began the redistribution of
the land.

The agricultural ·system then developed into one

of small landowners controlling their own land.

The

government aided the new peasant landowners through the
establishment of agricultural cooperatives which provided
credit for the new landowners, as well· as necessary materials.

The beginning of land reform was the beg_inning of the
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modernization of Iranian society, in particular, the
traditional social structure, for it abolished the ancient
system of landownership, . and provided the new peasant

landowners 'with added incentive for increased agricultural
productivity.
One year after the Land Reform Law had initiated the
first stage of land reform, a National Congress of Peasants
was held in Tehran.

At the Congress, on January 9, 1963,

Mohammad Reza Shah announced that he would place these six
reforms before the people in a referendum: redistribution
of land among the peasants, nationalization of forests and
pasturesj sale of shares in government factories, profit
sharing for workers, the enfranchisement of women, and the
formation of the Literacy Corps. 48 On January 26, 1963,
the referendum was held, and over 99 percent of the votes
49 Since
. favor of the reform po 1icies.
· '
·
were in
Mohammad Reza Shah had gone to the people for the approval
of the revolutionary reforms, the implementation of these

reforms is · referred to as "The Revolution of the Shah and
the People. "

In another sense, . it is called the "White

Revolution, " "Revolution" because the programs wiped away

the old institU:tions and brought in new ideals, and "Whit·e 11
48 Gregory Lima and others, The.Revolutionizing of Iran
(Tehran: International Communicators Iran, . 1973) , p. 17.
49 Ibid. , p. 19.
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because the programs were· carried out without bloodshed. so
The reforms of the referendum were · indeed revolutionary for
a developing country.

The spirit of the Revolution

inspired the Iranian government and people to such an extent
that in 1964, three additional reforms were · introduced: the
Health Corps, the Reconstruction and Development Corps, and
the Courts of Equity.

In 196 7, three other reforms - were

introduced: the nationalization of water, urban and rural

reconstruction, and ·administrative and educational reforms.
The enthusiastic and successful implementation of the reforms
has gained the title the "Decade of the Revolution" for the

period between 196 3 and 1973.
While the maj ority of the Iranian people backed the
policies of the Revolution, there were continued segments of
opposition.

The main sources of opposition were large

landowners, tribal leaders, religious leaders, and the
National Front.
the reforms.

Each group had its own reason for opposing

The large landowners did not wish to relinquish

their large landholdings, nor the wealth and influence which

land symbolized.

The tribal leaders resented governmental

authority, especially that of land reform personnel, . being
exerted in tribal areas, for the tribal leaders felt that

50Central Insurance of Iran, Decade of the Revolution,
.
1963-1973 (Tehran : Central Insurance of Iran, 1973) , p. v.
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they held exclusive authority over their tribal lands.

The

religious leaders did not want the land reform to apply to
the religious endowments (waqfs) and they did not want
women to have the right to vote.

The National Front

supporters and leftists who opposed the government opposed
the government's land reform, and gave as their reason,
disapproval of the way that the land reform had been
legislated and carried out. 51
The opposition demonstrated its disapproval of the
government's reforms through riots following the January,
1963, referendum.

The most drastic steps taken by the

opposition forces were in 1965.

In January, 1965, Prime

Minister Hasan Ali Mansur, who solidly supported the Shah's
reforms, . was assassinated.

The assassin was captured and

he revealed the conspiracy of the Islamic Nations' Party
(Hizb-i Melal-i Islami) for an uprising against the
government.

In April, 1965, another conspiracy resulted in

an attempt to assassinate : the Shah by a guard of the Shah's

Marble Palace; the guard was killed in the incident.

The

impact of the two occurrences resulted in a reorganization

of the security system, with a determination to suppress

subversive forces which were a threat to national security � 2
51rbid. , p. 22.
52Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical
Analysis, " pp. 111-12.
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The opposition was unable to frustrate the "Revolution
of the Shah and the People, " for the opposition had
underestimated the strength of the government and
Mohanunad Reza Shah's determination to carry out the reforms.
In addition, the opposition had underestimated the mass
support of the reforms.

Moreover, the opposition had

overestimated its own cohesive strength, . which in fact was
not strong. 53
Popular enthusiasm for the reform was exhibited in the
September, 1963, Parliamentary elections, which for the first

time were · held on the same day throughout the country.

The

popularity of the Shah's Revolution, and in ef fect, the
defeat of the opposition, was proven by the nature of the
elected deputies, for two female members were elected, in
re-cognition of the revised status of women in Iran.

Moreover, no great landlords and very · few · clerics were
elected. 54
Each of the reform measures contributed to the

cumulative success of the "Revolution of the Shah and the
People, " in its strengthening and stabilization of Iranian

economic, political, and social spheres.

The land reform

53Lima and others, The Revolutionizing of Iran, p. 29.
54Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical
Analysis, " p. 108.
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policy was the first and most significant point, for the
reform broke the traditional· landlord-peasant relationship ·
and gave the peasants a more · responsible place in the

society.

The second stage of the land reform program was

passed· in January, ·. 1963.

The purpose of this stage was to

provide for those peasants living on the land which the

landlords had chosen to retain under the first stage of land
reform. 55 The peasants appreciated the Shah's providing them
with- ownership to their land.

Indeed, the peasants felt as

though they had been reborn, for they became their own
masters. 56 The ownership of the land by the peasants

provided a greater incentive ·to the peasants, and, with · the
introduction of modern agricultural equipment, agricultural
production increased.
Another reform was the nationalization of the forests
and pastures.

Mohammad Reza Shah believed that through the

nationalization of these resources, all Iranians would
benefit from them.

In· this · regard , the . government

established conservation programs designed to develop the
productive use - and preservation of the natural resources
of forests and pastures. 57

55 central Insurance of Iran, . Decade of the Revolution,
1963-1973, p. 10.
56Lima and others, The Revolutionizing of Iran, p. 41.
57Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, The White Revolution
(Tehran: Kayhan Press . [n. d. ] ), pp. 46, 58 .
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The Third reform of the January, 1963, referendum was
the sale of shares in state owned factories.

The main

purpose· of this reform was to provide landowners, who sold
their holdings in the course of land reform, with financial
credits, for the landowners were · able to use their capital in
industrial enterprises by buying the factory shares. 58 The

sale of factory shares also aided the development of

industries, and thereby improved Iran's economic base.
An additional reform was profit sharing in industry for
workers, and improvement · in conditions of labor.

Profit

sharing provided that employers provide a share of the net
profit of the factory, or another reward, for the workers,
based upon increased production or reduction in costs or
waste. 59 In this regard, Mohammad Reza Shah wanted the
industrial workers· to feel the same sense of having a part
in, and a responsibility to, the economy and the society,
as · the new landowning peasants felt. 6 0 With . this reform,

the workers took a greater interest in the factories'
production, and . there were improved labor relations.

The

interest which the government took in the conditions of the

workers actua�ly helped to increase the support which . the

58 Ibid. , pp. 6 6 -6 7.
·
·
.59Central Insurance of Iran, . Decade of the Revolution,
1963-1973, p. 55.
6 0Pahlavi, The White Revolution, pp. 79-80.
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workers and trade unions gave to · the , Shah's government, . for
they realized that the improvements were · brought about by
Mohammad Reza Shah's government. 61
Another far reaching reform of the referendum was that
providing women with· the right to vote and to stand for
Parliament.

Mohammad Reza Shah felt that this was an

important reform, for it provided women with equal status
to men.

Moreover, the enfranchisement and greater

participation of women in social, political, and economic
matters would contribute. grea·tly to the reconstruction of
Iranian society.

Greater participation of women in the

society would be essential in the modernization and
development of the country. 62
Another of the reforms which was vital to the development
of Iran was the· campaign to eliminate illiteracy, primarily
through the creation of the Literacy Corps.

The Literacy

Corps was composed of high school graduates, eligible for

the draft, who fulfilled their service· by teaching in remote ·
villages.

In this way, villagers who were· otherwise out of

the range of regular schools were ab�e to acquire primary

education.

As a result of the Literacy Corps, . the illiteracy
'
.
' fican
'
tly. 63 The L1' teracy Corps
rate · began to dec1ine
s1gn1
61 Ibid. , pp. 84-85.
63 Ibid. , . p. 108.

62 Ibid. , p. 100.

brought an educational revolution to the villagers and .
introduced the desire to obtain additional education .
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The

effectiveness of the Literacy Corps contributed _to the
strengthening of Iran by bringing education to a greater
percentage of the rural population .

The Literacy Corps also

inspired a greater sense of cooperation on the · part of the

rural population toward the central government, for the rural
people realized that the government in Tehran was concerned
about the development of the rural society .
The original six reforms were augmented in 1964 with
three additional reforms .

Two of these reforms created

corps - similar to the ·Literacy Corps .

One such corps was the

Health Corps, which was designed to extend improvements in
public health to the rural villages .

The other corps was

the Reconstruction and Development Corps, which was
responsible for completing the reforms introduced by land
reform . 64 In this regard, the Reconstruction and Development
Corps was to assist the villagers with agricultural

improvements, through mechanized and modernized methods .

These two corps provided improvements in the living

conditions and productivity of the villages, and the

villagers came to feel enthusiastic support for the
64Ibid . , pp . 126, 132-134 .

governmental corps · which had helped them to achieve these
.
ts. 65
improvemen
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The third reform of 1964, was the creation of Courts
of Equity.

These were special courts formed of local village

leaders acting as judges in minor local cases.

The Courts

of Equity freed the villagers of the unnecessary and
complicated procedure of taking their minor cases to the
nearest town.

In addition, town and city courts were

relieved of minor cases, which aided in ligthening the
overloaded judicial courts .

This reform gave the villagers

a greater sense of responsibility in their local matters.
Indeed, the Courts of Equity had proven effective; therefore,
similar courts, called Adjudication Courts, were established
in the towns in order to relieve the burden of the judges
in the towns. 66
In 1967, three additional reforms were added to those
in progress.

One such reform was the nationalization of

water resources in Iran.

Since water was a scarce and

precious resource , . it seemed appropriate for the government
to create the Ministry of Water and Power, which was directed
·
67
to protect and conserve the natural resource of water.
65Ibid. , p. 137.
66central Insurance of Iran, Decade of the Revolution,
1963-1973, pp. 119-22.
67Ibid. , p. 133.
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Another important reform was that of National

Reconstruction for both . rural and urban development.

This

reform dealt with the problem of housing, as well as town
planning, the development of rural areas, and urban renewal.
It was also concerned with introducing modern amenities in
Iran. 68
The last reform of the Revolution was that of
administrative and educational reform.

Regarding the

administration, the reform was aimed at promoting honesty
and efficiency in government workers and officials by
eliminating excess staff members, controlling the employment
of new personnel on the basis of the applicant's qualifi
catio�s, and guarding against malpractices. 69 In addition,
less emphasis was to be placed on centralization, and greater
responsibility was to be given to the provinces and cities
for attending to local matters.

In this regard, village,

town, city, township, and provincial councils were created.
The administrative reform was designed as a long term program
to implement improved - and efficient procedures in civil
administration. 70 The civil administration was revised in
the spirit of better management and effectiveness.

The

reorganization of the administrative system was in keeping
68Ibid. , p. 139.
70Ibid. , p. 159.

69 I b 1' d . , p . 150 •
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with the government's role in leading social reform, and in
aiming for economic prosperity, for " efficient administration
of the social and economic programs requires an efficient
administrative system. " 71 The administrative reform involved
concentration on decentralization, which increased the
cooperation of citizens and government in social and economic
programs.

Included was reform of the administrative

organization and employment procedures.

The reform of

education was aimed at providing education for all Iranians,
such that each might develop to fulfill his potential.

Such

aims were designed to produce well developed people capable .
of providing Iran with the needed skilled and trained
personnel.
During the final stages of the introduction of the
twelve reforms, the Fourth Development Plan was introduced.
This Plan was directed toward economic growth as well as
attaining social welfare programs for the people of Iran.
The Plan Organization concentrated on urban reconstruction,

housing, and family life, which corresponded with the reform
policy of National Reconstruction. 72

71shahpour Rassekh, " Planning for Social Change, " Iran
Faces the Seventies, ed. Yar-Shater, p. 16 3.
72Ibid. , pp. 144, 16 2.
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Another development , which occurred in 1973, was the
revision of the 1954 oil agreement with the oil consortium.
Through the new agreement, Iran assumed the complete control
of the· Iranian oil industry, for all oil reserves, as well
as policy making in the industry, were· brought under Iran's
control.

According to Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda,

the 1973 oil agreement represented the full implementation
of the 1951 Oil Nationali�ation Act. 73
In retrospect, the decade from 1963 to 1973 must be
regarded as the period which completed the process of
stabilization for Iran.

The basic instrument for success in

this endeavor was the " Revolution of the Shah and the People :
for each of the reform policies was a step in · modernization

and the majority of the reforms directly or indirectly

improved the lifestyle of the Iranian people, especially
that of the peasants who lived in the underdeveloped· rural

areas of Iran.

Moreover, the reform policies brought greater

enthusiastic support for the regime of Mohanunad Reza Shah,
the leader of the Revolution.

The combined effects of the

individual reforms delivered Iran from the ranks of the

underdeveloped countries, and brought Iran into the role of

a progressive and stabilized nation.

The individual reforms

of the Iranian Revolution combined to form a reform program .
73 zabih, " Iran Today, " pp. 68 -69.
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which affected the social, political, and economic modernization
and stabilization in the country.
In this regard, the nationalization of the natural
resources of water, forests, and pastures provided
conservation and development of these forms of national
wealth.

The sale of government factory shares and profit

sharing plans for workers contributed to improved industrial
production.

The profit sharing program, as well as the

establishment of Courts of Equity and Adjudication Courts, .
and the land reform, provided a sense of responsibility and

greater incentive to work productively to a greater segment .

of the population.

Moreover, these reforms instilled a

greater enthusiasm in the rural and working classes' support
for the Shah ' s regime.

The formation of the Literacy Corps

extended the opportunity for educa�ion, as well as the spirit
of the Revolution to a wide spectrum of the rural population.
Moreover, the Health Corps, and the Reconstruction and·
Development Corps assisted the rural population in the

improvement of their health and living conditions, which

also stimulated greater support for the Shah's regime. · The

enfranchisement of women, . and the resultant changes in the

status of women, provided Iran with a greater percentage of .
citizens participating in the political, economic , and social
processes of the country, which contributed to the development
of Iran.

The urban and rural reconstruction contributed to
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the improvement of urban living conditions and to the
development of rural areas .

The development programs brought

greater modernization to areas of Iran.

The administrative

reform initiated policies for increased efficiency and· less
corruption in the administrative sphere, which are essential
to the management of a stable and developed. country.

The

stabilizing effect of the " Revolution of the Shah and the
People" was exhibited in the greater cooperation between the
government and the population.

The land reform and the other

reforms dir�cted toward improving the lifestyle of the masses
helped to make · the masses the greatest source · of support· for

the Shah's regime, which reversed the traditional situation
in , which the elite were· the strongest supporters of the
regime.

The successful , bloodless implementation of the reforms ·
,,,

of the " Revolution of the Shah and the People" was possible
mainly because of several characteristics of the Revolution
which differentiated Iran's Revolution from those of other
countries.

Firstly, the Iranian Revolution was created by

the Shah and approved by the people in a referendum.

In

this, as well as in other areas, the people placed their

confidence . and support in the leadership of the Shah.

Indeed, the Iranian people - looked to the Shah for " guidance , .

.i

direction and protection. 11 74

18 2 .
This characteristic of Iranian

life corresponded to the· fact that Mohammad Reza Shah was
the stabilizing force throughout the Decade of the Revolution;
moreover, Mohammad Reza Shah has been the stabilizer who

holds together the. various segments of Ir anian society. 75
Mohammad Reza Shah is.. the force which draws together the
separate elements of stability, such as the military, the

civil administration, the economy, the mass support, . and
Western aid, thereby channeling the stabilizing effect of
each element into the stabilization of the country as a

· whole.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the Iranian
Revolution was that the Shah curtailed the power of the
traditional landowning elite, and attended the situation of
those traditionally powerless in the political sphere, that
is, the rural and working classes, and women.

Through such

actions, the leader of the country received his most solid
support from the masses, rather than from the traditional

elite.

Another distinct characteristic of Iran's Revolution

was the many faceted nature of the Revolution, for the
l

reforms , dealt with the modernization and improvement of

social, · political, and economic conditions in the country.
74 Mohammad Ali Toussi, A . Reflection upon the White
Revolution of Iran. (Tehran: State Management Training Centre,
1974) , p. 14 .
75 11 0il, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " p. 33.
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Moreover, the Revolution was · an ongoing process of the
decade, the spirit of which continues in - Iran's present-day
po.1 1c1es. 76
0

I

According to Mohammad Reza Shah, . the initiator and
leader of the Iranian Revolution, one of the most. important
results of the Revolution - has been Iran's ability to "pursue:
a completely independent foreign policy, based solely on
Iran's legftimate · interests, while respecting the rights
of other nations. 11 7 7

Such a development was possible because

of the internal security and the stabilized position of
Irari, which resulted · from the suppression of subversive
forces in the · society.

Mohammad Reza Shah explained that

political, social, . and economic instability were · eliminated ,
by the Iranian R evolution, thereby making Iran "a model of
.- security and political stability. 11 7 8 The Shah noted that
Iran's reformed condition and political and economic
stabilization have provided Iran with an internationally
prestigious and respected position. 7 9 · Such a conclusion has
been attested to by political observers, who concede that Iran

is one of the most reliable (stable) states in the
76

Toussi, A Reflection upon the White Revolution of°
Iran, pp. 1 7 -18.
Pahlavi, The White Revolution, p . 151.
79
78
Ibid. , p. 153.
Ibid. , p. 152.
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Middle East. 8 0 · Moreover, it has been noted that
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Mohammad Reza Shah is the most progressive leader of a
Middle Eastern state in terms of planning for social and
economic growth.

In this regard, . the Shah has been directing

Irari's oil revenues toward the development of an industrial
foundation in the country, for Iranian estimations indicate
81
that Iran's oil resources will be exhausted by 1990.
In essence, the overall goal of the Iranian Revolution
was social and economic development throughout the country,
with an emphasis on the improvement of the position of the
working class and the peasants, and an increase in the·
effectiveness of the State.

Political observers have

concluded that the "Revolution of the Shah and the People, "
has brought Iran a prospering ec�nomy, and social and
.
' f ican
· ' 1 stab 1' l 1' ty. 82 · Sue h deve1.opment is
'
t,
pol 1· t ica
. s1gn1

for Iran's social and political stability is "considered
exceptional in the Middle East region as a whole. 11 8 3
80
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zabih, "Iran Today, �· p. 67.

11 oil, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " p. 33.
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rarmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical
Analysis, " p. 114.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the sources of political instability and
stability which prevailed in Iran during the periods
discussed in this thesis, it has been found that no period
was characterized solely by elements af instability or solely
by elements of stability, except the period of Mohammad

Reza Shah's strengthened rule, from 1963 onward, which has
been regarded as completely stabilized.

In the preceding

periods, however, the various elements of instabili�y and
stability existed in combination, such that, if in . a given
period, there existed a greater number of elements of
instability, that period was basically unstable .

On the

other hand, during periods in which there existed a greater
number of elements of stability, that period was basically
stable.
In retrospect, the period of the Qajar Dynasty,

1779-1925, was basically unstable, for elements of instability

prevailed during that· time.

In this regard, the Qajar period

was marked by a lack of strong leadership, administrative

, chaos, · political influence by reactionary clergy, economic
insolvency, and the practice of �elling concessions to
foreigners for unfavorable returns to Iran.
185

Moreover , the
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period was characterized by the · interference of foreign
powers in Iranian matters, and an overall domination of Iran
by the· Big Powers of Britain and Russia.

The Qajars did not

have a unified army capable of maintaining internal security
or defending Iran.

Thus, in the Qajar period, Iran exhibited

the traits of lack of viable leadership, economic insolvency,
inability to maintain internal security, and largely
unrespected sovereignty by the Big Powers .

The existence .of

the Big Power rivalry in Iran . did allow for a degree of
stability in one respect, for neither Britain nor Russia

would dare to take complete control of Iran while the other
maintained its interest in the country.

In addition, the

concern which the Big Powers had for their interests in Iran
promp�ed them into establishing internal security in their
spheres of influence.
The period of Reza Shah's rule, 1926-1941, was indeed
basically a stable period in Iran, for the conditions of the
time reflected mainly elements of stabili�y.
regard, Reza Shah was a viable leader.

In this

He had established

a unified army which was capable of bringing · about internal
security throughout the · country : he · had rid . the country of

foreign domination and . he had regained international respect
for the sovereignty of the country.

Reza Shah revived the

economy of Iran by initiating economic reforms, by eliminating
most of the foreign concessions, and by obtaining higher
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royalties for Iran from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Although the period of Reza Shah . was primarily a stable

time, World War II produced a destabilizing effect upon Iran,
for Iran did not have the military or diplomatic ability to
defend its neutrality, and thereby uphold its independent
sovereignty.
The early reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 1941-1953,

was basically an unstable period, for under the inexperienced
young Monarch, there was a lack of viable leadership.

The

continued occupation of Iran by the Allies slighted the
sovereignty of Iran.

Moreover, the breakdown · in the economy

following World War I I, the increased communist activities,
the coming to power of Mohammad Mossadegh, and the decline
of the economy following the 1951 .nationalization of the

oil industry, were destabilizing elements.

There were�

however, elements of stability during this period, as
evidenced by Iran's ability to prompt the evacuation of
Allied forces, particularly Soviet forces, and the Iranian .
government's recovery of the separatist province of

Azarbayjan.

Moreover, the British and American backing of

Iran helped Iran to reassert its sovereignty.

The period during which Mohammad Reza Shah began to
strengthen his rule, 1953-1962, and in which he actually

..
achieved an effective
rule, 1963 onward, has been a stable

period.

The viability of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule has been .

achieved through the use of the military, .which has been
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consistently loyal to · him, through the revival of the economy
with the resumption of oil production and American economic
aid, . and through the suppression of the subversive opposition.
Moreover, the reforms of the "White Revolution, " or the
· "Revolution of the Shah and the People, " have brought about

political, economic, . and social improvements in Ir.� n, which

reflect the permanency of the present period of st�bility

in Iran, . and the stability of the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah.
It is the conclusion of this thesis · that Mohanunad Reza .

Shah is the principal stabilizing force who has ·brought about

and maintained stability in contemporary Iran by overcoming

the sources of instability and by consolidating the various
sources of stability into a single focus.

Therefore, an

analysis of the, nature of Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership is
appropriate.
Leadership has been described by Dankwart A. Rustow as
"a process of complex mediation between the leader's
personality, the followers ' expectations, the circumstances
and a set of goals.."1 A conunent on leadership by Max Weber
proposed that · there are social problems that require a single
individual to solve them. 2 These two observations on
1 Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Leadersh�p, "
Philosophers and Kings, . ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (New York:
George Braziller, 1970), p. 20.
2
Ibid. , p. 1 5.
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leadership are relevant to an analysis of the nature of
Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership and to the conclusion that
it was Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership which brought about
political, social, and economic reforms and stability in
Iran.

In accord with Max Weber's proposal on leadership·,

Mohanunad Reza Shah was the single individual required to
solve Iran's problems.
Regarding the conclusion that Mohammad Reza Shah's
leadership was required to solve Iran's problems and to
bring about stability in Iran, . it should not be said that

Mohanunad Reza Shah was absolutely the only person who
possibly could have reformed Iran.

On the other hand, it

should not be said that the reforms were inevitable, that
is, that any leader would or could have brought about the
same results. 3 It should be established, however � that
Mohanunad Reza Shah's distinct leadership abilities, coupled
with the circumstances of the time, made the Shah's
leadership vital to the successful implementation of reforms
in the · country.

A number of characteristics of

Mohanunad Reza Shah's regime have designated the Shah's
leadership as that needed by Iran.

Max Weber proposed that political legitimacy is based
in varying proportions on three elements: tradition, charisma,
3 Ibid. , p. 21.

and rational legality. 4

These criteria may be applied in
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the analysis of the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah.
Regarding tradition, the Iranian people revere and respect
the tradition of the Monarchy which has been an - Iranian
.
.
institution for 2500 years. The Iranian people not only
respect the tradition of the Monarchy, but regard it as an
integral part of their nation and a part of their Shiite
Islamic tradition.

This deep regard for the tradition of

the Monarchy was exhibited in 1925 during discussions about
the possible creation of a republic in Iran.

The idea was

discarded, for there was a great preference for retaining
the Monarchy.

The t�adition of the Monarchy was challenged

a second time in 1953 by - Mohammad Mossadegh who hoped to
establish a republic in Iran.

The Iranian people's strong

regard for the Monarchy was exhibited, however, in a
coup d'etat by the· Army and the people which overthrew
.
Mossadegh and championed the· tradition o� the Monarchy.

The . people wanted the Shah to retain the �eadership of the
country.

Thus, the tradition of the Mo�archy provides a

strong foundation for Monammad Reza Shah's leadership.

The tradition · of the Monarchy encompasses more than -a

simple, preference for a monarchical form of government,
rather than a republic .
4Ibid. , p. 14·.

The Iranian people have traditionally
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looked to their Shah for " guidance, . direction and

protection. 11 5

Indeed, the Iranian people traditionally

expected their Shah to create better systems and to improve
the lifestyle of the people . 6 In this regard, Mohanunad· Reza
Shah has fulfilled the traditional expectations of the

people, and the tradition of the Monarchy has . provided the
Shah with a well-founded basis for his rule.
The awe-inspiring nature of the tradition of the
· Monarchy, as well as the personal characteristics of
Mohammad Reza Shah, have given, to some degree, a charismatic
quality to the position of the Shah.

" Charisma " is regarded

by Max Weber as an extraordinary quality of a person whether
it is actual, presumed, or alleged. 7

In this sense, . charisma

is viewed as a trait or quality that sets a person apart from
ordinary people.

In another sense, charisma is regarded not

as a trait of the leader, but as a perception on the part

of the people who follow him; that is, " a leader's charisma
is in the minds of the followers. " 8 Thus, it is the people's
belief that the leader has special qualities, a form of hero
�Mohanunad · Ali Toussi, A Reflection upon the White
Revolution of Iran �Tehran: State Management Training Centre,
1974) , p. 14.
6Ibid.
7Rustow, " The Study of Leadership, " p. 15.
8 Ibid.
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worship, that contributes to the charismatic nature of a
given leader .
Regarding the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah, the
tradition of the Monarchy is awe-inspiring and charismatic
vis-a-vis the Iranian people.

However, it is not merely the

tradition of the Monarchy which. inspires the people, for
their traditional reverence for the Monarchy has, in the ·
past, been outweighed by their contempt for weak or corrupt
monarchs .

Regarding Mohammad Reza Shah, their is. an aura

of charisma surrounding him as an individual Shah, for his

personal traits and leadership abilities · have a charismatic
effect upon his Iranian supporters .

The Iranian people,

especially the · peasants, view Mohammad Reza Shah as their
deliverer .

This feeling was particularly evident following·

Mohammad Reza Shah's implementation of the land reform and

the other reforms which improved the lifestyle of the people.
In this regard, the charismatic aspect of the relationship
between the Shah and the people exists because "the results
of the leader's actions induce the followers' belief, and

the followers' belief becomes the criterion for charismatic
authority . "9
In this regard, . it is important to note · that the

presence of a charismatic aspect in Mohammad Reza Shah ' s
9 Ibid . , p . 16.
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leadership does not imply that the Shah's leadership rests
mainly upon charismatic authority, for it does not.

In

accord with Weber's proposal that the elements contributing
to leadership are in varying proportions, the charismatic
element is of minor importance to the leadership of
Mohanunad Reza Shah.

Charismatic authority is not the element

which gives the Shah his viability as a leader .

In . this

respect, charismatic leadership relies upon the perceptions
of the leader's followers; therefore, such leadership is
unstable.

Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership, on the other

hand, has proven its stability during Mohanunad Reza Shah's
reign of over thirty years.

In essence, if the charismatic

quality of Mohanunad Reza Shah's regime disappeared with· a
change in the perceptions of the Iranian people,
Mohanunad Reza Shah's rule would, prevail, for his rule is
founded upon more stable elements than charismatic authority.
In this regard, the strength and stability of
Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership emanates from the· element
described by Weber as the rational legality of the rule.

The legality of Mohanunad Reza Shah ' s rule, · his legal right

to rule, originates in the Iranian Constitution, which.
provides for the succession of the Pahlavi Dynasty.

Moreover, the Shah's legal right to rule is enhanced by his
leadership in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy.

Although

there are a number of decision making members in the
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bureaucratic system, such as cabinet members, members of

parliament, and high civil servants, they a11· consistently
defer to the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah.
It has been said that "authority must accomplish its
proper task. "10 Mohammad Reza Shah has fulfilled this
function of leadership.

An essential point is that

Mohammad Reza Shah does not merely reign, he rules.
Moreover, he is not only a ruler, he is a great political
and social innovator.

In this regard, Mohammad Reza Shah

has transformed the traditional political and social
institutions into improved, modernized systems.

The Shah,

through his reforms, . has used military, political, economic,
and social° means to bring about order and stability in Iran
and to transform Iran's traditional institutions into systems
which would benefit the Iranian people, especially those· who
suffered under the traditional lifeways, such as rural
peasants, . urban workers, and women.

Mohammad Reza Shah developed the strength and stability

of his leadership and used these qualities to strengthen and
stabilize Iran.

The Shah's strength and· . stability has come

from his personal leadership abili�ies·, such as initiative,
innovativeness, the ability to cormnunicate with · the people,

.10oankwart A. Rust9w, . "Ataturk as Founder of a State, �·
Philosophers and Kings, ed. Rustow, p. 236.
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the ability to overcome the subversive forces of opposition,
as well as his devotion to the · interests of Iran and the
Iranian people.

Furthermore, the Iranian people have

realized that Mohammad Reza Shah has been concerned with
their interests.

This recognition by the people has provided

the Shah with· wide · support, which . further · enabled the Shah

to implement his reforms.

Two other sources of strength and

stability for Mohammad Reza Shah's regime were the support
of the Army, as �ell as the financial and military aid which
the Shah obtained for Iran from the United States.
In essence, Mohammad Reza Shah's abilities strengthened
and stabilized his leadership and · his reign, and the strength
of his reign plus his innovations brought about stability
and allowed the Shah to implement his reforms.

The

modernization and improvements which the reforms brought to
the lifestyle of the Iranian people and to the economic
and political situation of Iran served to further strengthen
the Iranian people's support for Mohammad Reza Shah's
leadership.

The strength of the Shah's regime, coupled with

the wide support for his rule, allowed for greater stability
of Mohammad Reza Shah's leadership .

Indeed, throughout· his

reign, Mohammad Reza Shah acquired stronger leadership
abilities.

This fact, along with �he expectations . of the

Iranian people and Mohammad Reza Shah's goals for modernizing
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Iran and for bringing about social equality among the classes
and between men and women, created the circumstances in

· which Mohammad Reza Shah's leadership was the necessary
force· in reforming and stabilizing Iran.
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